@article {BeirlaenForthcoming-BEIALF, title = {A Logic for the Discovery of Deterministic Causal Regularities}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {In Press}, pages = {1{\textendash}33}, author = {Mathieu Beirlaen and Bert Leuridan and Frederik Van De Putte} } @incollection {2045, title = {Logics of (formal and informal) provability}, booktitle = {Handbook of Formal Philosophy}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Pawlowski, Pawel}, editor = {Hansson, Sven Ove and Hendricks, Vincent F.} } @incollection {D:graham, title = {Looting Liars Masking Models}, booktitle = {Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency}, year = {2019}, pages = {139--164}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper does not raise objections but spells out problems that I consider at present unsolved within Priest{\textquoteright}s view on logic. In light of the state of scientific and other theories ({\textsection}2) and in light of the character of natural languages ({\textsection}3), Priest{\textquoteright}s central arguments do not seem convincing. Next, I offer some six independent obstacles for defining consistency, identifying models and describing the semantics and metatheory of LP ({\textsection}4).

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Ba{\c s}kent, Can and Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay} } @article {2125879, title = {On lawfulness in history and historiography}, journal = {HISTORY AND THEORY}, volume = {51}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {172{\textendash}192}, abstract = {

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward{\textquoteright}s notion of {\textacutedbl}invariance,{\textacutedbl}is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called {\textacutedbl}pragmatic laws{\textacutedbl}and {\textacutedbl}invariance{\textacutedbl}do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.

}, issn = {1468-2303}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00620.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Froeyman, Anton} } @article {D:campinas, title = {Logics for Qualitative Inductive Generalization}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {97}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

The paper contains a survey of (mainly unpublished) adaptive logics of inductive generalization. These defeasible logics are precise formulations of certain methods.\\ Some attention is also paid to ways of handling background knowledge, introducing mere conjectures, and the research guiding capabilities of the logics.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-010-9297-8}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {de2011looking, title = {Looking for busy beavers. A socio-philosophical study of a computer-assisted proof}, booktitle = {Foundations of the Formal Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {61{\textendash}90}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

"Young man, in mathematics you don{\textquoteright}t understand things, you just get used to them" John von Neumann

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @incollection {Christiaens2009, title = {La m{\'e}tamorphose gra{\c c}e au cin{\`e}ma.}, booktitle = {La m{\'e}tamorphose: d{\'e}finition, formes et th{\`e}mes}, year = {2009}, publisher = {G{\'e}rard Monfort Editeur}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Tatham, Anne-Marie and Bonnecase, Denis} } @article {weber2009laudation, title = {Laudatio Jens H{\o}yrup}, journal = {Sartoniana}, volume = {22}, year = {2009}, pages = {5{\textendash}7}, author = {Weber, Erik and Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Urbaniak2009b, title = {Leitgeb, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}about{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}, {Y}ablo}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {239-254}, abstract = {

Leitgeb (2002) objects against the clarity of the debate about the alleged (non-)circularity of Yablo’s paradox, arguing that there actually are at least two notions of self-reference and circularity at play.One, on which Yablo’s paradox is not circular, is defined via thereference of the constituents of a sentence, and another, on which the paradox is circular, is defined via syntactic mappings and fixedpoints. More importantly, Leitgeb argues that both definitions aren’t satisfactory and that before we can undertake a serious debate about the circularity of Yablo’s paradox we first need to clarify the notions involved. I will focus on Leitgeb’s criticism of the first definition1and will argue that the problems arise not as much on the level of our definition of circularity as on the level of our definition of reference of sentences (aboutness). Leitgeb’s main worry is the failure of a requirement called ‘Equivalence Condition’, which says that if a formula is self-referential, any formula logically equivalent to it should also be self-referential. I will argue that preservation under logical equivalence is unreasonable with respect to self-reference,but is indeed needed with respect to aboutness. Since Leitgeb’ sown tentative notion of aboutness doesn’t satisfy the requirement, I will suggest another approach which fixes this problem. I also explain why the intuitions that circularity should satisfy the equivalence condition are misled. Next, I argue that the new notion of aboutness is not susceptible to slingshot arguments. Finally, I compare it with Goodman’s notion of absolute aboutness, emphasizing those features of Goodman’s approach that make his notion inapplicable in the present discussion. [1]I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who discussed earlier versions of this paper with me: Hannes Leitgeb, Jeffrey Ketland, Karl Georg Niebergall, Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, Maarten Van Dyck, Stefan Wintein, Martin Bentzen, Christian Stra{\ss}er, Ghent Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science members, and the participants of PhDs in Logic workshop (Gent 2009)

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @book {689110, title = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Young Researchers Present their Work}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e} voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten}, isbn = {9789065690432}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @phdthesis {PhD_Bert, title = {Laws of Nature and Causality in the Special Sciences: A Philosophical and Formal Analysis}, year = {2008}, month = {March 13}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {urbaniak2008lesniewski, title = {Le{\'s}niewski and Russell{\textquoteright}s paradox: some problems}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {115{\textendash}146}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @phdthesis {PhD_Peter, title = {Logische Bewijsdynamieken voor de Formele Explicatie van Wetenschappelijke Probleemoplossingsprocessen}, year = {2008}, month = {April 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @incollection {370857, title = {Learning concepts through the history of mathematics: the case of symbolic algebra.}, booktitle = {Philosophical dimensions in mathematics education}, year = {2007}, pages = {83{\textendash}103}, publisher = {Springer}, isbn = {978-0-387-71571-1}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {Christiaens2006, title = {Lichamelijkheid en cinema volgens een {A}posteliaanse ontologie}, journal = {Esthetica. Tijdschrift voor kunst en filosofie}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {1{\textendash}8}, abstract = {

In 1998 verschenen twee opmerkelijke films, Saving Private Ryan van Steven Spielberg en The Thin Red Line van Terrence Malick. De overeenkomsten tussen deze producties zijn oppervlakkig: ze gaan beide over de Tweede Wereldoorlog en het zijn allebei grote Hollywoodproducties. De verschillen daarentegen zijn diepgaand en nodigen uit tot nadenken over de aard van film. Ik zal eerst enkele verschillen en contrasten tussen genoemde films schetsen, bij wijze van inleiding tot de thema’s ontologie, cinema en lichamelijkheid. Daarna komen in (2) de volgende onderwerpen aan de orde: (2.1) film is het tot stand komen van een lichamelijkheid binnen onze eigen lichamelijkheid; en voorts (2.2) lichamelijkheid is een ontologisch proces. De ontologie waarbinnen ik werk is gebaseerd op de inzichten van Leo Apostel. In dit deel zal ik daarom ook de centrale aspecten van de Aposteliaanse ontologie beschrijven. Ik zal verder (3.) een verband leggen tussen de cinema van Malick en de Aposteliaanse ontologie. Op basis van deze ontologie maak ik in (4.) een onderscheid tussen films zoals Saving Private Ryan, waarin het ontologische (de lichamelijkheid) impliciet gehouden wordt, en films zoals The Thin Red Line die dat niet doen.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {heeffer2006logic, title = {The logic of disguise: {D}escartes{\textquoteright} discovery of the Sine Law}, journal = {Historia scientiarum. International Journal of the History of Science Society of Japan}, volume = {16}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {144{\textendash}165}, abstract = {

The discovery of the sine law of refraction by Decartes has been a source of controversy since its first publication in 1637. Scholars describe Descartes’ demonstration of the law as inadequate and implausible or see in his proof an attempt to cover up plagiarism. Most of this critique stems from a lack of understanding the Cartesian theory of explanation. Descartes aims in the Discourse to find undoubtable knowledge that serves as a basis for his natural philosophy. In his Principles of Philosophy he deduces from his metaphysics several laws of nature and additional rules. However, for the explanation on physical phenomena, Descartes adopts a method different from the one proposed in his Discourse. This paper discusses the logical structure of the demonstration and provides an analysis of the premises and conclusions used in the derivation of the sine law. It is argued that Descartes’s explanation of refraction is a continuation of the perspectivists tradition and, ironically, Fermat’s account of 1662 is better application of the Cartesian method.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {D:induct1a, title = {On a Logic of Induction}, journal = {Logic and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {IV}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, note = {(Corrected version of \cite{D:induct1}.)}, pages = {3{\textendash}32}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present a simple and straightforward logic of induction: a consequence relation characterized by a proof theory and a semantics. This system will be called LI. The premises will be restricted to, on the one hand, a set of empirical data and, on the other hand, a set of background generalizations. Among the consequences will be generalizations as well as singular statements, some of which may serve as predictions and explanations.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {ducheyne2005lessons, title = {Lessons from {G}alileo: The pragmatic model of shared characteristics of scientific representation}, journal = {Philosophia naturalis}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {214{\textendash}234}, abstract = {

In this paper I will defend a new account of scientific representation. I will begin by looking at the benefits and drawbacks of two recent accounts on scientific representation: Hughes’ DDI account and Su{\'a}rez’ inferential account. Next I use some of Galileo’s models in the Discorsi as a heuristic tool for a better account of scientific representation. Next I will present my model. The main idea of my account, which I refer to as the pragmatic model of shared characteristics (PMSC), is that a model represents, if and only if, (1) a person accepts that there is a set of shared characteristics between the model and its target; (2) this set has the inferential power to generate results which can be tested empirically; (3) and the corresponding test(s) of these results is/are in agreement with our data and the specific cognitive goals we have in mind.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Guido, title = {Logica en het Waardevolle in de Wereld. De Rol van Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s bij de Constructie van Theorie{\"e}n}, year = {2004}, month = {May 12}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @phdthesis {PhD_Kristof, title = {Logica in Communicatie. Bijdragen vanuit Vraaglogica en {\textquoteright}Belief Revision{\textquoteright}, Steunend op Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s}, year = {2004}, month = {September 3}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Clercq, Kristof} } @article {VanBouwel2002a, title = {The Living Apart Together Relationship between Causation and Explanation. {A} comment on {J}ean {L}achappelle.}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, year = {2002}, pages = {560-569}, doi = {10.1177/004839302237837}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {402962, title = {A logical approach to the analysis of metaphors}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, volume = {25}, year = {2002}, pages = {21{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will present an adaptive logic that grasps the way we analyze metaphors. Metaphors are powerful tools to generate new scientific ideas. Therefore, it is important to have a good theory on what metaphors are and how they function. The first question we have to answer when we want to develop such a theory is obviously {\textacutedbl}what metaphors are{\textacutedbl}. Philosophy of language can offer some interesting ideas but most views do not allow for a cognitive function of metaphors. One of the sparse views that does allow for it is interactionism. The basic version, however, has some serious shortcomings that need solving when we want to use this theory. First of all the terminology is too vague. Furthermore, the description of the reasoning process we use when we analyze a metaphor, only works for very simple examples. The logic I will present, ALM, is based on a broadened version of this view. A logical approach of metaphors allows us to gain a profound insight in the way we analyze metaphors. The analysis of metaphors is a dynamical reasoning process. When we want to capture this process in a logical system, we need a logic that is capable of grasping that specific type of dynamics. An adaptive logic seems to be the best choice. Therefore, I shall present an adaptive logic that grasps the analysis of metaphors.

}, isbn = {1402007124}, author = {D{\textquoteright}Hanis, Isabel}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Nersessian, Nancy and Pizzi, Claudio} } @incollection {Amo2002, title = {A Logical Framework for Integrating Inconsistent Information in Multiple Databases}, booktitle = {Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {2284}, year = {2002}, pages = {67-84}, publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, abstract = {

When integrating data coming from multiple different sources we are faced with the possibility of inconsistency in databases. In this paper, we use one of the paraconsistent logics introduced in [9,7] (LFI1) as a logical framework to model possibly inconsistent database instances obtained by integrating different sources.We propose a method based on the sound and complete tableau proof system of LFI1 to treat both the integration process and the evolution of the integrated database submitted to users updates. In order to treat the integrated database evolution, we introduce a kind of generalized database context, the evolutionary databases, which are databases having the capability of storing and manipulating inconsistent information and, at the same time, allowing integrity constraints to change in time. We argue that our approach is sufficiently general and can be applied in most circumstances where inconsistency may arise in databases.

}, isbn = {978-3-540-43220-3}, doi = {10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45758-5_5}, author = {de Amo, Sandra and Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o}, editor = {Eiter, Thomas and Schewe, Klaus-Dieter} } @incollection {DJ:lpe, title = {On the Logic and Pragmatics of the Process of Explanation}, booktitle = {Explanatory Connections. {E}lectronic Essays Dedicated to Matti Sintonen}, year = {2001}, note = {

22\ pp.

}, publisher = {University of Helsinki}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present mainly two logical systems that clarify pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. The first concerns a proof theory that leads to the derivation of possible initial conditions from an \emph{explanandum} and a given theory. The second logic concerns the derivation of questions in view of the verification of some possible initial condition, or of one out of several possible initial conditions. It is essential that the latter derivation proceeds in terms of all available knowledge, and not in terms of the explaining theory. It is shown that the second logic provides useful information for explicating further pragmatic aspects of the process of explanation. Several extensions of the logics are argued to be both useful and rather easy to obtain.

}, url = {http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/kfil/matti/}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Kiikeri, Mika and Ylikoski, Petri} } @article {D:l\&om, title = {Linguistic and Ontological Measures for Comparing the Inconsistent Parts of Models}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {5{\textendash}33}, abstract = {

Adaptive logics depend essentially on measures for the degree of abnormality of models. The linguistic approach to such measures compares the sets of abnormal, e.g., inconsistent wffs verified by the models. The ontological approach compares models in terms of {\textquoteleft}structural{\textquoteright} properties that do not depend on the way in which the language is interpreted in the model.

While the linguistic approach has not been questioned up to now, present proposals for an ontological approach are affected by several weaknesses. The present paper argues for the attractiveness of an ontological approach and elaborates on the challenge to adequately define it. The final outcome is rather negative: the only sensible definition attained leads to a logic that does not seem to have any suitable application contexts.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {VanBendegem1997, title = {L.E.J. Brouwer.}, journal = {Kritisch Denkerslexicon}, volume = {23}, year = {1997}, pages = {1-14}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @book {D:tfg, title = {Leo Apostel. {T}ien filosofen getuigen}, series = {Leo Apostel. {T}ien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, organization = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @book {D:logica, title = {Logicaboek. {P}raktijk en theorie van het redeneren}, year = {1992}, publisher = {Garant}, organization = {Garant}, address = {Antwerpen/Apeldoorn}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:ladl, title = {Leo {A}postel on Dialectical Logic}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of {L}eo {A}postel, vol. 2: {D}escriptive and Critical Essays}, year = {1989}, pages = {24{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand and Pinxten, Rik} }