@article {heefferinterpretation, title = {On the interpretation of early Italian bartering problems}, year = {Submitted}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {RaD:i, title = {Induction}, booktitle = {Handbook of Formal Philosophy}, year = {2018}, publisher = {Springer}, keywords = {induction, logic, probability}, isbn = {978-3-319-77433-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Hansson, Sven Ove and Hendricks, Vincent F.} } @incollection {Wieland2014, title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {247-260}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

}, keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism}, isbn = {978-94-017-9010-9}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_13}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @phdthesis {3257462, title = {{\textquoteright}I began with the desire to speak with the dead{\textquoteright}: de ethiek als {\textquoteright}eerste filosofie{\textquoteright} van de geschiedschrijving}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, isbn = {9789083125053}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {3134040, title = {The ICE-theory of technical functions}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {23{\textendash}44}, issn = {0815-0796}, doi = {10.1007/s11016-012-9642-9}, author = {Weber, Erik and Reydon, Thomas and Boon, Mieke and Houkes, Wybo and Vermaas, Pieter} } @article {MCJ:iadlnc, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative Conflicts}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {285{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic \sys{DP}$^r$, a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts. On the other hand, \sys{DP}$^r$ still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (\sys{SDL}). \sys{DP}$^r$ interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to \sys{SDL}. Whereas some \sys{SDL}-rules are verified unconditionally by \sys{DP}$^r$, others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of \sys{DP}$^r$

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9221-3}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke} } @article {4443727, title = {Induction from a single instance: {I}ncomplete frames}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {641{\textendash}653}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9295-6}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {4118013, title = {Inferential explanations in biology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, volume = {44}, year = {2013}, pages = {356{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {DeVreese2012, title = {An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {55-71}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, abstract = {

In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the {\textquoteleft}truth{\textquoteright} about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White{\textquoteright}s theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity

}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {Prim_Intu_lo, title = {Intuitionistic Logic of Proofs with dependent proof terms}, year = {2012}, abstract = {

The basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by expressions of the form "s is a proof of A", for any proposition A. In this paper we explore the extension of its intuitionistic fragment to a language including expressions of the form "t is a proof of B, dependent from sbeing a proof of A". We aim at laying down a ground comparison with equivalent constructions present in theories of dependent types, especially those similarly based on the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics. We further translate this extended language to a natural deduction calculus which allows for a double interpretation of the construction on which a proof term may depend: as actually proven, or valid assumption, or as possibly proven, locally true assumption. We show meta-theoretical properties for this calculus and explain normalisation to a language with only unconditional proofs. We conclude by stating the characterization of our calculus with standard intutionistic logic of proofs

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {D:CL-, title = {It might have been {C}lassical {L}ogic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {218}, year = {2012}, pages = {241{\textendash}279}, abstract = {

In this paper, a propositional logic Q is presented. This logic is more attractive than classical propositional logic P for explicating actual proofs. Moreover, while Q and P assign the same consequence set to consistent premise sets, Q assigns a sensible and non-trivial consequence set to in- consistent premise sets.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {1223153, title = {The IARC and mechanistic evidence}, booktitle = {Causality in the Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {91{\textendash}109}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. For each agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review IARC{\textquoteright}s carcinogenicity evaluations. First we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures - more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problems of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, viz. How we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings.

}, isbn = {9780199574131}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik}, editor = {McKay Illari, Phyllis and Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @article {3144317, title = {Incommensurability and rationality in engineering design: the case of functional decomposition}, journal = {SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY \& TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {118{\textendash}136}, issn = {1091-8264}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar} } @article {1890961, title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {1104693, title = {The intended window of epistemic opportunity: a comment on Miriam Solomon}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that Miriam Solomon fails to show that medical consensus conferences, as organised by the National Institute of Health (NIH), miss the intended window of epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007: 170), and thus typically take place after the experts have reached consensus. This is done, on the one hand, by differentiating between, what I intend to call, {\textquoteleft}academic{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}non-academic consensus{\textquoteright}, and, on the other hand, by analyzing the arguments and argumentation style Solomon uses to make her claim explicit. At the very least, the overall argument suggests that her statement is inadequately supported, if not that the opposite claim is true. In this manner, I intend to bring additional insight into the notion of {\textquoteleft}consensus{\textquoteright} when applied in scientific practice. Any decision as to change the NIH consensus development program should take these actual achievements into account.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {734645, title = {Inconsistency-adaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {1-2}, year = {2010}, pages = {31{\textendash}61}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive logics, namely inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, url = {http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @article {DeLanghe2010, title = {Increasing returns in science: a model of the dynamics of scientific activity}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {278-294}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Greiff, Matthias} } @incollection {909570, title = {Introduction: Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics, Its Crisis and Challenge}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. {A} Selection of Topics From a Methodological Perspective}, year = {2009}, pages = {4{\textendash}9}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, isbn = {978-981-4295-81-9}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @article {683771, title = {Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Of The Church{\textquoteright} Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva}, journal = {European journal of science and theology}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {25{\textendash}35}, abstract = {

In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s manuscript {\textquoteright}Of the Church{\textquoteright} (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.

}, issn = {1841-0464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Rusu, Iulian} } @article {420317, title = {An introduction to wasan, native {J}apanese mathematics}, journal = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics}, volume = {68}, year = {2008}, pages = {20{\textendash}24}, issn = {N/A}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/11413}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Ducheyne2007a, title = {"Ignorance is Bliss": On {B}ernard {N}ieuwentijt{\textquoteright}s {D}octrina {I}gnorantia and His Contribution to Our Understanding of Scientific Idealisation}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {699-710}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {WaartvanGulik2007, title = {On the Implementation of Concept Structures in Fuzzy Logic.}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the European Cognitive Science Conference 2007}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

A procedure is presented which can modify a large number of fuzzy logics in such a way that the result integrates a logically meaningful representation of the family resemblance structure of fuzzy concepts. The most important aspect of this modification is the implementation of so-called ‘concept matrices’. The interpretation and construction of these new formal objects is based upon Fintan Costello’s ‘Diagnostic Evidence Model’ (2000), a contemporary cognitive scientific model of concept structure and concept combination. As a result, it becomes possible to formalize, explain and simulate new logical aspects of cognitive fuzziness such as meaning transformations by means of non-scalar hedges, and interpretational and inferential operations over non-intersective concept combinations.

}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Vosniadou, S. and Kayser, D. and Athanassios, P.} } @incollection {VanBouwel2006, title = {The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations.}, booktitle = {Progress in Social Psychology Research}, series = {Advances in social psychology research}, year = {2006}, pages = {83{\textendash}95}, publisher = {Nova Science}, isbn = {1594546584}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Arlsdale, John Z.} } @article {683834, title = {Imagination{\textquoteright}s Grip on Science}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {222{\textendash}239}, abstract = {

In part because {\textacutedbl}imagination{\textacutedbl} is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.

}, issn = {0026-1068}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @incollection {386241, title = {INUS Conditions}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science}, volume = {2}, year = {2005}, pages = {955{\textendash}958}, publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons}, isbn = {0470860804}, author = {Horsten, Leon and Weber, Erik} } @article {307814, title = {Imperialistische tendensen in de economiebeoefening en politieke wetenschappen. {O}ver heterodoxie en pluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {32{\textendash}45}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {397669, title = {Introduction: beyond Empiricism in the Social Explanation of Action}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {197{\textendash}201}, issn = {1386-9795}, doi = {10.1080/1386979042000258303}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Cuypers, Stefaan} } @article {J:i\&ds, title = {Inconsistencies and the Dynamics of Science}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {129{\textendash}148}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:defprog, title = {In Defence of a Programme for Handling Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {129{\textendash}150}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

This paper states and defends the philosophical programme underlying the Ghent approach to adaptive logics. Two central arguments are epistemic in nature, one logical. The underlying claim is that even people with rather classical views should see adaptive logics as the only sensible way to handle the inconsistencies that regularly arise in human knowledge, including scientific theories.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {J:clau2, title = {Inconsistencies in Scientific Discovery. {C}lausius{\textquoteright}s Remarkable Derivation of {C}arnot{\textquoteright}s Theorem}, booktitle = {History of Modern Physics. {A}cta of the XXth International Congress of History of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Brepols}, address = {Turnhout (Belgium)}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Krach, Helghe and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @incollection {152589, title = {Inconsistencies in the history of mathematics: the case of infinitesimals.}, booktitle = {Inconsistency in Science}, series = {Origins}, volume = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}57}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper I will not confine myself exclusively to historical considerations. Both philosophical and technical matters will be raised, all with the purpose of trying to understand (better) what Newton, Leibniz and the many precursors (might have) meant when they talked about infinitesimals. The technical part will consist of an analysis why apparently infinitesimals have resisted so well to be formally expressed. The philosophical part, actually the most important part of this paper, concerns a discussion that has been going on for some decennia now. After the Kuhnian revolution in philosophy of science, notwithstanding Kuhn’s own suggestion that mathematics is something quite special, the question was nevertheless asked how mathematics develops. Are there revolutions in mathematics? If so, what do we have to think of? If not, why do they not occur? Is mathematics the so often claimed totally free creation of the human spirit? As usual, there is a continuum of positions, but let me sketch briefly the two extremes: the completists (as I call them) on the one hand, and the contingents (as I call them as well) on the other hand.

}, isbn = {1-4020-0630-6}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6_3}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {vermeir2002inconsistency, title = {An Inconsistency-Adaptive Proof Procedure for Logic Programming}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. The Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {323-340}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

It is the goal of this paper to de ne a paraconsistent proof procedure that has the best of two mechanisms, in casu logic programming and inconsistency-adaptive logics. From logic programming we will maintain the ease of computing, and from adaptive logics their paraconsistency, dynamics and non-monotonicity. This will be done by combining the notion of competitor from logic programming together with the conditionallity that is common in all adaptive proofs.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {152512, title = {Isaac Newton on space and time: metaphysician or not?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2002}, pages = {77{\textendash}114}, abstract = {

But whereas we can blame Bohr, Schrodinger and Einstein for our problems, Newton has only God to blame for his. (Tamny, 1979: 58). After all, if Newton does not believe in the reality of space and time themselves, over and above the material inhabitants of them, who does? (Sklar, 1990: 68).

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Vermeir_inconsistency-adaptivearithmetic, title = {Inconsistency-adaptive Arithmetic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {167-168}, year = {2000}, pages = {221-241}, abstract = {

In this article, it is shown that inconsistent arithmetic, as proposed by Jean Paul Van Bendegem and Graham Priest, does not have all the properties they claim the system has. The search for a system of inconsistent arithmetic that does have the intended properties, will lead us through different axiomatizations and different logics, the final result being inconsistency-adaptive arithmetic.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy} } @incollection {D:ial, title = {Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Logic at Work. {E}ssays Dedicated to the Memory of {H}elena {R}asiowa}, year = {1999}, pages = {445{\textendash}472}, publisher = {Physica Verlag (Springer)}, address = {Heidelberg, New York}, abstract = {

After a general description of adaptive logics and their intended applications, I study the proof theory and semantics of two closely related predicative inconsistency-adaptive logics, ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. To this end, I first describe their monotonic basis: the paraconsistent logic CLuN obtained by dropping the consistency requirement from classical logic. The propositional fragments of these inconsistency-adaptive logics have been studied elsewhere. The predicative versions involve several interesting difficulties that lead to new results.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Or{\l}owska, Ewa} } @article {109726, title = {Introduction.}, journal = {FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {231{\textendash}234}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:i\&b, title = {Inconsistencies and Beyond. {A} Logical-Philosophical Discussion}, journal = {Revue Internationale de Philosophie}, volume = {200}, year = {1997}, pages = {259{\textendash}273}, abstract = {

The paper starts off by epistemological arguments for the need of paraconsistent logics. Next it is argued that some contexts require that one allows for other abnormalities, next to or instead of inconsistencies. The feasibility of such moves is defended in terms of a contextual epistemology. Finally, adaptive logics are defended as means to interpret theories {\textquoteleft}as normally as possible{\textquoteright}, even if they contain some abnormalities.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {DJ:real, title = {In-world realism vs. reflective realism.}, booktitle = {Realism in the Sciences}, year = {1996}, pages = {35{\textendash}53}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, address = {Leuven}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Douven, Igor and Horsten, Leon} } @article {van1995defence, title = {In defence of discrete space and time}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {38}, number = {150-151-152}, year = {1995}, pages = {127-150}, abstract = {

In this paper several arguments are discussed and evaluated concerning the possibility of discrete space and time.

}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {D:ialfnm, title = {Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Non-Monotonic Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1994}, note = {Appeared 1996}, pages = {57{\textendash}94}, abstract = {

This paper contains the reconstruction of (what I shall call) mixed non-monotonic logics as a combination of a deductive and a preferential component. The first leads from the premises to a possibly inconsistent consequence set; the second weeds out the inconsistencies. Among the candidates for the deductive component inconsistency-adaptive logics prove most suitable. The ensuing preferential component is formulated in terms of models and is itself split into two parts: (i) a transparent, purely logical procedure leads from a set of inconsistent models to a set of associated consistent models and (ii) the choice between the latter relies on the preferences. The real fight between mixed non-monotonic logics should concentrate on this last aspect. The outlined approach has a broader domain of application than mixed non-monotonic logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {VanMeirvenne1994, title = {Indexed Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1994}, pages = {41-55}, author = {Van Meirvenne, Joachim} } @article {241633, title = {The indirect practical functions of explanations}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, year = {1993}, pages = {105{\textendash}124}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {WE_In, title = {Introduction}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, year = {1993}, pages = {5{\textendash}7}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {D:incomm, title = {Incommensurability is not a threat to the rationality of science or to the anti-dogmatic tradition}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {32}, year = {1983}, pages = {117{\textendash}132}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:ind, title = {Inductie}, booktitle = {Standaard Encyclopedia voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs}, year = {1977}, pages = {180}, publisher = {Standaard}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Block, A. and Ten Have, T.T. and De Keyser, C.C.} } @incollection {D:_inf, title = {Inferentie}, booktitle = {Standaard Encyclopedie voor Opvoeding en Onderwijs}, year = {1977}, pages = {382{\textendash}383}, publisher = {Standaard}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Block, A. and Ten Have, T.T. and De Keyser, C.C.} } @article {D:il, title = {Inductieve logica. {E}en inleiding tot enkele basisproblemen}, journal = {Communicatie en Cognitie}, volume = {3}, year = {1969}, pages = {128{\textendash}154}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }