@unpublished {2085, title = {Original position arguments: an axiomatic characterization}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Thijs De Coninck and Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {Putte2016ObligationAW, title = {Obligation as Weakest Permission: a Strongly Complete Axiomatization}, journal = {Rew. Symb. Logic}, volume = {9}, year = {2016}, pages = {370-379}, abstract = {

In (Anglberger et al., 2015, Section 4.1), a deontic logic is proposed which explicates the idea that a formula φ is obligatory if and only if it is (semantically speaking) the weakest permission. We give a sound and strongly complete, Hilbert style axiomatization for this logic. As a corollary, it is compact, contradicting earlier claims from Anglberger et al. (2015). In addition, we prove that our axiomatization is equivalent to Anglberger et al.{\textquoteright}s infinitary proof system, and show that our results are robust w.r.t. certain changes in the underlying semantics.

}, author = {Frederik Van De Putte} } @article {2006773, title = {Offline and online data: on upgrading functional information to knowledge}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {164}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {371{\textendash}392}, abstract = {

This paper addresses the problem of upgrading functional information to knowledge. Functional information is defined as syntactically well-formed, meaningful and collectively opaque data. Its use in the formal epistemology of information theories is crucial to solve the debate on the veridical nature of information, and it represents the companion notion to standard strongly semantic information, defined as well-formed, meaningful and true data. The formal framework, on which the definitions are based, uses a contextual version of the verificationist principle of truth in order to connect functional to semantic information, avoiding Gettierization and decoupling from true informational contents. The upgrade operation from functional information uses the machinery of epistemic modalities in order to add data localization and accessibility as its main properties. We show in this way the conceptual worthiness of this notion for issues in contemporary epistemology debates, such as the explanation of knowledge process acquisition from information retrieval systems, and open data repositories.

}, issn = {0031-8116}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9860-4}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {3177520, title = {Oneindige regressieargumenten}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {105}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, abstract = {

Infinite regress arguments show up in many philosophical debates. But what actually is a regress argument? This article reviews two theories: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreed-upon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly well-developed, and this article shows that the Failure Theory can be supplied with similar tools.

}, issn = {0002-5275}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ANTW2013.1.WIEL}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {2977237, title = {The ontology of causal process theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHIA}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}538}, abstract = {

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of {\textacutedbl}causal process{\textacutedbl} does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe{\textquoteright}s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon{\textquoteright}s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair{\textquoteright}s phsyicalist reduction of causation.

}, issn = {0048-3893}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9329-2}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {1854847, title = {Op het snijvlak van cognitie, wetenschap en filosofie: intertheoretische relaties in de twintigste eeuw}, journal = {ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE}, volume = {104}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

This article provides a critical survey of the debate on intertheoretic relations, with particular emphasis on the cognitive sciences. I begin by distinguishing two opposing sides, reductionism and antireductionism, and proceed by tracking the changes these positions underwent in the twentieth century. It appears that these changes consist to a significant degree in smoothing out the rough edges of both, so that the original positions can be understood as crude extremes. The monistic accounts of intertheoretic relations were traded in for more tolerant and nuanced approaches, a tendency that is chiefly inspired by an increasing focus on actual scientific practice.

}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @incollection {683520, title = {Ockhams theorie van evidente kennis en het epistemologisch externalisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. {E}ssays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {227{\textendash}239}, publisher = {Academia Press}, isbn = {978-90-382-1279-1}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @article {urbaniak2006ontological, title = {On Ontological Functors of {L}esniewski{\textquoteright}s Elementary Ontology}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {40}, year = {2006}, pages = {15{\textendash}43}, abstract = {

We present an algorithm which allows to define any possible sentence-formative functor of Le\&\#347;niewski{\textquoteright}s Elemen- tary Ontology (LEO), arguments of which belong to the category of names. Other results are: a recursive method of listing possible functors, a method of indicating the number of possible n-place ontological functors, and a sketch of a proof that LEO is function- ally complete with respect to {\&\#8743;,\&\#172;, \&\#8704;, \&\#949;}

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {345102, title = {Optical versus Mechanical Models: Newton{\textquoteright}s "Failure" to Construct an Optical Theory}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {49}, number = {194}, year = {2006}, pages = {199{\textendash}223}, abstract = {

In this essay, I take up both Shapiro’s and Hakfoort’s suggestion that Newton tried to apply the same method he used in the Principia (first edition: 1687) to The Opticks (first edition: 1704). Why did Newton’s method, which was apparently so successful in the realm of mechanics, fail when applied to optics? I shall argue that both empirical as well as methodological aspects are needed to explain Newton’s failure. Newton’s repugnance to introduce hypotheses in published texts forced him to explore, in the demonstrative part of science, a conceptually poor framework. Such framework has limited inferential power, i.e. the set of consequences which can be deduced from it is limited. This will be contrasted with the Principia where a richer conceptual framework was at hand and its deduced effects could by confirmed by experiment. The conceptual framework in the Principia allowed Newton to a priori deduce the celestial motions. As I have argued elsewhere, a priori deducing the phenomena under investigation was one of Newton’s most central methodological ideals. In this essay, I shall attempt to explain why a priori deduction of phenomena was impossible in optics.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {361180, title = {The origin of the problems in {E}uler{\textquoteright}s {A}lgebra}, journal = {Bulletin of the Belgian Mathematical Society - Simon Stevin}, volume = {13}, number = {5}, year = {2006}, pages = {949{\textendash}952}, issn = {1370-1444}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {402884, title = {Ontological causes of inconsistency and a change-adaptive, logical solution}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, volume = {228}, year = {2002}, pages = {151{\textendash}166}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, abstract = {

This paper reveals an implicit ontological assumption that is presupposed in common thought. This assumption results in the fact that people usually do not make any distinction between {\textquoteright}the object a{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}the object a at a given moment{\textquoteright}. This laziness causes many inconsistencies. Several attempts to solve these inconsistencies are studied, and the most natural one is elaborated, namely the one obtained by applying Classical Logic to an ontological correct domain. This solution has a drawback with respect to communication, which is solved by the change-adaptive logic CAL2. This non-monotonic, paraconsistent logic, belongs to the family of ambiguity-adaptive logics. It has the special characteristic that it solves inconsistencies by the introduction of more precise names for objects, more exactly names that refer to objects at a moment. The dynamics of the logic captures the change in objects. CAL2 has a nice proof theory, and an intuitive semantics. Interesting results and applications are commented upon, for instance those making use of the notion {\textquoteright}periods of invariance{\textquoteright}. Of course, the philosophical background is discussed.

}, isbn = {0824708059}, author = {Vanackere, Guido}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {D:zinleven, title = {Over de zin van het leven en de zingevende functie van wereldbeelden}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {226}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}63}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {VanBendegem1999, title = {Oorlog en vrede in wetenschapsland}, booktitle = {Denken als Openheid. {L}iber Amicorum {H}ubert {D}ethier}, year = {1999}, pages = {153-160}, publisher = {VUB}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Walraves, Else and Stuy, Johan} } @article {DJ:gw, title = {Over het (vermeende) conflict tussen godsgeloof en de wetenschappen}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {42}, year = {1997}, pages = {401{\textendash}415}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {257818, title = {Ook het oneindige is ons werk}, booktitle = {Leo Apostel. Tien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, pages = {119{\textendash}134}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {J:ocwm, title = {Ontdekking en creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen}, year = {1993}, pages = {41{\textendash}52}, publisher = {Nationaal Comit{\'e} voor Logica, Geschiedenis en Filosofie van de Wetenschappen}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Halleux, Robert and Bern{\'e}s, Anne-Cath{\'e}rine} } @incollection {D:o\&cvcka, title = {Onze huidige kijk op ontdekking en creativiteit vereist een {\textquoteleft}contextuele{\textquoteright} kennistheoretische aanpak}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {265{\textendash}267}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @incollection {D:kloof, title = {Over de kloof tussen feit en norm, bekeken vanuit de hedendaagse wetenschapsfilosofie}, booktitle = {Dwarsdenken. Omtrent {J}aap {K}ruithof}, year = {1989}, pages = {165{\textendash}177}, publisher = {EPO}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van den Enden, Hugo} } @article {D:otom:sc, title = {Outline of a theory of meaning: semantical and contextual}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {19}, year = {1977}, pages = {137{\textendash}154}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:svzcil, title = {Over de stand van zaken in de {C}arnapiaanse inductieve logica}, journal = {Communicatie en Cognitie}, volume = {6}, year = {1969}, pages = {29{\textendash}57}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }