@article {pouliasis2014j, title = {J-Calc: A typed lambda calculus for Intuitionistic Justification Logic}, journal = {Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {300}, year = {2014}, pages = {71{\textendash}87}, abstract = {

In this paper we offer a system J-Calc that can be regarded as a typed λ -calculus for the {{\textrightarrow},\&\#8869;} fragment of Intuitionistic Justification Logic. We offer different interpretations of J-Calc, in particular, as a two phase proof system in which we proof check the validity of deductions of a theory Τ based on deductions from a stronger theory Τ{\textquoteright} and computationally as a type system for separate compilations. We establish some first metatheoretic results.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.entcs.2013.12.012}, author = {Pouliasis, Konstantinos and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {wieland2013justification, title = {Is Justification Dialectical?}, journal = {International Journal for the Study of Skepticism}, volume = {3}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {182{\textendash}201}, abstract = {

Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they ha ve in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in ord er to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow tha t one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it agains t challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its most interesting format. In this paper I zoom i n on this debate, and fix further details of Lammenranta’s lead. Specifically , I will side with skepticism that justification is dialectical, yet o nly if certain conditions are in place.

}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {432906, title = {J. B. {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}{D}e {T}empore{\textquoteright} as an influence on {I}saac {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute time}, journal = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {90}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {216{\textendash}228}, abstract = {

Here, I shall argue that Van Helmont needs to be added to the list of sources on which Newton drew when formulating his doctrine of absolute time. This by no means implies that Van Helmont is the factual source of Newton{\textquoteright}s views on absolute time (I have found no clear-cut evidence in support of this claim). It is by no means my aim to debunk the importance of the other sources, but rather to broaden them. Different authors help to explain different aspects of Newton{\textquoteright}s conception of absolute time.

}, issn = {0003-9101}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {441499, title = {JS {M}ill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction: From True Causes to Provisional Ones}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {361{\textendash}376}, abstract = {

In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill conceived of the certainty of inductive generalisations and to offer a systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of Mill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill{\textquoteright}s views on the certainty of knowledge changed over time and that this change was accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later editions of The System of Logic as conceived by the late Mill was no longer that by the Canons of Induction we can establish scientific certainty and true causes, but rather that the Canons are useful in establishing causal laws in a provisional way. Deduction is a game and induction a grievance. (Bagehot 1913, vol. 3, p. 37)

}, issn = {0144-5340}, doi = {10.1080/01445340802164377}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340802164377}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {362595, title = {Johannes {B}aptista {V}an {H}elmonts experimentele aanpak: een poging tot omschrijving}, journal = {Gewina, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Techniek}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}25}, issn = {0928-303X}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {354192, title = {Joan {B}aptiste {V}an {H}elmont and the question of experimental modernism}, journal = {Physis: Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza}, volume = {43}, year = {2005}, pages = {305{\textendash}332}, abstract = {

In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Joan Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as ‘‘modern.’’ Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice has been. I will argue – after having analysed some of Van Helmont’s experiments such as his tree experiment, ice experiment, and thermoscope experiment – that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and, ultimately, in relatively closed physical systems such as, paradigmatically, the vessel, globe, or sphere [vas, globus, sphera]). After having reviewed some alternative options, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification is the feature that best characterizes his contributions to ‘‘modern’’ experimentation.

}, issn = {0031-9414}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} }