@incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {978-94-014-5589-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @article {3152328, title = {Kuhn and the question of pursuit worthiness}, journal = {Topoi - An International review of philosophy}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn{\textquoteright}s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn{\textquoteright}s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.

}, issn = {0167-7411}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9144-9}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {1854786, title = {Kant and {W}hewell on bridging principles between metaphysics and science}, journal = {Kant Studien}, volume = {102}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {22{\textendash}45}, abstract = {

In this essay, I call attention to Kant{\textquoteright}s and Whewell{\textquoteright}s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant{\textquoteright}s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or {\textquoteright}Mittelbegriffe{\textquoteright} (henceforth this problem is referred to as {\textquoteright}the bridging-problem{\textquoteright}). It will be argued, on the basis of a close reading of Whewell{\textquoteright}s Notebooks on Induction, that Whewell{\textquoteright}s account of the Idea of Cause (and by extension, his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas in general) grew out of his dissatisfaction with Kantian philosophy of science and its seeming inability to solve the bridging-problem. This analysis throws new light on the importance of Kantianism in Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy, for it will be shown that Whewell took over and transformed Kant{\textquoteright}s idea of a priori principles as conditions for the establishment of proper knowledge about the world (without always clinging to Kant{\textquoteright}s exact differentiation between them) and that Whewell was trying to address a typical Kantian topic: namely, to show how scientific knowledge could be both empirical and necessary and how the gap between metaphysics and physics could be bridged.

}, issn = {0022-8877}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/KANT.2011.002}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1078347, title = {Kuhn and coherentist epistemology}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {322{\textendash}327}, abstract = {

The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) ‘the weak notion of rationality’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.003}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {683842, title = {Kuhn{\textquoteright}s paradox of thought experiments resolved}, journal = {The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {111{\textendash}125}, issn = {1944-3676}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @book {371039, title = {Kennis ontrafeld: {v}ijftien hedendaagse filosofen over wetenschap, ethiek en metafysica.}, year = {2005}, pages = {155 p.}, publisher = {Garant}, organization = {Garant}, isbn = {90-441-1781-5}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {217593, title = {Kepler{\textquoteright}s near discovery of the sine law: a qualitative computational model.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {93{\textendash}102}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, abstract = {

Computational models offer an excellent tool for the study and analysis of scientific discovery processes. The study of failures provides an insight into the history and philosophy of science as valuable as the study of successful discoveries. Using a computational model I analyzed Kepler’s approach in formulating a quantitative law for refraction. Although Kepler ultimately failed in discovering the sine law, the model shows that his basic hypothesis as well as his approach by geometrical reasoning was a correct one. This went largely unnoticed by commentators on the history of optics. Based on this analysis I provide new evidence that Descartes and Snell found in Kepler’s main hypothesis everything needed to deduce the sine law by pure geometrical reasoning. Our computational model is based on geometrical knowledge as contrasted with previous quantitative approaches. It has been implemented as a Prolog program.

}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {D:goedel, title = {Kurt {G}{\"o}del en de wetenschappelijke zekerheid}, booktitle = {Nieuwe visies in de wetenschap}, year = {1989}, pages = {43{\textendash}66}, publisher = {Acco}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Kint, J.} }