@article {Pawlowski2017b, title = {Non-deterministic logic of informal provability has no finite characterization}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Pawlowski, Pawel} } @article {JMFC:iadl, title = {Non-Adjunctive Deontic Logics That Validate Aggregation as Much as Possible}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, year = {In Press}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {PD:embed, title = {Nice Embedding in Classical Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, year = {2016}, pages = {47-78}, abstract = {

It is shown that a set of semi-recursive logics, including many fragments of CL (Classical Logic), can be embedded within CL in an interesting way. A logic belongs
to the set iff it has a certain type of semantics, called nice semantics. The set includes
many logics presented in the literature. The embedding reveals structural properties of the embedded logic. The embedding turns finite premise sets into finite premise sets. The partial decision methods for CL that are goal directed with respect to CL are turned into partial decision methods that are goal directed with respect to the embedded logics.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-015-9622-3}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter and Batens, Diderik} } @article {DeBal2006, title = {A new approach to classical relevance.}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {82}, year = {2015}, pages = {1{\textendash}31}, abstract = {

n this paper we present a logic that determines when implications in a classical logic context express a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent. In contrast with logics in the relevance logic literature, we leave classical negation intact - in the sense that the law of non-contradiction can be used to obtain relevantly implications, as long as there is a connection between antecedent and consequent. On the other hand, we give up the requirement that our theory of relevance can define a new standard of deduction. We present and argue for a list of requirements that such a logical theory of classical relevance needs to meet and go on to formulate a system that respects each of these requirements. The presented system is a monotonic and transitive logic that extends the relevance logic ℜ with a richer relevant implication that allows for Disjunctive Syllogism and similar rules. This is achieved by interpreting the logical symbols in the antecedents in a stronger way than the logical symbols in consequents. A proof theory and an algebraic semantics are formulated and interesting metatheorems (soundness, completeness and the fact that it satisfies the requirements for classical relevance) are proven. Finally we give a philosophical motivation for our non-standard relevant implication and the asymmetric interpretation of antecedents and consequents.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {4269435, title = {Non-cognitive values and objectivity in scientific explanation: the case of the {M}ovius line}, journal = {PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {429{\textendash}452}, abstract = {

Although it is now widely accepted that in science, non-cognitive values play a role, it is still debated whether this has implications for its objectivity. It seems that the task of philosophers here is twofold: to flesh out what kinds of non-cognitive values play what kinds of roles, and to evaluate the implications for objectivity. I attempt to contribute to both tasks by introducing the value of egalitarianism, and showing how this non-cognitive value shapes three alternative explanations of the Movius Line. It is argued that although these explanations are motivated by egalitarianism, they are nevertheless objective.

}, issn = {0926-3977}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/POSC\_a\_00111}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {beirlaen2013non, title = {Non-monotonic reasoning with normative conflicts in multi-agent deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {24}, number = {6}, year = {2013}, pages = {1179{\textendash}1207}, abstract = {

We present two multi-agent deontic logics that consistently accommodate various types of normative conflicts. Its language features modal operators for obligation and permission, and for the realization of individual and collective actions. The logic is non-classical since it makes use of a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective. Moreover, it is non-monotonic due to its definition within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The logic is equipped with a defeasible proof theory and semantics.

}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exs059}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {verdee2013non, title = {Non-monotonic set theory as a pragmatic foundation of mathematics}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {655{\textendash}680}, abstract = {

In this paper I propose a new approach to the foundation of mathematics: non-monotonic set theory. I present two completely different methods to develop set theories based on adaptive logics. For both theories there is a finitistic non-triviality proof and both theories contain (a subtle version of) the comprehension axiom schema. The first theory contains only a maximal selection of instances of the comprehension schema that do not lead to inconsistencies. The second allows for all the instances, also the inconsistent ones, but restricts the conclusions one can draw from them in order to avoid triviality. The theories have enough expressive power to form a justification/explication for most of the established results of classical mathematics. They are therefore not limited by G{\"o}del’s incompleteness theorems. This remarkable result is possible because of the non-recursive character of the final proofs of theorems of non-monotonic theories. I shall argue that, precisely because of the computational complexity of these final proofs, we cannot claim that non-monotonic theories are ideal foundations for mathematics. Nevertheless, thanks to their strength, first order language and the recursive dynamic (defeasible) proofs of theorems of the theory, the non-monotonic theories form (what I call) interesting pragmatic foundations.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-012-9296-5}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @proceedings {2973606, title = {An {A}ndersonian deontic logic with contextualized sanctions}, journal = {11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, DEON2012}, year = {2012}, pages = {151-169}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

We present a refinement of Anderson{\textquoteright}s reduction of deontic logic to modal logic with only alethic modalities. The refined proposal contextualizes the Andersonian sanction constant s by replacing it with a unary sanction operator S that is dependent on the concrete normative requirement that is violated. A formula S B is then for instance interpreted as ldquo B causes a sanctionrdquo or as ldquo B provides a reason for (the applicability of) a sanctionrdquo. Due to its modified sanction operator, the resulting logic DSL invalidates some instances of the inheritance principle. This gives rise to new interesting features. For instance, DSL consistently allows for the presence of conflicting obligations. Moreover, it provides novel insights in various central {\textquoteleft}paradoxes{\textquoteright} in deontic logic such as the Ross paradox, the paradox of the good Samaritan, and Forrester{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}gentle murderer{\textquoteright} paradox.

}, isbn = {9783642315695}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu}, editor = {Agotnes, Thomas and Broersen, Jan and Elgesem, Dag} } @article {3148353, title = {Numbers and propositions versus nominalists: yellow cards for {S}almon \& {S}oames}, journal = {ERKENNTNIS}, volume = {77}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {381{\textendash}397}, abstract = {

Salmon and Soames argue against nominalism about numbers and sentence types. They employ (respectively) higher-order and first-order logic to model certain natural language inferences and claim that the natural language conclusions carry commitment to abstract objects, partially because their renderings in those formal systems seem to do that. I argue that this strategy fails because the nominalist can accept those natural language consequences, provide them with plausible and non-committing truth conditions and account for the inferences made without committing themselves to abstract objects. I sketch a modal account of higher-order quantification, on which instead of ranging over sets, higher order quantifiers are used to make (logical) possibility claims about which predicate tokens can be introduced. This approach provides an alternative account of truth conditions for natural language sentences which seem to employ higher-order quantification, thus allowing the nominalist to evade Salmon{\textquoteright}s argument. I also show how the nominalist can account for the occurrence of apparently singular abstract terms in certain true statements. I argue that the nominalist can achieve this by, first, dividing singular terms into real singular terms (referring to concrete objects) and only apparent singular terms (called onomatoids), introduced for the sake of brevity and simplicity, and then providing an account of nominalistically acceptable truth conditions of sentences containing onomatoids. I develop such an account in terms of modally interpreted abstraction principles and argue that applying this strategy to Soames{\textquoteright}s argument allows the nominalists to defend themselves. One would hope and perhaps conjecture that the whole general set theory, however beautiful it is, will in the future disappear. With the higher types Platonism begins. The tendencies of Chwistek and others ({\textquoteright}Nominalism{\textquoteright}) of speaking only of what can be named are healthy. [Alfred Tarski](1)

}, issn = {0165-0106}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9402-7}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {primieronecessity, title = {On the necessity of (sometimes) being synthetic. {C}omment on {P}oggiolesi.}, booktitle = {Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information}, year = {2011}, pages = {63-68}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussels}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {2020633, title = {Needham{\textquoteright}s grand question revisited: on the meaning and justification of causal claims in the history of {C}hinese science}, journal = {East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine}, volume = {33}, year = {2011}, pages = {13{\textendash}32}, abstract = {

The Needham Question (i.e. the question why modern science has not developed in Chinese civilization but only in Europe) has drawn a substantial amount of criticism. Despite its apparent innocuousness, influential sinologists have written devastating critiques of it. These criticisms fall into two main categories. The first denies the validity of the central concepts by means of which the question is formulated (e.g. {\textquoteright}science’ or {\textquoteright}civilization’). The second calls into question (1) the legitimacy of asking for explanations of absences (i.e. of events that did not occur), (2) the legitimacy of citing absences as explanations (i.e. citing negative facts in explanations), and (3) whether the Needham question can be answered, even if asking for explanations of absences and citing absences as explanations are both legitimate. In this article, we take into account the former criticism, in order to arrive at a new starting point: dividing the Needham Problem into its various sub-questions. We then tackle the latter criticism by calling upon the contemporary philosophy of causation. We will argue that, according to certain theories of causation, the subquestions under discussion can be answered, and we will clarify how they can be argued for.

}, issn = {1562-918X}, author = {De Saeger, David and Weber, Erik} } @article {Urbaniak2010, title = {Neologicist nominalism}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {96}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {149-173}, abstract = {

The goal is to sketch a nominalist approach to mathematics which just like neologicism employs abstraction principles, but unlike neologicism is not committed to the idea that mathematical objects exist and does not insist that abstraction principles establish the reference of abstract terms. It is well-known that neologicism runs into certain philosophical problems and faces the technical difficulty of finding appropriate acceptability criteria for abstraction principles. I will argue that a modal and iterative nominalist approach to abstraction principles circumvents those difficulties while still being able to put abstraction principles to a foundational use.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-010-9279-x}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @conference {678587, title = {On the Nature and Origin of Algebraic Symbolism}, booktitle = {New Perspectives on Mathematical Practices. Essays in Philosophy and History of Mathematics.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing}, isbn = {978-981-281-222-3}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/etextbook/6810/6810\_chap01.pdf}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {1234666, title = {Newtonianism in {L}ocke, {H}ume, and {R}eid, or: how far can one stretch a label?}, journal = {Enlightenment and Dissent - Special}, volume = {25}, year = {2009}, pages = {62{\textendash}105}, issn = {0262-7612}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {Ducheyne2009, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s Theology and the Flow of Influence}, booktitle = {Future Perspectives on {N}ewton Scholarship and the {N}ewtonian Legacy}, year = {2009}, pages = {35-47}, publisher = {KVAB, Brussel}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {Primiero2009, title = {A note on constructive modalities for information}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {urbaniak2009note, title = {A note on identity and higher-order quantification.}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Logic}, volume = {7}, year = {2009}, pages = {48{\textendash}55}, abstract = {

It is a commonplace remark that the identity relation, even though not expressible in a first-order language without identity with classical set-theoretic semantics, can be de ned in a language without identity, as soon as we admit second-order, set-theoretically interpreted quanti ers binding predicate variables that range over all subsets of the domain. However, there are fairly simple and intuitive higher-order languages with set-theoretic semantics (where the variables range over all subsets of the domain) in which the identity relation is not de nable. The point is that the de nability of identity in higher-order languages not only depends on what variables range over, but also is sensitive to how predication is construed.

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {ciuciura2008negations, title = {Negations in the adjunctive discursive logic}, journal = {Bulletin of the Section of Logic}, volume = {37}, number = {3-4}, year = {2008}, pages = {143{\textendash}160}, abstract = {

In the logical literature, Discursive (or Discussive) Logic introduced by Stanis law Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski is seen as one of the earliest examples of the so-called paraconsistent logic. Nevertheless, there is some confusion over what discursive logic actually is. One of the possible sources of the confusion may be easily discerned; it comes from the fact that Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski published his two papers in Polish and their English translations appeared many years later.1 Up till 1999, no one but a Polish reader was able to read Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s paper on the discursive conjunction and, consequently some authors took discursive logic to be a foremost example of a non-adjunctive logic. The situation became even more complicated when da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas presented an axiomatization with discursive connectives as primitive symbols. It turned out that a connective of the discursive conjunction they considered did not correspond to any of Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s connectives. Thus, their axiomatization contained some axiom schemata that were not generally valid in Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s logic. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the confusion surrounding the discursive logic. We will present a direct semantics and axiomatization of Ja{\textasciiacute}skowski‘s adjunctive discursive logic and show how to define and axiomatize two additional connectives of negation.

}, author = {Ciuciura, Janusz} } @conference {428001, title = {Negative numbers as an epistemic difficult concept. Some lessons from history.}, booktitle = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics. Satellite Meeting of International Congress on Mathematical Education 11, 14 - 18 July 2008.}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Centro Cultural del M{\'e}xico Contemporan{\'e}o}, organization = {Centro Cultural del M{\'e}xico Contemporan{\'e}o}, abstract = {

Historical studies on the development of mathematical concepts will serve mathematics teachers to relate their students’ difficulties in understanding to conceptual problems in the history of mathematics. We argue that one popular tool for teaching about numbers, the number line, may not be fit for early teaching of operations involving negative numbers. Our arguments are drawn from the many discussions on negative numbers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from philosophers and mathematicians as Arnauld, Leibniz, Wallis, Euler and d’Alembert. Not only the division by negative numbers poses problems for the number line, but also the very idea of quantities smaller than nothing has been challenged. Drawing lessons from the history of mathematics we argue for the introduction of negative numbers in education within the context of symbolic operations.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Tzanakis, C.} } @incollection {531096, title = {Naar een Pluralistisch Model van Onderzoeksfinanciering in de Humane Wetenschappen}, booktitle = {Welke Universiteit Willen We (Niet)?}, year = {2007}, pages = {205{\textendash}216}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Het nieuwe Financieringsmodel voor het Hoger Onderwijs wordt vaak bekritiseerd vanuit argumentendie teruggaan op de eigenheid van de humane wetenschappen. Dit artikel poogt deze eigenheid preciezer teomschrijven en brengt de gevolgen voor de relatie tussen onderzoek en het tijdschriftenlandschap in kaart. Opbasis daarvan wordt de doelmatigheid betwist van het huidige voorstel, dat de effici{\"e}ntie van onderzoek wilverhogen door publicaties te wegen op basis van de tijdschriften waarin ze worden gepubliceerd. Dit betekentgeenszins dat een effici{\"e}ntere humane wetenschap onmogelijk is, alleen moet dat gebeuren op een manierwaarop haar pluralistische natuur niet wordt miskend. Hoe een dergelijk beleid er kan uitzien wordt daaromuitgewerkt in een aanzet naar een pluralististisch model van onderzoeksfinanciering in de humanewetenschappen.

}, isbn = {9789038211879}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/onderzoeksfinanciering.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier}, editor = {Loobuyck, Patrick and Vanheeswijck, G. and Van Herck, W.} } @booklet {heeffer2007near, title = {Near-optimal strategies for the game of Logik}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

Logik is an interesting variation of the game of Mastermind. For the latter several strategies have been proposed. We present some computational results for existing and new strategies applied to Logik. Our results give some indication on the scalability and applicability of these strategies to similar games.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Heeffer, Harold} } @article {ducheyne2007noodzakelijkheid, title = {Noodzakelijkheid bij {W}illiam {W}hewell: De ontwikkeling Van een concept}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2007}, pages = {239{\textendash}265}, abstract = {

The immense oeuvre of William Whewell (1794-1886), a Victorian monument by itself, has to some extent been treated in a stepmotherly fashion by philosophers and historiansof philosophy. This paper attempts to conceptually clarify Whewell{\textquoteright}s notion of necessity, which was a core notion in his philosophical project. The author also sketches in broad lines the historical development of this notion in Whewell{\textquoteright}s thinking and points tothe intertwinement between Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy and theology. Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophical work was deeply based on the history of science and his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas can be interpreted as an attempt to historicize Kant{\textquoteright}s transcendental categories.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {D:nds, title = {Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology.}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science and the Humanities}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {185{\textendash}209}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {

Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {326144, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s onto-theology versus {D}escartes{\textquoteright}s and {L}eibniz{\textquoteright}s: or on the relevance of unificatory tendencies in the secularization-process}, journal = {Theology and Science}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {71{\textendash}85}, issn = {1474-6700}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2005newton, title = {Newton’s notion and practice of unification}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {36}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

In this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newton’s Principia. I will clarify Newton’s notion (as can be found in Newton’s utterances on unification) and practice of unification (its actual occurrence in his scientific work). In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis (Kitcher, Salmon and Schurz). I will argue, after showing that neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’s account aptly capture Newton’s notion and practice of unification, that Salmon’s later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmon’s account in order to answer the question at stake.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.12.004}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {321509, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s training in the {A}ristotelian textbook tradition: From effects to causes and back}, journal = {History of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {141}, year = {2005}, pages = {217{\textendash}237}, issn = {0073-2753}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Vanderbeeken2004, title = {Naar een pluralisme van verklaringen in mens- en natuurwetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {60-69}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {D:eial, title = {The Need for Adaptive Logics in Epistemology}, booktitle = {Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {459{\textendash}485}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

After it is argued that philosophers of science have lost their interest in logic because they applied the wrong type of logics, examples are given of the forms of dynamic reasoning that are central for philosophy of science and epistemology. Adaptive logics are presented as a means to understand and explicate those forms of reasoning. All members of a specific (large) set of adaptive logics are proved to have a number of properties that warrant their formal decency and their suitability with respect to understanding and explicating dynamic forms of reasoning. Most of the properties extend to other adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Symons, John and Gabbay, Dov M. and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {haesaert2004non, title = {A non-probabilistic Approach to Inductive Prediction}, year = {2004}, abstract = {

The underlying idea behind the adaptive logics of inductive generalization is that most inductive reasoning can be explicated by simple qualitative means. Therefore, those classical models are selected that are ‘as uniform as possible ’ with respect to a certain set of (empirical) data. This led to the question if the same idea of uniformity can be applied if no generalizations are derivable. It is clear that in this case one may be still interested to make some direct inductive predictions. The main problem with this kind of prediction is that we lack a decision theory for it. In the present paper we make some proposals to deal with this problem. Our purpose here is to get more control over the difficult aspects of inductive prediction. In order to do so, we will not proceed in a probabilistic context, but we will apply the idea of minimizing the abnormalities in uniform models, an idea that derives from the adaptive logic programm. 1 Aim of this paper In our [1], we have presented some adaptive logics for induction based on Classical Logic (henceforth: CL). The underlying idea of these adaptive logics of induction is that most inductive reasoning does not proceed in terms of probabilities, and cannot be explicated in terms of probabilities, but can be explicated by rather simple qualitative means. In that paper we presented for example the adaptive logic for inductive generalization IL +m: from a set of data and (possibly falsified) background knowledge, inductive generalizations are ‘derived ’ 1. In the same paper we also

}, author = {Haesaert, Lieven} } @article {287734, title = {Non-spatiality and EPR-experiments according to the creation-discovery view}, journal = {Foundations of Physics Letters}, volume = {16}, number = {4}, year = {2003}, month = {August}, pages = {379{\textendash}387}, abstract = {

The creation-discovery interpretation of the EPR-experiments, developed by D. Aerts, draws our attention on the role of spacetime in our description of the physical world: the EPR-experiments give us reason to believe that quantum entities do not always exist in space. This interpretation of the quantum description would explain the peculiar correlations obtained in these experiments as arising from the most obvious candidate for a common cause, the entity described by the singlet state. The absence of unique and determinate localization as a criterium for individuation is met by a new physical ontology. We use it to obtain a better understanding of the interaction between quantum individuals and spacetime.

}, issn = {0894-9875}, doi = {10.1023/A:1025317910387}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {christiaens2003note, title = {A note concerning the place of contradictions in the ontologies of constitution}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {67{\textendash}72}, abstract = {

In this first section we start with defining the notions of inconsistency and para-consistency, we give an example of an inconsistency and clarify what according to us is the basic problem with respect to the occurrence of inconsistencies. We are then in a position to state the aim of this paper

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @proceedings {caleiro2001non, title = {Non-truth-functional fibred semantics}, journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence ({IC}-{AI}{\textquoteright}2001)}, volume = {2}, year = {2001}, pages = {841{\textendash}847}, publisher = {CSREA Press}, abstract = {

Until recently, truth-functionality has been considered essential to the mechanism for combining logics known as fibring. Following the first efforts towards extending fibred semantics to logics with nontruth- functional operators, this paper aims to clarify the subject at the light of ideas borrowed from the theory of general logics as institutions and the novel notion of non-truth-functional room. Besides introducing the relevant concepts and constructions, the paper presents a detailed worked example combining classical first-order logic with the paraconsistent propositional system C1, for which a meaningful semantics is obtained. The possibility of extending this technique to build rst-order versions of further logics of formal inconsistency is also discussed.

}, author = {Caleiro, Carlos and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Arabnia, Hamid R.} } @article {J:np, title = {Nieuwe perspectieven voor het begrijpen en bevorderen van creativiteit}, journal = {Mores}, volume = {40}, year = {1995}, pages = {164{\textendash}178}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {D:nhpc1, title = {Natural Heuristics for Proof Construction. {P}art {I}: Classical Propositional Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {32}, number = {127-128}, year = {1989}, note = {Appeared 1992}, pages = {337{\textendash}363}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:NRctt, title = {Nicholas {R}escher{\textquoteright}s coherence theory of truth}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {16}, number = {63-63}, year = {1973}, pages = {393{\textendash}411}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }