@proceedings {4443830, title = {Rethinking the explanatory power of extended cognition}, year = {In Press}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {vanreconciling, title = {Reconciling Ontic and Epistemic Constraints on Mechanistic Explanation, Epistemically}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, month = {Aug}, pages = {5{\textendash}22}, abstract = {

In this paper I address the current debate on ontic versus epistemic conceptualizations of mechanistic explanation in the mechanisms literature. Illari recently argued that good explanations are subject to both ontic and epistemic constraints: they must describe mechanisms in the world (ontic aim) in such fashion that they provide understanding of their workings (epistemic aim). Elaborating upon Illari’s ‘integration’ account, I argue that causal role function discovery of mechanisms and their components is an epistemic prerequisite for achieving these two aims. This analysis extends Illari’s account in important ways, putting more pressure on ontic readings of mechanistic explanation and providing an answer to the question how ontic and epistemic constraints on mechanistic explanation are related. I argue these point in terms of cases on memory research drawn from neuroscience and research on extinct neurogenetic mechanisms from early nervous systems biology.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10516-014-9243-x}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {4265612, title = {The role of unification in micro-explanations of physical laws}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {79}, year = {2014}, pages = {41{\textendash}56}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of particular facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of laws, more specifically about microexplanations of laws in physics. We investigate whether providing unificatory information has a surplus value in micro-explanations of physical laws. Unificatory information is information that provides ontological unification in the sense defined by Uskali M{\"a}ki. We argue that providing unificatory information may lead to explanations with more explanatory power (we use Jim Woodward’s concept of explanatory power for that) and that it may lead to more strongly supported explanations.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Weber, Erik and Lefevere, Merel} } @article {3152435, title = {Reactive standard deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {117{\textendash}157}, abstract = {

We introduce a reactive variant of SDL (standard deontic logic): SDLR1 (reactive standard deontic logic). Given a Kripkean view on the semantics of SDL in terms of directed graphs where arrows {\textrightarrow} represent the accessibility relation between worlds, reactive models add two elements: arrows {\textrightarrow} are labelled as ‘active’ or ‘inactive’, and double arrows \&8608; connect arrows, e.g. (x1 {\textrightarrow} x2) \&\#8608; (x3 {\textrightarrow} x4). The idea is that passing through x1 {\textrightarrow} x2 activates a switch represented by \&8608; that inverts the label of x3 {\textrightarrow} x4 and hence activates respectively deactivates this arrow. This allows to introduce two modalities: \&\#9633; is the usual KD-modality of SDL and operates on the Kripkean graph where all labels and double arrows are ignored, while \&\#8709; takes them into account. We demonstrate that RSDL1 allows for an intuitive interpretation of ‘ought’. The logic can handle contrary-to-duty cases such as several instantiations of the Chisholm set in a paradox-free way by means of using double arrows and annotations to block and give access to ideal worlds.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs043}, author = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {2079125, title = {Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit?}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {147{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in \&\#353;e\&\#353;elja and Stra\&\#223;er (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.005}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Weber, Erik} } @article {2999523, title = {The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {51{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3063631, title = {Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {83{\textendash}99}, abstract = {

What happens if one applies the "evaluation methodology" of The Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the "problem solving methodology" of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers{\textquoteright} methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan{\textquoteright}s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutins to these problems.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @proceedings {dereasoning, title = {Reasoning with computer-assisted experiments in mathematics}, journal = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2012}, pages = {80-92}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} door Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Allo, Patrick} } @article {raey, title = {Regress Argument Reconstruction}, journal = {Argumentation}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {489-503}, abstract = {

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.

}, keywords = {Argument, Charity, Infinite regress, Interpretation, Reconstruction}, issn = {0920-427X}, doi = {10.1007/s10503-012-9264-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {DeMol2012, title = {Report {\textquoteright}International Conference on History and Philosophy of Computing{\textquoteright} (HAPOC)}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {7-8}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403-413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @incollection {2116243, title = {The rule of quantity by {C}huquet and de la {R}oche and its influence on {G}erman {C}ossic algebra}, booktitle = {Pluralit{\'e} de l{\textquoteright}alg{\`e}bre {\`a} la Renaissance}, year = {2012}, pages = {127{\textendash}147}, publisher = {Honor{\'e} Champion}, abstract = {

The importance of Larismethique of de La Roche, published in 1520, has been seriously underestimated. One reason for the neglect is related to the inscrutable way he is referred to. Buteo and Wallis called him Stephanus {\`a} Rupe de Lyon. Other obscure references, such as Gosselin calling him Villafrancus Gallus have been overlooked by many commentators. His influence can be determined in several works that do not credit him but use problems or definitions from the Larismethique. However, most damaging for its historical assessment was Aristide Marre?s misrepresentation of the Larismethique as a grave case of plagiarism. Marre discovered that the printed work of 1520 by Estienne de la Roche contained large fragments that were literally copied from Chuquet?s manuscript of the Triparty. Especially on the Appendice, which contains the solution to a large number of problems, Marre writes repeatedly that it is a literal copy of Chuquet. However, he fails to mention that the structure of the text of de la Roche, his solution methods and symbolism differs significantly from Chuquet. De la Roche introduces several improvements, especially with regards to the use of the second unknown. We provide an in-depth comparison of some problems solved by the so-called regle de la quantite by Chuquet with those of de la Roche. We further report on the surprising finding that Christoff Rudolff{\textquoteright}s solution to linear problems by means of the second unknown in his Behend vnnd Hubsch Rechnung of 1525 depends on Chuquet and de la Roche. As it is generally considered that algebra was introduced in Germany through Italy this provides a new light on the transmission of algebraic knowledge from France to the rest of Europe.

}, isbn = {9782745323989}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Rommevaux, Sabine and Spiesser, Maryvonne and Massa Esteve, Maria Rosa} } @article {Allo2011, title = {Report 3rd Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {1}, number = {5}, year = {2011}, pages = {6-7}, author = {Allo, Patrick and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {Heeffer2011, title = {The Rhetoric of Problems in Algebra Textbooks from Pacioli to Euler}, year = {2011}, abstract = {

The selection of problems by Euler in his Vollst{\"a}ndige Anleitung zur Algebra displays a great familiarity with the typical recreational and practical problems of Renaissance and sixteenth-century algebra books. A detailed study into the sources of Euler reveals that he copied most of his problems from Christoff Rudolff’s Coss which was first published in 1525 and reissued in 1553 by Michael Stifel. Why would Euler found his popular textbook on algebra on a book published 250 years before? We propose an explanation based on the evolving rhetorical function of problems in algebra textbooks since the Renaissance. We discern six stages in the evolution from abacus problem solving to algebraic theory. The first theory emerged through the extraction of general principles from the practice of problem solving. The algebra textbooks of the eighteenth century close a circle of continuous rhetorical development by using problems for practicing general principles and applying the algebraic language. Euler’s Algebra is a prime example of the new rhetoric of problems still prominent in today’s textbooks.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {1980039, title = {Rules regresses}, booktitle = {AGPC 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {79{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, abstract = {

Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as {\textquoteright}if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p{\textquoteright}? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a {\textquoteright}dilemma of regress and idleness{\textquoteright}, as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.

}, url = {http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {1029910, title = {The Reception of Ancient Indian Mathematics by Western Historians}, booktitle = {Ancient Indian Leaps into Mathematics}, year = {2010}, pages = {135{\textendash}152}, publisher = {Birkh{\"a}user Verlag}, abstract = {

While there was an awareness of ancient Indian mathematics in the West since the sixteenth century, historians discuss the Indian mathematical tradition only after the publication of the first translations by Colebrooke in 1817. Its reception cannot be comprehended without accounting for the way that the new European mathematics was shaped by Renaissance humanist writings. We sketch this background and show with one case study on algebraic solutions to a linear problem how the understanding and appreciation of Indian mathematics was deeply influenced by the humanist prejudice that all higher intellectual culture, in particular all science, had risen from Greek soil.

}, isbn = {978-0-8176-4694-3}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Yadav, B.S. and Mohan, Man} } @incollection {767731, title = {On Relevance Conditions for Asserting Disjunctions}, booktitle = {The Logica Yearbook 2009}, year = {2010}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1848900090}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pelis, Michal} } @article {1096460, title = {Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {165{\textendash}166}, url = {http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner-4(11).pdf}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Gauderis, Tjerk and Gervais, Raoul and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {urbaniak2010response, title = {Response to a Critic (Definability and Ontology)}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {45}, year = {2010}, pages = {255-259}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008, title = {Reasoning with dynamic conceptual frames.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {84-89}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {Urbaniak2008a, title = {Reducing sets to modalities}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society}, volume = {XVI}, year = {2008}, pages = {359-361}, publisher = {Department for Culture and Science of the Province of Lower Austria}, address = {Kirchberg am wechsel}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}, editor = {Hieke, Alexander and Hannes, Leitgeb} } @article {1092888, title = {Regiomontanus and Chinese mathematics}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {87{\textendash}114}, abstract = {

This paper critically assesses the claim by Gavin Menzies that Regiomontanus knew about the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) through the Sh{\`u} sh\={u} Ji\v{u} zh\={a}ng (SSJZ) written in 1247. Menzies uses this among many others arguments for his controversial theory that a large fleet of Chinese vessels visited Italy in the first half of the 15th century. We first refute that Regiomontanus used the method from the SSJZ. CRT problems appear in earlier European arithmetic and can be solved by the method of the Sun Zi, as did Fibonacci. Secondly, we pro-vide evidence that remainder problems were treated within the European abbaco tradition independently of the CRT method. Finally, we discuss the role of recre-ational mathematics for the oral dissemination of sub-scientific knowledge.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {1985316, title = {Relata-specific relations: a response to Vallicella}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {509{\textendash}524}, abstract = {

According to Vallicella{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley{\textquoteright}s Regress{\textquoteright} (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella{\textquoteright}s conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three feature-pairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relata-specificity/relata-unspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be relata-specific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition.

}, issn = {0012-2017}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01167.x}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Betti, Arianna} } @article {weber2008reply, title = {Reply to Daniel Steel{\textquoteright}s “With or Without Mechanisms”}, journal = {Philosophy of the social sciences}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {267{\textendash}270}, abstract = {

In this discussion note I clarify the motivation behind my original paper “Social Mechanisms, Causal Inference and the Policy Relevance of Social Science.” I argue that one of the tasks of philosophers of social science is to draw attention to methodological problems that are often forgotten or overlooked. Then I show that my original paper does not make the mistake or fallacy that Daniel Steel suggests in his comment on it.

}, doi = {10.1177/0048393108315559}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Ducheyne2008b, title = {Review of {F}lorian {E}beling{\textquoteright}s The Sectret History of Hermes}, journal = {Annals of Science}, volume = {66}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {294{\textendash}295}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {D:LiPoS, title = {The Role of Logic in Philosophy of Science}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {47{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Routledge}, address = {London, New York}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Psillos, Stathis and Curd, Martin} } @phdthesis {PhD_Hans, title = {Relevance in Reasoning: The Adaptive Logics Approach}, year = {2007}, month = {May 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {368285, title = {The relevance of a relevantly assertable disjunction for material implication}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {36}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {339{\textendash}366}, abstract = {

In this paper Grice{\textquoteright}s requirements for assertability are imposed on the disjunction of Classical Logic. Defining material implication in terms of negation and disjunction supplemented by assertability conditions, results in the disappearance of the most important paradoxes of material implication. The resulting consequence relation displays a very strong resemblance to Schurz{\textquoteright}s conclusion-relevant consequence relation

}, issn = {0022-3611}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {353368, title = {R{\'e}cr{\'e}ations math{\'e}matiques (1624): a study on its authorship, sources and influence}, journal = {Gibeci{\`e}re}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {77{\textendash}167}, abstract = {

In 1624 a small octavo was published in the French university town Pont-{\`a}-Mousson. It was the first time a reference was made to ‘recreational mathematics’ in the title of a book. This work is pivotal in the history of science and mathematics. It brings together two sixteenth-century traditions, mercantile arithmetic and natural magic, and creates two new ones: recreational mathematics and popular science. The booklet did not abound in new ideas. Several of the recreational problems treated, can be traced back to Babylonian, Greek and Hindu sources and the infatuation with mechanical contrivances dates from Hero of Alexandria. But the fact that the book stands on the crossroad of traditions, its popularity with the natural philosophers of the seventeenth century and its complex history makes it a grateful subject for study. Some of the complexities about the numerous editions and confusing claims about its authorship will be clarified. The author’s direct sources will be exposed. The arithmetical and combinatorial problems were copied from Bachet, problems on practical geometry from Jean Errard. Salomon de Caus was the source of inspiration for problems on perspective, mechanical devices and fountains. Several problems were recipies by Alexis of Piemont from the classic book by Ruscelli. The book was influencial on early seventeenth-century natural philosophers such as Descartes, Mersenne and Leibniz.

}, issn = {1558-8149}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {337658, title = {Reid{\textquoteright}s adaptation and radicalization of Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy.}, journal = {History of European Ideas}, volume = {32}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {173{\textendash}189}, abstract = {

For Thomas Reid, Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s scientific methodology in natural philosophy was a source of inspiration for philosophical methodology in general. I shall look at how Reid adapted Newton{\textquoteright}s views on methodology in natural philosophy. We shall see that Reid radicalized Newton{\textquoteright}s methodology (especially his view on causal explanation) and, thereby, begins to pave the way for the positivist movement, of which the origin is traditionally associated with the Frenchman Auguste Comte. In the Reidian adaptation of Newtonianism, we can already notice the beginnings of the anti-causal trend that would become so popular in the age of positivism.

}, issn = {0191-6599}, doi = {10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2006.02.001}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Urbaniak2006, title = {On representing 2After a brief presentation of Lesniewski{\textquoteright}s notation for 1- and 2-place sentential connectives of protothetic, the article discusses a method of extending this method to n \&\#8805; 3-place sentential connectives. Such a method has been hinted at by Luschei, but in fact, no general effective method of defining such functors has been clearly and explicitly given. The purpose of this article is to provide such a method.

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {683494, title = {Remodeling the past}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {10}, year = {2005}, pages = {47{\textendash}66}, abstract = {

In some of the papers in which she develops and defends the mental modelview of thought experiments in physics, Nersessian expresses the belief that her account has implications for thought experiments in other domains as well. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that counterfactual reasoning has a legitimate place in historical inquiry, and secondly, that the mental model view can account for such "alternative histories". I proceed as follows. Firstly, I review the main accounts of thought experiments in physics and point at some explanatory advantages of the mental model view. Subsequently, I argue that historians cannot dispense with counterfactual reasoning altogether and qualify a number of principled objections against the explicit use of alternative histories for theoretical purposes. Finally, I show that the mental model view can account for such thought experiments in history.

}, issn = {1572-8471}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {326990, title = {Review of {I}. {B}ernard {C}ohen and {G}eorge {E}. {S}mith ({E}{D}s.), The {C}ambridge companion to {N}ewton}, journal = {PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {506{\textendash}508}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {DK:cluns, title = {A Rich Paraconsistent Extension of Full Positive Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, note = {Appeared 2005}, pages = {227{\textendash}257}, abstract = {

In the present paper we devise and study the most natural predicative extension of Sch{\"u}tte{\textquoteright}s maximally paraconsistent logic. With some of its large fragments, this logic, \sys{CLuNs}, forms the most popular family of paraconsistent logics. Devising the system involves some entanglements, and the system itself raises several interesting questions. As the system and fragments were studied by other authors, we restrict our attention to results that we have not seen in press.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof} } @article {324230, title = {The roles of one thought experiment in interpreting quantum mechanics: {W}erner {H}eisenberg meets {T}homas {K}uhn}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {79{\textendash}103}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {VanBouwel2002, title = {Remote Causes, Bad Explanations?}, journal = {The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, volume = {32}, year = {2002}, pages = {437-449}, doi = {10.1111/1468-5914.00197}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {Klijn2001, title = {Robots en Onderwijs.}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {28}, year = {2001}, pages = {249-263}, author = {Klijn, Alex} } @article {291580, title = {The role of ambiguities in the construction of collective theories.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {189{\textendash}214}, abstract = {

The paper presents a formal model for theory development, based on a very intuitive ambiguity-adaptive logic. Apart from its simplicity, the model has some interesting features. (i) It allows for the construction of theories that cannot rely on observational data. (ii) It allows to construct a theory starting from zero, and using a small set of predicates. (iii) The model establishes that there is no real difference between the construction of scientific theories and the development of everyday knowledge.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @incollection {D:clash, title = {Rich inconsistency-adaptive logics. {T}he clash between heuristic efficiency and realistic reconstruction}, booktitle = {Logique en perspective. {M}{\'e}langes offerts {\`a} {P}aul {G}ochet}, year = {2000}, pages = {513{\textendash}543}, publisher = {{\'E}ditions OUSIA}, address = {Brussels}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Grillet, Eric and Beets, Fran{\c c}ois} } @incollection {D:ra, title = {Radicaal Athe{\"\i}sme}, booktitle = {Wat met {G}od?}, year = {1999}, pages = {129{\textendash}162}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} } @article {386238, title = {Rationality in the Discovery of Empirical Laws}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {4}, year = {1999}, pages = {355{\textendash}368}, abstract = {

In this paper I argue against the traditional viewthat in discovery processes there is no place forrational decisions. First I argue that some historicalprocesses in which an empirical law was developed,were rational. Second, I identify some of themethodological rules that we can follow in order to berational when constructing an empirical law. Finally,I argue that people who deny that scientific discoverycan be rational do not understand the nature ofmethodological rules.

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