@article {DeBal2017evid, title = {From one to many: generalisation and evidence in failure analysis.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper, I use cases and reasoning from failure analysis (a part of engineering
science which deals with artefact failure and its causes) to draw attention to a relatively
unstudied problem of knowledge generalisation: when we are focusing on creating new
things; designing new artefacts and technologies. Using three cases from failure
analysis practice, I present a two-fold mechanism-based procedure to determine when
generalisations to non-existing artefacts are warranted. This procedure builds on (1)
Cartwright{\textquoteright}s notion of capacities (2) literature on mechanisms and (3) Steel{\textquoteright}s
comparative process tracing, developed for the biomedical sciences. I will show that,
while they provide guidance, these literatures and concepts are not enough to grasp
how we use information from current artefacts and failures to create new things - we
will need a lot more specific information and adequate ways to present it. The account
developed in this paper is relevant for both philosophers and failure analysts. For
philosophers, it can provide input for a theory of evidence. For failure analysts, it allows
them to present stronger arguments for their recommendations by making the required
evidence explicit. My account can furthermore provide inspiration for similar inferences
in other innovation contexts such as pharmacology.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @incollection {1986, title = {The Feasibility of Modeling Hypothetical Reasoning by Formal Logics. Including an Overview of Adaptive Logics for Singular Fact Abduction}, booktitle = {Handbook of Model-Based Science}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Bertolotti, Tommaso} } @article {DeMoltoappear, title = {Formalism. The success(es) of a failure}, year = {In Press}, institution = {College publications}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Moktefi, A. and Moretti, A. and Schang, Fabian} } @incollection {2021, title = {Free Choice Permission in STIT}, booktitle = {Logica Yearbook 2016}, year = {2017}, pages = {289--303}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {Pavel Arazim and Tom{\'a}{\v s} L{\'a}vi{\v c}ka}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {Gervais2014, title = {A framework for inter-level explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism.}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {48}, year = {2014}, pages = {1{\textendash}9}, abstract = {

According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher- or lower-level explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and non-pragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.07.002}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {4443818, title = {Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {79}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, month = {February}, pages = {1367{\textendash}1389}, abstract = {

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-{\`a}-vis functional explanations.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar and Weber, Erik} } @article {4254569, title = {Fraud in academic medical research: lessons from Flanders, Belgium}, journal = {The reasoner}, volume = {7}, number = {7}, year = {2013}, pages = {2}, abstract = {

A scientific survey on fraud in academic medical research in Flanders , of which the results were recently published in popular science magazine Eos, has caused tumult in the Flemish academic community. The reason is that these results suggest that scientific fraud (which could indirectly cause ill health and death among patients) is not as rare as earlier estimates indicate . Malpractices are primarily attributed to the pressure to publish. In this piece , we elaborate on the content of the study and pave the way for reform.

}, issn = {1757-0522}, url = {http://thereasoner.org/}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @proceedings {martens2012formal, title = {A formal approach to vague expressions with indexicals}, journal = {Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 9 (LENLS 9-2012)}, year = {2012}, pages = {37-51}, publisher = {Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence}, abstract = {

In this paper, we offer a formal approach to the scantily investigated problem of vague expressions with indexicals, in particular including the spatial indexical {\textquoteleft}here{\textquoteright} and the temporal indexical {\textquoteleft}now{\textquoteright}. We present two versions of an adaptive fuzzy logic extended with an indexical, formally expressed by a modifier as a function that applies to predicative formulas. In the first version, such an operator is applied to non-vague predicates. The modified formulas may have a fuzzy truth value and fit into a Sorites paradox. We use adaptive fuzzy logics as a reasoning tool to address such a paradox. The modifier enables us to off er an adequate explication of the dynamic reasoning process. In the second version, a different result is obtained for an indexical applied to a formula with a possibly vague predicate, where the resulting modified formula has a crisp value and does not add up to a Sorites paradox.

}, author = {Martens, Liesbeth and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {lycke2012formal, title = {A formal explication of the search for explanations: the adaptive logics approach to abductive reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {497{\textendash}516}, abstract = {

Most logic–based approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may e.g. be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the background theory). Despite the fact that these approaches succeed in specifying which formulas count as valid consequences of abductive inference steps, they do not explicate the way people actually reason by means of abductive inferences. This is most clearly shown by the absence of a decent proof theory. Instead, search procedures are provided that enable one to determine the right abductive consequences. However, these do not by far resemble human reasoning. In order to explicate abductive reasoning more realistically, an alternative approach will be provided in this article, namely, one that is based on the adaptive logics programme. Proof theoretically, this approach interprets the argumentation schema affirming the consequent (AC: A ⊃ B, B |- A) as a defeasible rule of inference. This comes down to the fact that the abductive consequences obtained by means of AC are accepted only for as long as certain conditions are satis.ed—e.g. as long as their negation has not been derived from the background theory. In the end, only the unproblematic applications of AC are retained, while the problematic ones are rejected. In this way, the adaptive logics approach to abduction succeeds to provide a more realistic explication of the way people reason by means of abductive inferences. Moreover, as multiple abduction processes will be characterized, this article may be considered as the first step in the direction of a general formal approach to abduction based on the adaptive logics programme.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzq053}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {2977241, title = {Frank {A}nkersmit and {E}elco {R}unia: the presence and the otherness of the past}, journal = {Rethinking history}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {393{\textendash}415}, abstract = {

This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an in-depth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a {\textquoteright}presence in absence{\textquoteright}. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being self-centered and nationalistic.

}, issn = {1364-2529}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2012.695065}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924343, title = {Filling a typical gap in a regress argument}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {54}, number = {216}, year = {2011}, pages = {589{\textendash}597}, abstract = {

In the following we fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of its first premise.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @proceedings {1854115, title = {From problem solving to the teaching of algebra: the genesis of the algebra textbook}, journal = {11th international IHPST and 6th Greek history, philosophy and science teaching joint conference, Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {344-347}, publisher = {Epikentro Publications}, isbn = {9789604583256}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Seroglou, Fanny and Koulountzos, Vassilis and Siatras, Anastasios} } @incollection {1043033, title = {From the second unknown to the symbolic equation}, booktitle = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {57{\textendash}102}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of- ten pointed at Francois Vi{\`e}te as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like to emphasize the foundations on which Vi{\`e}te could base his logistica speciosa. The period between Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae of 1539 and Gosselin’s De arte magna of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build- ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the so-called “second unknown” or the Regula quantitates steered the development of an adequate symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur- ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate from previous notions of what we call “co-equal polynomials”.

}, isbn = {978-1-84890-017-2}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {1234635, title = {Fundamental questions and some new answers on philosophical, contextual and scientific {W}hewell: some reflections on recent {W}hewell scholarship and the progress made therein}, journal = {Perspectives on Science}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {242{\textendash}272}, issn = {1063-6145}, doi = {10.1162/posc.2010.18.2.242}, url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives\_on\_science/v018/18.2.ducheyne.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {674595, title = {Fitch-style natural deduction for modal paralogics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {193{\textendash}218}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will present a Fitch{\textendash}style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {733505, title = {The Flow of Influence: {F}rom {N}ewton to {L}ocke … and Back}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {64}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay, the affinity between Locke{\textquoteright}s empiricism and Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy is scrutinized. Parallels are distinguished from influences. I argue, pace G.A.J. Rogers, that Newton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute space and time influenced Locke{\textquoteright}s Essay concerning Human Understanding (first edition: 1689, though bearing the year 1690 on its cover) from the second edition onwards. I also show that Newton used Lockean terminology in his criticism of Cartesianism. It is further argued that Locke{\textquoteright}s endorsement of corpuscularianism is merely methodological, i.e. he accepts it as a scientifically useful and psychologically intelligible paradigm, but not as a realist explanation of rerum natura. Like Newton, Locke was reluctant to accept the corpuscular theory of light. However, his reasons for doing so were different from those of Newton. This essay is divided into three parts: in the first, the stage is set by looking at the fundamentals of Locke{\textquoteright}s epistemology; in the second, several correspondences between Locke{\textquoteright}s and Newton{\textquoteright}s thought are explored and two cases of influence are argued for; and in the third, several arguments are provided for interpreting Locke{\textquoteright}s corpuscularianism as methodological.

}, issn = {0393-2516}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {van2009fuzzy, title = {A Fuzzy Logic Approach to Non-Scalar Hedges}, booktitle = {Towards Mathematical Philosophy}, series = {Trends in Logic}, year = {2008}, pages = {233-247}, publisher = {Kluwer}, abstract = {

In (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 458–508, 1973), George Lakoff proposes a fuzzy semantics for the non-scalar hedges technically, strictly speaking, and loosely speaking. These hedges are able to modify the meaning of a predicate. However, Lakoff’s proposal is problematic. For example, his semantics only contains interpretations for hedged predicates using semantic information provided by selection functions. What kind of information these functions should provide for non-hedged predicates remains unspecified. This paper presents a solution for this deficit and other problems by means of a generic first-order fuzzy logic FLh . A wide range of fuzzy logics can be used as a basis for FLh . Next to a fully specified semantics, this solution also incorporates a proof theory for reasoning with these hedges. FLh makes use of a special set of selection functions. These functions collect the kind of information a reasoner can retrieve from concepts in his or her memory when interpreting a (non-)hedged predicate. Despite this non-standard element, FLh remains a conservative modification of its underlying fuzzy logic.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-1-4020-9084-4_12}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan}, editor = {Makinson, David and Wansing, Heinrich} } @article {370073, title = {Father {H}enri {B}osmans (S.J.) A {B}elgian pioneer in the history of mathematics}, journal = {History and Pedagogy of Mathematics Newsletter}, volume = {65}, year = {2007}, pages = {12{\textendash}15}, issn = {N/A}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @conference {DeMol2006, title = {Facing the Computer. Some techniques to understand technique.}, booktitle = {Computers and Philosophy, an International Conference}, year = {2006}, month = {May}, publisher = {EOARD}, organization = {EOARD}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Schmidt, C. T. A.} } @article {JD:cogsci, title = {A Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {221{\textendash}236}, abstract = {

This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint (but not necessarily exhaustive). Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/5210}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @article {334983, title = {Forms of causal explanation}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2005}, pages = {437{\textendash}454}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {386239, title = {The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {33}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}16}, abstract = {

This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {D:faps, title = {A Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {15{\textendash}26}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {Vermeir_fromwffs, title = {From Wffs to Clauses: Transforming Wffs in Clauses Without Loss of Meaning}, year = {2002}, abstract = {

This paper is the rst step into the research of inconsistency-adaptive logic programming. It will be shown here that a mapping can be dened for well formed formulas to logic programming clauses in a paraconsistent environment, and without loss of information. Furthermore, this mapping is a purely mechanical procedure that can be implemented with ease on a computer.

}, author = {Vermeir, Timothy} } @book {D\&CMGPJpVB, title = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, series = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, organization = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {EDa:diag, title = {A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {161{\textendash}180}, abstract = {

Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {D:ftal, title = {Functioning and teachings of adaptive logics}, booktitle = {Logic and Argumentation}, year = {1996}, pages = {241{\textendash}254}, publisher = {North-Holland}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some formal systems, viz. adaptive logics, that display a specific flexibility in the meanings of logical terms. Both the flexibility that occurs within the systems and the question as to how we may arrive at such systems is discussed. Both, it is argued, are relevant for bridging the gap between logic and argumentation.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Benthem, Johan and Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Veltman, Frank} }