@article {4254511, title = {The semantics of untrustworthiness}, journal = {Topoi. An International Reiew of Philosophy}, year = {In Press}, abstract = {

We o er a formal treatment of the semantics of both complete and incomplete mistrustful or distrustful information transmissions. The se- mantics of such relations is analysed in view of rules that dene the be- haviour of a receiving agent. We justify this approach in view of human agent communications and secure system design. We further specify some properties of such relations.

}, issn = {1316-5011}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9227-2}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {2057, title = {The Scale Structure of Moral Adjectives}, journal = {Studia Semiotyczne}, volume = {31}, year = {2017}, chapter = {161}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Soria Ruiz, Andr{\'e}s} } @article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9372-0}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {van2012splitting, title = {Splitting and Relevance: Broadening the Scope of Parikh{\textquoteright}s Concepts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {59}, year = {2016}, pages = {173 -205}, chapter = {173 }, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {D:TelAviv2012, title = {Spoiled for Choice?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, year = {2016}, pages = {65-95}, abstract = {

The transition from a theory that turned out trivial to a consistent replacement need not proceed in terms of inconsistencies, which are negation gluts. Logics that tolerate gluts or gaps (or both) with respect to any logical symbol may serve as the lower limit for adaptive logics that assign a minimally abnormal consequence set to a given premise set. The same obtains for logics that tolerate a combination of kinds of gluts and gaps. This result runs counter to the obsession with inconsistency that classical logicians and paraconsistent logicians share.
All such basic logics will be systematically reviewed, some variants will be outlined, and the claim will be argued for. While those logics tolerate gluts and gaps with respect to logical symbols, ambiguity logic tolerates ambiguities in non-logical symbols. Moreover, forms of tolerance may be combined, with zero logic as an extreme.\{\.I}n the baffling plethora of corrective adaptive logics (roads from trivial theories to consistent replacements), adaptive zero logic turns out theoretically interesting as well as practically useful. On the one hand all meaning becomes contingent, depending on the premise set. On the other hand, precisely adaptive zero logic provides one with an excellent analyzing instrument. For example it enables one to figure out which corrective adaptive logics lead, for a specific trivial theory, to a suitable and interesting minimally abnormal consequence set.

}, doi = { 10.1093/logcom/ext019}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:AcLFI, title = {Some Adaptive Contributions to Logics of Formal Inconsistency}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, pages = {309 -333}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @article {wieland2014sceptical, title = {Sceptical Rationality}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, pages = {222{\textendash}238}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {Straser2014, title = {Sequent-Based Argumentation for Normative Reasoning}, journal = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems: Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {8554}, year = {2014}, pages = {224{\textendash}240}, abstract = {

In this paper we present an argumentative approach to normative reasoning. Special attention is paid to normative conflicts, contrary-to-duty and specificity cases. These are modeled by means of argumentative attacks. For this, we adopt a recently proposed frame- work for logical argumentation in which arguments are generated by a sequent calculus of a given base logic (Arieli, CLIMA’2013, pp.69–85), and use an intuitionistic variant of stan- dard deontic logic as our base logic. Argumentative attacks are realized by elimination rules that allow to discharge specific sequents. We demonstrate our system by means of various well-known benchmark examples.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer} } @article {4443783, title = {S\lupecki{\textquoteright}s generalized mereology and its flaws}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {35}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {289{\textendash}300}, abstract = {

One of the streams in the early development of set theory was an attempt to use mereology, a formal theory of parthood, as a foundational tool. The first such attempt is due to a Polish logician, Stanis\unmatched{0142}aw Le{\'s}niewski (1886{\textendash}1939). The attempt failed, but there is another, prima facie more promising attempt by Jerzy S\unmatched{0142}upecki (1904{\textendash}1987), who employed his generalized mereology to build mereological foundations for type theory. In this paper I (1) situate Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s attempt in the development of set theory, (2) describe and evaluate Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s approach, (3) describe S\unmatched{0142}upecki{\textquoteright}s strategy without unnecessary technical details, and (4) evaluate it with a rather negative outcome. The issues discussed go beyond merely historical interests due to the current popularity of mereology and because they are related to nominalistic attempts to understand mathematics in general. The introduction describes very briefly the situation in which mereology entered the scene of foundations of mathematics {\textendash}- it can be safely skipped by anyone familiar with the early development of set theory. Section 2 describes and evaluates Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s attempt to use mereology as a foundational tool. In Section 3, I describe an attempt by S\unmatched{0142}upecki to improve on Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s work, which resulted in a system called generalized mereology. In Section 4, I point out the reasons why this attempt is still not successful. Section 5 contains an explanation of why Le{\'s}niewski{\textquoteright}s use of Ontology in developing arithmetic also is not nominalistically satisfactory.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.917837}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {4443772, title = {Stanislaw {L}e{\'s}niewski: rethinking the philosophy of mathematics}, journal = {European review}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {125{\textendash}138}, abstract = {

Near the end of the XIXth century part of mathematical research was focused on unification: the goal was to find {\textacutedbl}one sort of thing{\textacutedbl} that mathematics is (or could be taken to be) about. Quite quickly sets became the main candidate for this position. While the enterpize hit a rough patch with Frege{\textquoteright}s failure and set-theoretic paradoxes, by the 1920s mathematicians (roughly speaking) settled on a promising axiomatization of set theory and considered it foundational. Quite parallel to this development was the work of Stanislaw Le{\textbackslash}{\textquoteright}sniewski (1886-1939), a Polish logician who did not accept the existence of abstract (aspatial, atemporal and acausal) objects such as sets. Lesniewski attempted to find a nominalistically acceptable replacement for set theory in the foundations of mathematics. His candidate was Mereology - a theory which instead of sets and elements spoke of wholes and parts. The goal of this paper will be to present Mereology in this context, to evaluate the feasibility of Lesniewski{\textquoteright}s project and to briefly comment on its contemporary relevance.

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3171382, title = {The status of functional explanation in psychology: reduction and mechanistic explanation}, journal = {THEORY \& PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {23}, year = {2013}, pages = {145{\textendash}163}, abstract = {

The validity of functional explanations as they are commonly used in psychology has recently come under attack. Kim’s supervenience argument purports to prove that higher-level generalizations have no causal powers of their own, and hence are explanatorily irrelevant. In a nutshell, the supervenience argument forces us to either embrace epiphenomenalism of higher- level properties, or accept Kim’s specific brand of reductionism. However, with the current emphasis on mechanistic explanations, the literature on explanation in psychology has undergone some drastic changes. It could be argued, therefore, that Kim’s argument targets an outdated concept of functional explanations. In any case, these developments warrant a reassessment of the implications of his argument, which is the purpose of the present paper. First, we argue that the metaphysics behind the supervenience argument is incompatible with that of mechanisms. Second, we argue that Kim’s proposed brand of reductionism does not accurately describe the explanatory practices of cognitive science.

}, issn = {0959-3543}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354312453093}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Looren de Jong, Huib} } @article {wieland2013strong, title = {Strong and weak regress arguments}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {56}, number = {224}, year = {2013}, pages = {439{\textendash}461}, abstract = {

In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can in fact take both forms, and clearly set out the logical difference between them. Throughout the paper, I confine myself to metaphysical examples from the early Russell. Only now that we know they are valid can we start to discuss whether they are sound.

}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {Verdee01022013, title = {Strong, universal and provably non-trivial set theory by means of adaptive logic}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {108-125}, abstract = {

In this article, I present a non-trivial but inconsistent set theory based on unrestricted comprehension. The theory is provably non-trivial and strong enough for most of the applications of regular mathematics. This is realized by distinguishing between strong and weak set membership and allowing for the derivation of strong membership from weak membership whenever this is not problematic (it does not lead to paradoxes). This idea of applying rules whenever unproblematic is formalized by means of an adaptive logic.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzs025}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {leuridan2013structure, title = {The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal-Structural Account}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {65}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {717{\textendash}771}, abstract = {

What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this article, I propose a causal–structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher’s unificationist view, and Darden’s theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided, which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study.

}, doi = {10.1093/bjps/axt015}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {de2012short, title = {A short history of small machines}, year = {2012}, abstract = {

One of the most famous results of Alan M. Turing is the so-called universal Tur- ing machine (UTM). Its in uence on (theoretical) computer science can hardly be overestimated. The operations of this machine are of a most elementary na- ture but nonetheless considered to capture all the (human) processes that can be carried out in computing a number. This kind of elementary machine ts into a tradition of {\textquoteleft}logical minimalism{\textquoteright} that looks for simplest sets of operations or axioms. It is part of the more general research programme into the foundations of mathematics and logic that was carried out in the beginning of the 20th cen- tury. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, this tradition was rede ned in the context of {\textquoteleft}computer science{\textquoteright} when computer engineers, logicians and mathematicians re-considered the problem of small(est) and/or simple(st) machines in the con- text of actual engineering practices. This paper looks into this early history of research on small symbolic and physical machines and tie it to this older tradi- tion of logical minimalism. Focus will be on how the transition and translation of symbolic machines into real computers integrates minimalist philosophies as parts of more complex computer design strategies. This contextualizes Turing{\textquoteright}s machines at the turn from logic to machines.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Bullynck, Maarten} } @article {wieland2011sceptic, title = {The Sceptic{\textquoteright}s Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2011}, pages = {359{\textendash}369}, abstract = {

Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Paul Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers{\textquoteright} practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.

}, doi = {10.1080/05568641.2011.634246}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @conference {1859548, title = {Strong paraconsistency by separating composition and decomposition in classical logic}, booktitle = {WoLLIC 2011 Proceedings LNAI Series}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper I elaborate a proof system that is able to prove all classical first order logic consequences of consistent premise sets, without proving trivial consequences of inconsistent premises (as in A, {\textlnot}A\,\unmatched{22a2}\,B). Essentially this result is obtained by formally distinguishing consequences that are the result of merely decomposing the premises into their subformulas from consequences that may be the result of also composing {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright}, more complex formulas. I require that, whenever {\textquoteleft}new{\textquoteright} formulas are derived, they are to be preceded by a special +-symbol and these +-preceded formulas are not to be decomposed. By doing this, the proofs are separated into a decomposition phase followed by a composition phase. The proofs are recursive, axiomatizable and, as they do not trivialize inconsistent premise sets, they define a very strong non-transitive paraconsistent logic, for which I also provide an adequate semantics.

}, isbn = {364220919X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20920-8\_26}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter}, editor = {Goebel, R} } @article {3144328, title = {Supporting design knowledge exchange by converting models of functional decomposition}, journal = {JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING DESIGN}, volume = {22}, number = {11-12}, year = {2011}, pages = {839{\textendash}858}, issn = {0954-4828}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09544828.2011.603692}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {934535, title = {Setting-up early computer programs: D. H. {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC computation}, journal = {Archive for Mathematical Logic}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {123{\textendash}146}, abstract = {

A complete reconstruction of Lehmer{\textquoteright}s ENIAC set-up for computing the exponents of p modulo two is given. This program served as an early test program for the ENIAC (1946). The reconstruction illustrates the difficulties of early programmers to find a way between a man operated and a machine operated computation. These difficulties concern both the content level (the algorithm) and the formal level (the logic of sequencing operations).

}, issn = {1432-0665}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00153-009-0169-8}, author = {Bullynck, Maarten and De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Beckmann, Arnold and Dimitracopoulos, Costas and L{\"o}we, Benedikt} } @article {de2010solvability, title = {Solvability of the halting and reachability problem for binary 2-tag systems}, journal = {Fundamenta Informaticae}, volume = {99}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, pages = {435{\textendash}471}, abstract = {

In this report we will provide a detailed proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2-symbolic tag systems with a shiftnumber v = 2.

}, doi = {10.3233/FI-2010-257}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {1064460, title = {Standards and the distribution of cognitive labour: A model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278{\textendash}294}, issn = {1367-0751}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp058}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @booklet {pittphilsci5074, title = {The Status of Hypothesis and Theory}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

Nowadays, it is a truism that hypotheses and theories play an essential role in scientific practice. This, however, was far from an obvious given in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy. Different natural philosophers had different views on the role and status of hypotheses and theories, ranging from fierce promotion to bold rejection, and to both they ascribed varying meanings and connotations. The guiding idea of this chapter is that, in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy, the terms ?hypothesis???hypothetical? and ?theory???theoretical? were imbedded in a semantic network of interconnected epistemological and methodological notions ? such as ?knowledge?, ?method?, ?probability?, ?certainty?, ?induction?, ?deduction?, ?experimental philosophy?, ?speculative philosophy?, and the like). As these semantic networks changed overtime, the meaning and significance of ?hypothesis? and ?theory? likewise shifted. Without pretence of completeness, this chapter highlights chronologically some of the defining moments in the semantic transformation of these two terms within the context of seventeenth-century natural philosophy.

}, keywords = {Francis Bacon, history of natural-philosophical methodology, Hypothesis, Isaac Newton., John Locke, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, speculative versus experimental seventeenth-century natural philosophy, theory}, url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5074/}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {1217131, title = {The symbolic model for algebra: functions and mechanisms}, booktitle = {Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology}, volume = {314}, year = {2010}, pages = {519{\textendash}532}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The symbolic mode of reasoning in algebra, as it emerged during the sixteenth century, can be considered as a form of model-based reasoning. In this paper we will discuss the functions and mechanisms of this model and show how the model relates to its arithmetical basis. We will argue that the symbolic model was made possible by the epistemic justification of the basic operations of algebra as practiced within the abbaco tradition. We will also show that this form of model-based reasoning facilitated the expansion of the number concept from Renaissance interpretations of number to the full notion of algebraic numbers.

}, isbn = {9783642152221}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15223-8\_29}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Carnielli, Walter A. and Pizzi, Claudio} } @article {Urbaniak2009, title = {Slingshot arguments: two versions}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {4{\textendash}5}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {924546, title = {Strategies: what{\textquoteright}s in a name?}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {287{\textendash}306}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that Hintikka’s notion of ‘strategy’ can refer to proof-heuristic reasoning as well as to methodological reasoning forms. Stating this distinction allows for a better understanding of the notion and for an easier way to tackle the problem of formalization. Contrary to Hintikka’s opinion, heuristic reasoning can be implemented in formal proofs by means of goal-directed proof procedures. Methodological reasoning forms on the other hand can be formally represented by means of adaptive logics.

}, isbn = {9781904987789}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {1098767, title = {{\textquoteright}Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can the men of {K}uang do to me?{\textquoteright}: cosmological confucianism and the development of science}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2008}, pages = {27{\textendash}53}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Dessein, Bart}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Ducheyne2008, title = {Some Worries for J.D. {N}orton’s Material Theory of Induction}, journal = {Philosophia Naturalis}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {37 - 46}, abstract = {

In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton, 2003). I attempt to show (1) that his “principle argument” is based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {386236, title = {Social mechanisms, causal inference, and the policy relevance of social science}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {348{\textendash}359}, abstract = {

The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare.

}, issn = {0048-3931}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Christiaens2007, title = {Some notes on {A}erts{\textquoteright} interpretation of the {E}{P}{R}-paradox and the violation of {B}ell-inequalities}, booktitle = {Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Probability and Axiomatics}, year = {2007}, pages = {250{\textendash}286}, publisher = {World Scientific}, author = {Christiaens, Wim and Czachor, Marek}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Durt, Thomas} } @conference {384497, title = {Study of limits of solvability in tag systems}, booktitle = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper we will give an outline of the proof of the solvability of the halting and reachability problem for 2-symbolic tag systems with a deletion number v = 2. This result will be situated in a more general context of research on limits of solvability in tag systems.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-74592-1}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Durand Lose, J and Margenstern, M} } @article {427293, title = {Supervenience: Its logic and its inferential role in classical genetics}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {50}, number = {198}, year = {2007}, pages = {147{\textendash}171}, abstract = {

Supervenience is mostly conceived of as a purely philosophical concept. Nevertheless, I will argue, it played an important and very fruitful inferential role in classical genetics. Gregor Mendel assumed that phenotypic traits supervene on underlying factors, and this assumption allowed him to successfully predict and explain the phenotypical regularities he had experimentally discovered. Therefore it is interesting to explicate how we reason about supervenience relations. I will tackle the following two questions. Firstly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found for inferring supervenience claims from data? Secondly, can a reliable method (a logic) be found to empirically test supervenience claims? I will answer these questions within the framework of the adaptive logics programme.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {urbaniak2006some, title = {Some non-standard interpretations of the axiomatic basis of Le{\'s} niewski’s Ontology}, journal = {The Australasian Journal of Logic}, volume = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {13{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

We propose an intuitive understanding of the statement: ‘an ax-iom (or: an axiomatic basis) determines the meaning of the only specific constant occurring in it.’ We introduce some basic semantics for functors of the category s{\textfractionsolidus}n,n of Le{\textasciiacute}sniewski’s Ontology. Using these results weprove that the popular claim that the axioms of Ontology determine themeaning of the primitive constants is false.

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {324419, title = {Secularizerende Tendenzen in {I}saac {N}ewtons Onto-theologie}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {98}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {18{\textendash}33}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {360923, title = {Socratic proofs and paraconsistency: a case study}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {80}, number = {2-3}, year = {2005}, pages = {431{\textendash}466}, abstract = {

This paper develops a new proof method for two propositional paraconsistent logics: the propositional part of Batens{\textquoteright} weak paraconsistent logic CLuN and Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic Fv. Proofs are de.ned as certain sequences of questions. The method is grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic.

}, issn = {0039-3215}, author = {Vanackere, Guido and Wisniewski, Andzrej and Leszczynska, Dorota} } @article {332160, title = {Study of fractals derived from {I}{F}{S}-fractals by metric procedures}, journal = {Fractals. {C}omplex Geometry, Patterns, and Scaling in Nature and Society}, volume = {13}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {237{\textendash}244}, abstract = {

It is a well-known fact that when visualizing an IFS-attractor through the chaos game, it is possible that the first points mapped will come closer to but stay visibly different from the attractor. This simple fact will be analyzed in more detail, through visualizations of different aspects of this convergence process. It will be shown that, in applying on every point in a 2D-plane the same sequence of mappings and coloring each point according to convergence distance, neighboring points form structures which resemble the attractor itself. Further, it is in this way possible to generate boundaries of the attractor that vary between small and coarse-grained. Using these results, it will be shown that it is possible to, starting with an IFS-attractor, construct fractals of which this IFS-attractor is a subset.

}, issn = {0218-348X}, doi = {10.1142/S0218348X05002878}, url = {http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0218348X05002878}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {322466, title = {Sieving Out Relevant and Efficient Questions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {189{\textendash}216}, abstract = {

Wisniewksi’s erotetic logic provides us with two slightly different semantic explications of the intuitive concept of “a question arises from a set of declarative premises”. Unfortunately, Wisniewski’s erotetic concepts suffer from the drawback that they allow for the raising of irrelevant and inefficient questions. The aim of this paper is to show that raising such questions can be avoided by changing the underlying logic. Several closely related logical approaches which enable us to eliminate irrelevant and inefficient questions, are presented.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {LeE:ssce, title = {Searching for Singular Causal Explanations: a formal analysis}, year = {2003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {DJDaL:diag, title = {Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {39{\textendash}65}, abstract = {

A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:RMs, title = {A Strengthening of the {R}escher{\textendash}{M}anor Consequence Relations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {289{\textendash}313}, abstract = {

The flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}-the Free, Strong, Weak, C-Based, and Argued consequence relation{\textendash}-are defined in terms of the classical consequences of the maximal consistent subsets of (possibly) inconsistent sets of premises. If the premises are inconsistent, the Free, Strong and C-Based consequence sets are consistent and the Argued consequence set avoids explicit inconsistencies (such as A and \ A).

The five consequence relations may be applied to discussive situations as intended by Jaskowski{\textendash}-the comparison with Jaskowski{\textquoteright}s D2 is instructive. The method followed by Joke Meheus to extend D2 to an adaptive logic, may also be applied to the Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations. It leads to an extension of the Free, Strong, Weak, and C-Based consequence relations. The extended consequence sets are consistent and closed under Classical Logic. Applying the method to the Argued consequence relation leads to a different consequence relation, not an extension. Neither the Argued consequence relation nor its extension appear very interesting in the present application context.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:scaial, title = {Some Computational Aspects of Inconsistency-Adaptive logics}, journal = {CLE e-Prints}, volume = {2}, number = {7}, year = {2002}, pages = {15~pp.}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propo- sitional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. The procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability and may easily be generalized for the propositional fragment of all at adaptive logics. The aim is to articulate a procedure that, if extended to the predicative level, provides criteria for final derivability.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:camp, title = {On some Remarkable Relations between Paraconsistent Logics, Modal Logics, and Ambiguity Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {275{\textendash}293}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some connections between paraconsistent logics, modal logics (mainly S5), and Ambiguity Logic AL (Classical Logic applied to a language in which all letters are indexed and in which quantifiers over such indices are present). S5 may be defined from AL.

Three kinds of connections are illustrated. First, a paraconsistent logic A is presented that has the same expressive power as S5. Next, I consider the definition of paraconsistent logics from S5 and AL. Such definition is shown to work for some logics, for example Priest{\textquoteright}s LP. Other paraconsistent logics appear to withstand such definition, typically those that contain a detachable material implication. Finally, I show that some paraconsistent logics and inconsistency-adaptive logics serve exactly the same purpose as some modal logics and ampliative adaptive logics based on S5. However, they serve this purpose along very different roads and the logics cannot be defined from one another.

The paper intends to open lines of research rather than pursuing them to the end. It also contains a poor person{\textquoteright}s semantics for S5 as well as a description of the simple but useful and powerful AL.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {152596, title = {Subject ingebed? {O}ver het methodologisch individualisme in de sociale wetenschappen.}, booktitle = {De terugkeer van het subject? {R}ecente Ontwikkelingen binnen de filosofie}, year = {2002}, pages = {169{\textendash}179}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, isbn = {90-5867-237-9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Verdonck, Barbara}, editor = {Devos, Rob and Braeckman, Antoon} } @article {152660, title = {Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {259{\textendash}275}, abstract = {

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

}, issn = {0266-2671}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {322170, title = {Secondary qualities in retrospect}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {68}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh{\textquoteright}s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different primary-secondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primary-secondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matter{\textquoteright}s other qualities.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @article {DJ:tabl2, title = {Shortcuts and Dynamic Marking in the Tableau Method for Adaptive logics}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {69}, year = {2001}, pages = {221{\textendash}248}, abstract = {

Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In \cite{DJ:tabl1}, we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the meta-theoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision{\textendash}-the conclusion follows or does not follow{\textendash}-in a very economical way.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:surv-ial, title = {A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {49{\textendash}73}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, abstract = {

This paper offers a systematic review of some central philosophical and technical results on adaptive logics. Quite a few of the results are still in print or forthcoming.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {135139, title = {Scientific revolutions, rationality and creativity}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {109{\textendash}128}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {van1998schoonheid, title = {Schoonheid in de wiskunde: Birkhoff Revisited}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {60}, year = {1998}, pages = {106{\textendash}130}, abstract = {

Everyone is familiar with the measure of beauty that has been proposed by Birkhoff, the famous formula M = O/C. Although I show that the formula in its original form cannot be maintained, I present a reinterpretation that adapts the formula for measuring the beauty of mathematical proofs. However, this type of measure is not the only aesthetic element in mathematics. There exists a {\textquoteright}romantic{\textquoteright} side as well, to use the term introduced by Fran{\c c}ois Le Lionnais. Thus, a more complex proposal of mathematical beauty is presented. Finally and as a consequence, I argue against the dichotomy that associates science, including mathematics, with the beauty of simplicity and that associates the arts with the beauty of complexity. As an example, the work of Oulipo, Raymond Queneau in particular, is briefly presented.

}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {267462, title = {Scientific explanation and the interrogative model of inquiry}, booktitle = {Knowledge and inquiry : essays on Jaakko Hintikka{\textquoteright}s epistemology and philosophy of science}, series = {Poznan Studies}, volume = {51}, year = {1997}, pages = {239{\textendash}259}, publisher = {Rodopi}, isbn = {9789042000803}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Sintonen, M} } @article {184851, title = {Simulating without negation.}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, year = {1997}, pages = {501{\textendash}522}, abstract = {

Although negation-free languages are widely used in logic and computer science, relatively little is known about their expressive power. To address this issue we consider kinds of non-symmetric bisimulations called directed simulations, and use these to analyse the expressive power and model theory of negation-free modal and temporal languages. We first use them to obtain preservation, safety and definability results for a simple negation-free modal language. We then obtain analogous results for stronger negation-free languages. Finally, we extend our methods to deal with languages with non-Boolean negation. Keywords: Expressive power, modal logic, negation-free languages.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, author = {Kurtonina, Natasha and De Rijke, Maarten} } @article {257909, title = {Some problems for {K}itcher{\textquoteright}s unification account of explanation}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {29}, year = {1996}, pages = {441{\textendash}456}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {JD:steering, title = {Steering Problem Solving Between Cliff Incoherence and Cliff Solitude}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {58}, year = {1996}, note = {Appeared 1998}, pages = {153{\textendash}187}, abstract = {

Starting from Nickles{\textquoteright} constraint-inclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @article {van1996strange, title = {The strange case of the missing body of mathematics}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {112}, number = {3-4}, year = {1996}, pages = {403{\textendash}413}, abstract = {

La notion d{\textquoteright}infini est analys{\'e}e en comparant les math{\'e}matiques et la th{\'e}ologie car les math{\'e}maticiens ont pendant longtemps per{\c c}u une relation entre la notion infinie math{\'e}matique et la notion d{\textquoteright}infinit{\'e} de Dieu

}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {257814, title = {Strict finitism as a viable alternative in the foundations of mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {23{\textendash}40}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @incollection {Weber1995, title = {Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction.}, booktitle = {Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation}, volume = {IV}, year = {1995}, pages = {377-387}, publisher = {SicSat}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Blair, J. and Willart, C.} } @article {241629, title = {Socialisatie, sociale controle en sociologische verklaringen van menselijke handelingen.}, journal = {TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN}, volume = {38}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}68}, issn = {0040-7615}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Weber1992, title = {Scientific Explanation}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {49}, year = {1992}, pages = {148{\textendash}154}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {3063666, title = {Scientific explanation, necessity and contingency}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {44}, year = {1989}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:sks, title = {The structure of our knowledge system}, booktitle = {Communication and Cognition. {A}pplied Epistemology}, year = {1987}, pages = {101}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:rssm\&l, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, booktitle = {Reason, Emotion and Music. {T}owards a Common Structure for Arts, Sciences and Philosophies, Based on a Conceptual Framework for the Description of Music}, year = {1986}, note = {

Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}

}, pages = {127{\textendash}143}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Apostel, Leo and Sabbe, Herman and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:rssm\&lcc, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {19}, year = {1986}, note = {Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}}, pages = {135{\textendash}151}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:expert, title = {Static and dynamic paraconsistent logics and their use in expert systems}, journal = {CC-AI}, volume = {3}, year = {1986}, pages = {33{\textendash}50}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:scloa, title = {Some contributions to the logic of action}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {9}, year = {1976}, pages = {347{\textendash}376}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:srrs\&v, title = {Some remarks on the relations between science and values}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {17}, year = {1976}, pages = {13{\textendash}46}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @book {D:studies, title = {Studies in the Logic of Induction and in the Logic of Explanation. {C}ontaining a New Theory of Meaning Relations}, series = {Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, Rijksuniversiteit Gent}, volume = {161}, year = {1975}, publisher = {De Tempel}, organization = {De Tempel}, address = {Brugge}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:KLrir, title = {Some objections to {K}eith {L}ehrer{\textquoteright}s rule {IR}}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {22}, year = {1971}, pages = {357{\textendash}362}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:cpd, title = {Some proposals for the solution of the {C}arnap-{P}opper discussion on {\textquoteleft}inductive logic{\textquoteright}}, journal = {Studia Philosophica Gandensia}, volume = {6}, year = {1968}, pages = {5{\textendash}25}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }