@article {4443711, title = {Groepsbeslissingen: kwaliteit, autoriteit en vertrouwen}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, year = {In Press}, author = {Baartmans, Tim and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433-455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {diez2013general, title = {General theories of explanation: buyer beware}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {379{\textendash}396}, abstract = {

We argue that there is no general theory of explanation that spans the sciences, mathematics, and ethics, etc. More specifically, there is no good reason to believe that substantive and domain-invariant constraints on explanatory information exist. Using Nickel (No{\^u}s 44(2):305–328, 2010) as an exemplar of the contrary, generalist position, we first show that Nickel’s arguments rest on several ambiguities, and then show that even when these ambiguities are charitably corrected, Nickel’s defense of general theories of explanation is inadequate along several different dimensions. Specifically, we argue that Nickel’s argument has three fatal flaws. First, he has not provided any compelling illustrations of domain-invariant constraints on explanation. Second, in order to fend off the most vehement skeptics of domain-invariant theories of explanation, Nickel must beg all of the important questions. Third, Nickel’s examples of explanations from different domains with common explanatory structure rely on incorrect formulations of the explanations under consideration, circular justifications, and/or a mischaracterization of the position Nickel intends to critique. Given that the best and most elaborate defense of the generalist position fails in so many ways, we conclude that the standard practice in philosophy (and in philosophy of science in particular), which is to develop theories of explanation that are tailored to specific domains, still is justified. For those who want to buy into a more ambitious project: beware of the costs!

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-011-0020-8}, author = {D{\'\i}ez, Jos{\'e} and Khalifa, Kareem and Leuridan, Bert} } @incollection {de2013generating, title = {Generating, solving and the mathematics of {H}omo {S}apiens. {E}mil {P}ost’s views on computation}, booktitle = {A Computable Universe: Understanding and Exploring Nature as Computation}, year = {2013}, pages = {45{\textendash}62}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishers}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Zenil, H.} } @article {4443766, title = {G{\"o}delizing the Yablo sequence}, journal = {Journal of philosophical logic}, volume = {42}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {679{\textendash}695}, abstract = {

We investigate what happens when {\textquoteright}truth{\textquoteright} is replaced with {\textquoteright}provability{\textquoteright} in Yablo{\textquoteright}s paradox. By diagonalization, appropriate sequences of sentences can be constructed. Such sequences contain no sentence decided by the background consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical theory. If the provability predicate satisfies the derivability conditions, each such sentence is provably equivalent to the consistency statement and to the Godel sentence. Thus each two such sentences are provably equivalent to each other. The same holds for the arithmetization of the existential Yablo paradox. We also look at a formulation which employs Rosser{\textquoteright}s provability predicate.

}, issn = {0022-3611}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9244-4}, author = {Cie{\'s}li{\'n}ski, Cezary and Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {frans2012game, title = {The Game of Fictional Mathematics. {R}eview of “Mathematics and Reality” by {M}ary {L}eng}, journal = {Constructivist Foundations}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {126{\textendash}128}, abstract = {

Leng attacks the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. She offers an account that treats the role of mathematics in science as an indispensable and useful part of theories, but retains nonetheless a fictionalist position towards mathematics. The result is an account of mathematics that is interesting for constructivists. Her view towards the nominalistic part of science is, however, more in conflict with radical constructivism.

}, author = {Frans, Joachim} } @article {3139252, title = {The generation of abductive explanations from inconsistent theories}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {400{\textendash}416}, abstract = {

In this article I will show how the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the {\textquoteright}inconsistency-adaptive{\textquoteright} logic CLuN(r)from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250) called pCLuN(r) allows for generating sensible abductive explanations from finite inconsistent theories. Before this is shown, I give a more general account on how goal-directed proof procedures contribute to the study of abduction as backward reasoning. Between these two parts, I describe the goal-directed proof procedure for the propositional fragment of the {\textquoteright}inconsistency-adaptive{\textquoteright} logic CLuNr from Batens (2005, J. Appl. Logic, 3, 221-250).

}, issn = {1367-0751}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzq056}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @phdthesis {PhD_Frederik, title = {Generic Formats for Prioritized Adaptive Logics. With Applications in Deontic Logic, Abduction and Belief Revision}, year = {2012}, month = {May 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {Primiero2011, title = {Giovanni Sommaruga (ed): Formal Theories of Information: From {S}hannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information (Review)}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {119-122}, issn = {0924-6495}, doi = {10.1007/s11023-011-9228-0}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {JK:gdt, title = {Goal-Directed Tableaux}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {2009}, pages = {241{\textendash}256}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper contains a new format for analytic tableaux, called goal-directed tableaux. Their main interest lies in the fact that the search for a closed tableau proceeds in a highly constrained way. The goal-directed tableaux do not form a complete decision method for propositional classical logic (because they do not sustain Ex Falso Quodlibet). For consistent sets of premises, however, they lead to the same results as the usual analytic tableaux for classical logic.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and De Clercq, Kristof}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {444488, title = {Galileo and {H}uygens on free fall: Mathematical and methodological ifferences}, journal = {Dynamis}, volume = {28}, year = {2008}, pages = {243{\textendash}274}, abstract = {

In this essay, I will scrutinize the differences between Galileo{\textquoteright}s and Huygens{\textquoteright}s demonstrations of free fall, which can be found respectively in the Discorsi and the Horologium, from a mathematical, representational and methodological perspective. I argue that more can be learnt from such an analysis than the thesis that Huygens re-styled Galilean mechanics which is a communis opinio. I shall argue that the differences in their approach on free fall highlight a significantly different mathematical and methodological outlook.

}, issn = {0211-9536}, doi = {10.4321/S0211-95362008000100011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {GP\&D:inter, title = {Graham {P}riest and {D}iderik {B}atens Interview Each Other}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {2}, number = {8}, year = {2008}, pages = {2{\textendash}4}, author = {Priest, Graham and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {373206, title = {Galton{\textquoteright}s blinding glasses: modern statistics hiding causal structure in early theories of inheritance.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {243{\textendash}262}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1-904987-35-4}, author = {Leuridan, Bert}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @article {345101, title = {Galileo{\textquoteright}s interventionist notion of "cause"}, journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas}, volume = {67}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {443{\textendash}464}, abstract = {

In this essay, I shall argue that Galileo introduced a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality was an interventionist notion, according to which causal relations can be discovered by actively exploring and manipulating natural processes. The presence of this conception can be seen from Galileo{\textquoteright}s explanation of floating bodies and his theory of the tides. I shall point to the similarity between Galileo{\textquoteright}s notion of "cause" and recent interventionist accounts of causation in the philosophy of science (especially James Woodward{\textquoteright}s).

}, issn = {0022-5037}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {415528, title = {Gravitating towards stability: {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s Aristotelian-Archimedean synthesis}, journal = {History of science}, volume = {44}, number = {146}, year = {2006}, pages = {373{\textendash}407}, issn = {0073-2753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10929}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {524788, title = {Graham Allisons modellen voor de analyse van internationale betrekkingen: een pluralistische kritiek}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, year = {2005}, pages = {64{\textendash}77}, abstract = {

A call for epistemic pluralism is credible only when showing enough pluralism itself. Graham Allison’s three conceptual models made such a call, but do his models differ enough? Based on a fundamental theoretical analysis, disentangling the ontological and methodological aspects of Allison’s models, I conclude they do not. Subsequently, arguing that additional diversity is necessary and not an impossible endeavour, I construct a fourth model based on Alexander Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’. This model is fundamentally different from Allison’s models, and in combination with them a more convincing case for epistemic pluralism.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {D:gcal, title = {A General Characterization of Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, note = {Appeared 2003}, pages = {45{\textendash}68}, abstract = {

This paper contains a unified characterization of adaptive logics. The general structure is presented in the simplest possible guise, both for flat and prioritized adaptive logics. The latter are presented as a special case of combined adaptive logics. The aim of the paper is to provide the general framework underlying several other papers in this volume and to prepare the unified metatheory of adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:vrijzhum, title = {Grondslagen van het vrijzinnig humanisme. {E}en kennistheoretisch pleidooi}, booktitle = {Grondslagen Vrijzinnig Humanisme}, year = {1997}, pages = {75{\textendash}104}, publisher = {Humanistisch Vrijzinnige Dienst}, address = {Antwerpen}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerckhove, Christian} }