@article {Pawlowski2017, title = {Paradoxes of informal provability and many-valued indeterministic provability logic}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Pawlowski, Pawel} } @unpublished {2070, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Semantics, Expressivity, and Applications}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @unpublished {2069, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Semantics, Expressivity, and Applications}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

We study classical modal logics with pooling modalities, i.e. unary modal operators that allow one to express properties of sets obtained by the pointwise intersection of neighbourhoods. We discuss salient properties of these modalities, situate the logics in the broader area of modal logics (with a particular focus on relational semantics), establish key properties concerning their expressive power, and discuss their application to epistemic/doxastic logic, the logic of evidence-based belief, deontic logic, and logics of agency and ability.

}, keywords = {classical modal logics, coalition logic, distributed belief, multi-agent systems, pointwise intersection, pooling modalities}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte}, editor = {Klein, Dominik} } @article {PawlowskiAcceptedandforthcoming, title = {Proof systems for {B}{A}{T} consequence relations }, journal = {The Logic Journal of IGPL}, year = {In Press}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel} } @article {2074, title = {Pooling Modalities and Pointwise Intersection: Axiomatization and Decidability}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {online first}, year = {2020}, abstract = {

We establish completeness and the finite model property for logics featuring the pooling modalities that were introduced in Van De\ Putte and Klein (Pooling modalities and pointwise intersection: semantics, expressivity, and applications). The definition of our canonical models combines standard techniques with a so-called {\textquotedblleft}puzzle piece construction{\textquotedblright}, which we first illustrate informally. After that, we apply it to the weakest classical logics with pooling modalities and investigate the technique{\textquoteright}s potential for the axiomatization of stronger logics, obtained by imposing well-known frame conditions on the models.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @unpublished {2051, title = {Pointwise intersection in neighbourhood modal logic}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Klein, Dominik} } @incollection {D:paradoxenVM, title = {Paradoxen in de vrijmetselarij en de relatie met waarden}, booktitle = {Kappen aan de ruwe steen}, year = {2017}, pages = {319{\textendash}336}, publisher = {Academic and Scientific Publishers}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rik Pinxten and Jean Swings} } @article {2071, title = {Participation beyond consensus? Technology assessments, consensus conferences and democratic modulation. }, journal = {Social Epistemology}, volume = {31 (6)}, year = {2017}, chapter = {497}, abstract = {

In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats
that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus
conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how
these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong
appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and
informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies,
we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including
dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy.
Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between
four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and
agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides
opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and
democratic modulation{\textemdash}three aspirations that are at the heart of most
pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses
of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should
therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and
process in science and technology.

}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Van Oudheusden, Michiel} } @incollection {Pawlowski2017a, title = {Philosophical Aspects of an Alleged Connection Between the Axiom of Choice and Predicting the Future}, booktitle = {Applications of Formal Philosophy The Road Less Travelled}, year = {2017}, pages = {213-220}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel}, editor = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Gillman, Payette} } @article {D:NoBigDeal, title = {Pluralism In Scientific Problem Solving. Why Inconsistency Is No Big Deal}, journal = {Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {32}, year = {2017}, pages = {149{\textendash}177}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {4254591, title = {{\textquoteright}Peer review is melting our glaciers{\textquoteright}: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) went astray}, journal = {Journal for general philosophy of science}, year = {2015}, pages = {351--366}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @incollection {4345994, title = {Private epistemic virtue, public vices: moral responsibility in the policy sciences}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {275{\textendash}295}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Lefevere, Merel and Schliesser, Eric}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tjerk, title = {Patterns of Hypothesis Formation}, year = {2014}, month = {March 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {4443770, title = {Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {7}, year = {2014}, pages = {1605{\textendash}1626}, abstract = {

One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objects-sets. On this view claims like {\textquoteright}some logicians admire only each other{\textquoteright} involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidates-substitutional and set-theoretic-only the latter can provide the language of plurals with the desired expressive power (given that the nominalist seems committed to the assumption that there can be at most countably many names). To counter this approach I develop a modal-substitutional semantics of plural quantification (on which plural variables, roughly speaking, range over ways names could be) and argue for its nominalistic acceptability.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0354-5}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {4090467, title = {Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry}, booktitle = {New directions in the philosophy of science}, year = {2014}, pages = {104{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner{\textquoteright}s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism {\textendash} different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry {\textendash} namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the {\textquotedblleft}genuine dialogue{\textquotedblright} or shape {\textquotedblleft}the pluralistic attitude{\textquotedblright} Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

}, isbn = {9783319043814}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_8}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @incollection {de2014proof, title = {The Proof Is in the Process: A Preamble for a Philosophy of Computer-Assisted Mathematics}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Science}, series = {The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {15{\textendash}33}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

According to some well-known mathematicians well-versed in computer-assisted mathematics (CaM), “Computers are changing the way we are doing mathematics”. To what extent this is really true is still an open question. Indeed, even though some philosophers of math have taken up the challenge to think about CaM, it is unclear in what sense exactly a machine (can) affect(s) the so-called “queen of the sciences”. In fact, some have concluded that issues raised by the use of the computer in mathematics are not specific to the use of the computer per se. However, such findings seem precarious since a systematic study of computer-assisted mathematics is still lacking. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the impact of CaM, it is necessary to take more seriously the computer itself and how it is actually used in the process of doing mathematics. Within such an approach, one searches for characteristics that are specific to the use of the computer in mathematics. I will focus on a feature that is beyond any doubt inherently connected to the use of computing machinery, viz. mathematician-computer interactions. I will show how such interactions are fundamentally different from the usual interactions between mathematicians and non-human aids (a piece of paper, a blackboard etc) and how such interactions determine at least two more characteristics of CaM, viz. the significance of time and processes and the steady process of internalization of mathematical tools and knowledge into the machine. I will restrict myself to the use of the computer within so-called experimental mathematics since this is the main object of CaM within the philosophical literature.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_2}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @article {D:pcr, title = {Propositional Logic Extended With A Pedagogically Useful Relevant Implication}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, year = {2014}, pages = {245{\textendash}276}, abstract = {

First and foremost, this paper concerns the combination of classical propositional logic with a relevant implication. The proposed combination is simple and transparent from a proof theoretic point of view and at the same time extremely useful for relating formal logic to natural language sentences. A specific system will be presented and studied, also from a semantic point of view. The last sections of the paper contain more general considerations on combining classical propositional logic with a relevant logic that has all classical theorems as theorems.

}, doi = {10.12775/LLP.2013.024}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {3178949, title = {Pauli{\textquoteright}s idea of the neutrino: how models in physics allow to revive old ideas for new purposes}, booktitle = {Model-based reasoning in science and technology : theoretical and cognitive issues}, year = {2013}, pages = {449-461}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Abstract Models have proven themselves to be the key catalyst of many new ideas in science. However, it is not yet fully clarified why models can fulfill such an important heuristic role. The two main reasons stated in the literature—the mental simulation of various scenarios and the wide cross-fertilization across various disciplines—seem to leave out one of the most obvious features of models: they are designed for a purpose. Therefore I investigated why, while the construction of models is a goal-oriented task with a predefined purpose, the use of models yields so many new ideas in science. This paper presents my conceptual analysis together with a detailed historical case study. The functional design of models forces scientists to explore vigorously older ideas to adapt them: as the lacunas in a functional model are also functional, scientists need to modify older ideas (that were formulated for different purposes) to fit the present functional gaps in their models. As such, they construct new ideas. The detailed historical case study exemplifies this by showing how Pauli’s original suggestion of the neutrino was, in fact, such an adaptation of Rutherford’s earlier idea of the neutron. The present analysis and case study suggest that functional adaptations are salient but often overlooked features of model based investigation.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @article {3086510, title = {Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {139{\textendash}152}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver{\textquoteright}s continuum of how-possibly, to how-plausibly, to how-actually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism{\textquoteright}s activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.

}, issn = {0951-5089}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.633693}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {van2013preferential, title = {Preferential Semantics using Non-smooth Preference Relations}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {43}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {903{\textendash}942}, abstract = {

This paper studies the properties of eight semantic consequence relations defined from a Tarski-logic L and a preference relation \&\#8826;. They are equivalent to Shoham’s so-called preferential entailment for smooth model structures, but avoid certain problems of the latter in non-smooth configurations. Each of the logics can be characterized in terms of what we call multi-selection semantics. After discussing this type of semantics, we focus on some concrete proposals from the literature, checking a number of meta-theoretic properties and elaborating on their intuitive motivation. As it turns out, many of their meta-properties only hold in case \&\#8826; is transitive. To tackle this problem, we propose slight modifications of each of the systems, showing the resulting logics to behave better at the intuitive level and in metatheoretic terms, for arbitrary \&\#8826;.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {van2013prime, title = {Prime implicates and relevant belief revision}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {109{\textendash}119}, abstract = {

This article discusses Parikh’s axiom of relevance in belief revision, and recalls some results from Kourousias and Makinson (2007, J. Symbolic Logic, 72, 994–1002) in this context. The crucial distinction is emphasized between the uniqueness of the finest splitting of K and the fact that K has several normal forms associated with that finest splitting. The main new result of this article is a new proof for the theorem that the set of prime implicates of K is a normal form for the finest splitting of K. It is explained how this proof avoids a mistake in an earlier proof from Wu and Zhang (2010, Knowledge-Based Syst., 23, 70–76). As a corollary, relevance can be re-defined without reference to the finest splitting, using the notion of path-relevance from Makinson (2009, J. Appl. Logic, 7, 377–387). Finally, a weak yet sufficient condition for irrelevance is presented.

}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exr040}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3148385, title = {{\textquoteright}Platonic{\textquoteright} thought experiments: how on earth}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {187}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {731{\textendash}752}, abstract = {

Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a, 1991b; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004; Thought experiments, 2008) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs "platonic"). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them as arguments for logical reasons: there is no logic that can adequately model such phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, "platonic" TEs provide us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against this approach by describing how "platonic" TEs can be modeled within the logical framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by Brown, Galileo{\textquoteright}s TE involving falling bodies.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0008-4}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {Gervais2012, title = {Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanation-seeking questions compared}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {131{\textendash}137}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {DeLanghe2012, title = {The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {11-31}, abstract = {

According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neo-positivist interpretation) and one based on values. I also describe two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the values-interpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agent-based model demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can account for Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view on the dynamics of scientific change.

}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @proceedings {3178954, title = {The problem of multiple explanatory hypotheses}, journal = {PhDs in Logic III}, year = {2012}, pages = {45-53}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In abduction – the process of finding explanatory hypotheses for puzzling phenomena – one is often confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses. In science one generally wants to test further the different hypotheses one by one. But, if we try to model this in a logic and make it possible to derive the differen t hypotheses apart from each other, we generally can derive their conjunction too. An elegant solution within the framework of adaptive logics is provided in Gauderis (2011). But this approach is not restricted to science. While it is true that a lot of cases in everyday reasoning require a more practical approach – in which one acts on the knowledge that all the different hypotheses might be the case – there are also a considerable amount of situations in which the more theoretical approach of the scientist is needed. In this paper we try to illustrate this by using this logic to model reasoning within detective literature.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Demey, Lorenz and Devuyst, Jonas} } @article {Verdee30112012, title = {A proof procedure for adaptive logics}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {21}, year = {2012}, pages = {743-766}, abstract = {

In this article, I present a procedure that generates proofs for finally derivable adaptive logic consequences. A proof procedure for the inconsistency adaptive logic CLuNr is already presented in [7]. In this article a procedure for CLuNm is presented and the results for both logics are generalized to all adaptive logics, on the presupposition that there exists a proof procedure for the lower limit logic. The generated proofs are so called goal-directed proofs, i.e. proofs that (i) start with the formula (the goal) of which one wants to know whether it is a consequence of a certain premise set and (ii) only consist of lines that may potentially be useful for proving or disproving the goal. The goal-directed proofs form good explications of actual problem-solving reasoning processes.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzs046}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {Strasser2012, title = {Proof Theories for Superpositions of Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, year = {2012}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, abstract = {

The standard format for adaptive logics offers a generic and unifying formal framework for defeasible reasoning forms. One of its main distinguishing features is a dynamic proof theory by means of which it is able to explicate actual reasoning. In many applications it has proven very useful to superpose sequences of adaptive logics, such that each logic treats the consequence set of its predecessor as premise set. Although attempts have been made to define dynamic proof theories for some of the resulting logics, no generic proof theory is available yet. Moreover, the existing proof theories for concrete superpositions are suboptimal in various respects: the derivability relations characterized by these proposals are often not adequate with respect to the consequence relation of the superposed adaptive logics and in some cases they even trivialize premise sets. An adequate and generic proof theory is needed in order to meet the requirement of explicating defeasible reasoning in terms of superpositions of adaptive logics. This paper presents two generic proof theories for superpositions of adaptive logics in standard format. By means of simple examples, the basic ideas behind these proof theories are illustrated and it is shown how the older proposals are inadequate.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2977245, title = {Psychoanalyse en geschiedfilosofie}, journal = {PSYCHOANALYTISCHE PERSPECTIEVEN}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {293{\textendash}306}, issn = {0771-5862}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @proceedings {1861627, title = {A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts}, journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)}, year = {2011}, pages = {312-329}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.

}, isbn = {9783642223587}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon} } @article {drouet2011propensities, title = {Propensities and conditional probabilities}, journal = {International Journal of Approximate Reasoning}, volume = {52}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {153{\textendash}165}, abstract = {

The present paper deals with the objection that Paul Humphreys raised against the propensity interpretation of probability  "Humphreys{\textquoteright} paradox". An update on existing solutions is oered, and it is concluded that none of them is completely satisfactory in view of Humphreys{\textquoteright} 2004 rejoinder. Positively, an original solution is formulated and discussed.

}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle} } @incollection {1980049, title = {Proto-regress argument schemas}, booktitle = {ISSA 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {2000{\textendash}2007}, publisher = {Ghent University. Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @book {1042976, title = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {302}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, abstract = {

This book presents a selection of peer-reviewed papers which were presented on a conference organized in Ghent, Belgium, from 27 till 29 August, 2009. The conference was given the title Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early modern Science and Mathematics (PASR). For this book we selected papers which deal with the consequences for mathematics in particular, hence the omission of {\textquoteleft}science{\textquoteright} in the title of this book. Another selection, dealing with the understanding of nature and a broader range of topics, will appear in the journal Foundations of Science. The conference was sponsored by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and Ghent University, which indirectly made this book possible. We also have to thank the other members of the programme committee Marco Panza, Chikara Sasaki, and Erik Weber and our keynote speakers Jens H{\o}yrup, Doug Jesseph, Eberhard Knobloch, Marco Panza, Mathias Schemmel and Michel Serfati. Five of their papers are included in this volume. Most of the papers benefited from valuable and sometimes substantive comments by our referees which must remain anonymous. Special thanks to Michael Barany who assisted in the editorial process.

}, isbn = {978-1-84890-017-2}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {de_winter_pragmatic_2010, title = {A Pragmatic Account of Functions}, journal = {Ghent University, Ghent}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

In this article, a pluralism of function concepts is defended on the basis of pragmatic considerations. It is shown that we use functional statements for a variety of explanatory purposes, and that each explanatory purpose asks for a specific notion of function. More specifically, I argue that the meaning of the statement “the function of x is to ” depends on the explanation-seeking question that this statement is supposed to answer, and that we cannot construct one ultimate notion of function that is appropriate in every explanatory context. Several explanation-seeking questions are explicated, as well as the function concepts that can be used to answer them, resulting in a pragmatic framework for function concepts. This framework is applied to both the technical and the biological domain.

}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_-_Functional_Explanation__DRAFT_24_.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @article {Urbaniak, title = {PhD{\textquoteright}s in Logic - report (with S. Wintein)}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {6{\textendash}7}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {primieroprioritized, title = {Prioritized Dynamic Retraction Function on Non-monotonic Information Updates}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {443-463}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

In this paper a model for updates on belief sets and retractions thereof is introduced using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core of the update retraction procedure is represented by abnormal expressions derivable in the language: they express updates with information con- tradicting previously derived contents. The adaptive strategy aims at restricting the validity of these formulas by focusing at each decreasing degree on the update which is the most rational to retract in order to re- store consistency as soon as possible. This work is related to the standard operations of retraction and withdrawal from the AGM-paradigm and the e ects of dynamic operations such as public announcement in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @incollection {812461, title = {The problem with(out) consensus: {T}he scientific consensus, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism.}, booktitle = {The social sciences and democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {121{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {978-0230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {734492, title = {Proceeding in abstraction: from concepts to types and the recent perspective on information}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {257{\textendash}282}, abstract = {

This article presents an historical and conceptual overview on different approaches to logical abstraction. Two main trends concerning abstraction in the history of logic are highlighted, starting from the logical notions of concept and function. This analysis strictly relates to the philosophical discussion on the nature of abstract objects. I develop this issue further with respect to the procedure of abstraction involved by (typed) -systems, focusing on the crucial change about meaning and predicability. In particular, the analysis of the nature of logical types in the context of Constructive Type Theory allows elucidation of the role of the previously introduced notions. Finally, the connection to the analysis of abstraction in computer science is drawn, and the methodological contribution provided by the notion of information is considered, showing its conceptual and technical relevance. Future research shall focus on the notion of information in distributed systems, analysing the paradigm of information hiding in dependent type theories.

}, issn = {0144-5340}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340902872630}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {D:rescher, title = {On Possibilities and Thought Experiments}, booktitle = {Rescher Studies. {A} Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of {N}icholas {R}escher}, year = {2008}, pages = {29{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Ontos Verlag}, address = {Frankfurt}, abstract = {

This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, Imagining Irreality on possibilities and What If? on thought experiments. Apart from an expository part, the present contribution consist on the one hand of some proposed elaborations, especially of two technical points, and on the other hand of some discussion concerning points where I am in doubt about Rescher{\textquoteright}s precise stand and of some suggestions for further research.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Almeder, Robert} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {0003-2638}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415578, title = {A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science.}, journal = {History and theory}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, month = {May}, pages = {168{\textendash}182}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

}, issn = {0018-2656}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {981623, title = {A preliminary study of the appropriation of {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in {B}ritain in chymistry, medicine and natural philosophy}, journal = {Ambix}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {122{\textendash}135}, abstract = {

Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s work was of major importance in seventeenth-century medicine, chymistry and natural philosophy. His work was a source of inspiration and mystery and an authoritas. His oeuvre was, together with that of many others, the culminating point of an ongoing process, starting in the Middle Ages, of turning medicine into a scientific discipline. In this essay, the appropriation, that is, the process of assimilation of an author{\textquoteright}s work by other scholars, of Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in England will be studied among chymists, physicians and natural philosophers (the distinctions between these three groups is primarily conceptual, but in practice hard to distinguish). Appropriation reminds us that the process of assimilating ideas of an author by contemporaries or later generations is not a passive activity, for scholars actively adapt and interpret them in new ways not initially envisaged by its original author.

}, issn = {0002-6980}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/174582308X255479}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {689055, title = {Protagoras en het kennistheoretisch relativisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. Essays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {181{\textendash}192}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent}, isbn = {9789038212791}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {

One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Leen, title = {Pluralisme versus Monisme in het Filosofische Debat over Causaliteit. Naar een Zinvolle Pluralistische Benadering van Causaliteit als Theoretisch Kader voor de Explicatie van Causaal Redeneren.}, year = {2006}, month = {October 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @booklet {de2006post, title = {Post{\textquoteright}’s machine}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

In 1936 Turing gave his answer to the question ”What is a computable number?” by constructing his now well-known Turing machines as formalisations of the actions of a human computor. Less well-known is the almost synchronously published result by Emil Leon Post, in which a quasi-identical mechanism was developed for similar purposes. In 1979 these Post ”toy” machines were described in a little booklet, called ”Post’s machine” by the Russian mathematician Uspensky. The purpose of this text was to advance abstract concepts as algorithm and programming for school children. In discussing this booklet in relation to the historical text it is based on, the author wants to show how this kind of ideas cannot only help to teach school children some of the basics of computer science, but furthermore contribute to a training in formal thinking.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {415526, title = {The paradox of conceptual novelty and {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s use of experiments}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {72}, number = {5}, year = {2005}, pages = {864{\textendash}875}, abstract = {

Starting with a discussion of what I call ‘Koyr{\'e}’s paradox of conceptual novelty’, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10928}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {ducheyne2005paul, title = {Paul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s theory of knowledge and linguistic objectivism}, journal = {Knowledge Organization}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {110{\textendash}116}, abstract = {

In this paper, I point to the importance of an often neglected objectivist strand in Paul Otlet{\textquoteright}s (1868-1944) thinking: his linguistic objectivism. Linguistic objectivism consists in the view that linguistic atoms uniquely correspond to certain discrete and well-defined elements in the world and further combinations of these linguistic atoms can objectively capture "the order of the world". This analysis tempers some of the past claims on the influence of positivism on Otlet.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {D:pcfdial, title = {A Procedural Criterion for Final Derivability in Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {221{\textendash}250}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a (prospective) goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the inconsistency-adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, the procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a \emph{criterion} for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dagmar, title = {Prospectieve Dynamiek. Filosofische en Technische Onderbouwing van Doelgerichte Bewijzen en Bewijsheuristieken}, year = {2005}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {J:parcomp, title = {Paraconsistent Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {251{\textendash}287}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for paraconsistent com-patibility. The consequence relation defined by these logics leads from a (possibly inconsistent) set of premises to all the sentences that are com-patible with them. Their proof theory is dynamic, but is proven sound and complete with respect to a static semantics. For the consistent case, both logics lead to exactly the same results as the logics for classical com-patibility that were presented in [11]. It is shown that paraconsistent compatibility cannot be defined with respect to a monotonic paraconsistent logic, but only with respect to an inconsistency-adaptive logic. The paper contains modal versions of two well-studied inconsistency-adaptive logics. These modal versions form the basis for the logics for paraconsistent compatibility, but are also interesting with respect to other applications.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {D:ppp_cl, title = {A Paraconsistent Proof Procedure Based on Classical Logic}, year = {2003}, abstract = {

Apparently Ex Falso Quodlibet (or Explosion) cannot be isolated within CL (Classical Logic); if Explosion has to go, then so have other inference rules, for example either Addition or Disjunctive Syllogism. This cer- tainly holds according to the standard abstract view on logic. However, as I shall show, it does not hold if a logic is defined by a procedure-a set of instructions to obtain a proof (if there is one) of a given conclusion from a given premise set. In this paper I present a procedure pCL{\textexclamdown} that defines a logic CL{\textexclamdown}|a function assigning a consequence set to any premise set. Anything deriv- able by CL from a consistent premise set {\textexclamdown} is derivable from {\textexclamdown} by CL{\textexclamdown}. If {\textexclamdown} is (CL-)inconsistent, pCL{\textexclamdown} enables one to demonstrate this (by de- riving a contradiction from {\textexclamdown}). The logic CL{\textexclamdown} validates applications of Disjunctive Syllogism as well as applications of Addition. Nevertheless, this logic is paraconsistent as well as (in a specific sense) relevant. pCL{\textexclamdown} derives from an intuitively attractive proof search procedure. A characteristic semantics for CL{\textexclamdown} will be presented and the central prop- erties of the logic will be mentioned. CL{\textexclamdown} shows that (and clarifies how) adherents of CL may obtain non-trivial consequence sets for inconsistent theories.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {597466, title = {A Procedure for Generating (Conditional) Answers in a Goal-Directed Way}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {57{\textendash}63}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, abstract = {

Two evolutionary games : collective action and prisoner{\textquoteright}s dilema / Jakson Alves de Aquino {\textendash} A formal approach to problem solving / Diderik Batens {\textendash} Application of mathematics and underdetermination / Ota\unmatched{0301}vio Bueno {\textendash} A framework for combining defeasible argumentation with labeled deduction / Carlos Iva\unmatched{0301}n Chesn\unmatched{0303}evar and Guillermo Ricardo Simari {\textendash} A procedure for generating (conditional) answers in a goal-directed way / Kristof De Clerq and Rob Vanderbeken {\textendash} Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning : a model for research programmes / Claudio Delrieux {\textendash} Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law : a quantitative computational model / Albrecht Heeffer {\textendash} Default models of rationality / Silvia Lerner {\textendash} Most inferences are defeasible / Jose\unmatched{0301} Carlos Loureiro Ralha and Ce\unmatched{0301}lia Ghedini Rahla {\textendash} Reasoning through doing : epistemic mediators in scientific reasoning / Lorenzo Magnani {\textendash} Do we need paraconsistency in commonsense reasoning? / Joke Meheus {\textendash} Descartes, a methodical elimination of paradoxes for (de)-ontology building / Jean Sallantin ... [et al.] {\textendash} Measuring coherence using LP-models / Carlos A. Oller {\textendash} What are multi-agent systems trying to accomplish? Towards pragmatic game-theoretical agenda / Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen {\textendash} Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility / Dagmar Provijn {\textendash} Semantic computations of truth, based on associations already learned / Patrick Suppes and Jean-Yves Be\unmatched{0301}ziau {\textendash} On the sense of eating strawberries, or, On the exclusivity implcature fo {\textquoteright}or{\textquoteright} / Liza Verhoeven and Leon Horsten {\textendash} A note on epistemology and logical afrificial intelligence / Gregory R. Wheeler and Lui\unmatched{0301}s Moniz Pereira.

}, isbn = {9879281896}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {319505, title = {Proof Theories for Some Prioritized Consequence Relations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {325{\textendash}344}, abstract = {

Handling a possibly inconsistent prioritized belief base can be done in terms of consistent subsets. Humans do not compute consistent subsets, they just start reasoning and when confronted with incon- sistencies in the course of their reasoning, they may adjust their interpretation of the information. In logics this behaviour corresponds to the mechanisms of dynamic proof theories. The aim of this paper is to transform known consequence relations for inconsistent prioritized belief bases in terms of consistent subsets, into dynamic proof theories that are a more faithful representation of human reasoning processes.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @incollection {D:pdmdp, title = {On a Partial Decision Method for Dynamic Proofs}, booktitle = {P{C}{L} 2002. Paraconsistent Computational Logic}, volume = {95}, year = {2002}, note = {

Also available as cs.LO/0207090 at \texttt{http://arxiv.org/archive/cs/intro.html}

}, pages = {91{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Roskilde University}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. At the propositional level, it forms an algorithm for final derivability. If extended to the predicative level, it provides a criterion for final derivability. This is essential in view of the absence of a positive test. The procedure may be generalized to all flat adaptive logics.

}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.LO/0207090}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Dekker, Hendrik and Villadsen, Jorgen and Waragai, Toshiharu} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @article {291578, title = {Preferences as inconsistency-resolvers: an Inconsistency-adaptive Tool}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2001}, pages = {47{\textendash}63}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {DDa:vd1, title = {Pushing the Search Paths in the Proofs. {A} Study in Proof Heuristics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {113{\textendash}134}, abstract = {

Introducing techniques deriving from dynamic proofs in proofs for propositional classical logic is shown to lead to a proof format that enables one to push search paths into the proofs themselves. The resulting goal directed proof format is shown to provide a decision method for A1, ..., An vdash B and a positive test for Gamma vdash A.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {D:pwv, title = {Paraconsistency and its Relation to Worldviews}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {259{\textendash}283}, abstract = {

The paper highlights the import of the paraconsistent movement, list some motivations for its origin, and distinguishes some stands with respect to paraconsistency. It then discusses some sources of inconsistency that are specific for worldviews, and the import of the paraconsistent turn for the worldviews enterprise.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {276844, title = {The practical function and epistemology of causal beliefs}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {31}, year = {1998}, pages = {297{\textendash}324}, abstract = {

Distinguant trois fonctions pratiques de la croyance causale : l{\textquoteright}affirmation de buts, la r{\'e}solution des probl{\`e}mes li{\'e}s {\`a} l{\textquoteright}action et la construction des probl{\`e}mes de d{\'e}cision, l{\textquoteright}A. montre que le premier implique {\`a} lui seul cinq conceptions diff{\`e}rentes de la croyance causale concernant : 1) les mouvements du corps; 2) les interactions causales; 3) la capacit{\'e} de certains objets {\`a} pr{\`e}server certaines caract{\'e}ristiques; 4) la causation structurale; 5) les influences causales permanentes. L{\textquoteright}A. cherche une m{\'e}thode {\`e}pist{\'e}mologique fiable (Salmon, Mackie) pour v{\'e}rifier et justifier la connaissance causale que nous pouvons avoir de ces cinq versions de la croyance causale

}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135140, title = {Prudential Arguments in the Realism Debate.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {41}, number = {164}, year = {1998}, pages = {301{\textendash}312}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:p\&rl, title = {Paraconsistente en relevante logica{\textquoteright}s}, journal = {Wijsgerig perspectief op maatschappij en wetenschap}, volume = {32/2}, year = {1992}, pages = {53{\textendash}59}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {241631, title = {Phenomenological Laws and their Application to Scientific Epistemic Explanation Problems}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {33}, number = {129-130}, year = {1990}, pages = {175{\textendash}189}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:prps, title = {Progress, rationality and the philosophy of science}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor de studie van de Verlichting en het Vrije denken}, volume = {8{\textendash}9}, year = {1981}, pages = {83{\textendash}102}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:pepl, title = {Paraconsistent extensional propositional logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {23}, number = {90-91}, year = {1980}, pages = {195{\textendash}234}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:poc, title = {The paradoxes of confirmation}, journal = {Revue internationale de philosophie}, volume = {95{\textendash}96}, year = {1971}, pages = {101{\textendash}118}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }