@article {DeBal2017epauth, title = {Epistemic authority: a pragmatic approach.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper, I investigate how we can legitimate that certain regularities get epistemic authority in specific contexts of scientific practice. With {\textquotedblleft}epistemic authority{\textquotedblright} I refer to the fact that regularities are trusted to achieve epistemic goals like prediction, explanation and manipulation. For my analysis, I use the Neuber rule, a regularity used to model creep in notches, as an exemplar. I distinguish two traditional ways of legitimating epistemic authority: a necessitarian approach and an epistemic mark approach. Throughout the paper, I argue that neither is, in its current form, sufficient to account for the epistemic authority of regularities like the Neuber rule. Regarding necessity, I expand arguments from Matthias Frisch{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of physics to show that (1) the Neuber rule is currently not successfully derived from (more) fundamental laws, (2) the idea that there are truly fundamental laws that can be used to represent any phenomenon is not unproblematic given the functioning of scientific practice, and (3) even if there are such fundamental laws, there is no guarantee that their necessity is undamaged by the modelling practices of science. I then present an alternative that resembles the basic idea behind the epistemic mark approach, but is significantly more informative. For this part, I build on insights from Sandra Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of biology. This results in a pragmatic approach to epistemic authority. At the same time, this paper functions as a defence and expansion of both Frisch and Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work. I also emphasize the benefits of combining insights from various philosophical disciplines.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @article {2056, title = {Ethical copula, negation, and responsibility judgments}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, year = {2016}, chapter = {3441}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @incollection {2054, title = {An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Obligation and Permission}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, pages = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, author = {Anglberger, Albert and Faroldi, Federico L. G. and Korbmacher, Johannes} } @incollection {4346560, title = {Explicating ways of consensus-making in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {71{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty \& Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @article {Kosolosky2014, title = {Editorial and interview with {J}ustin {B}iddle}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {8}, number = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {47{\textendash}50}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {3144548, title = {Epistemic justification and operational symbolism}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}113}, abstract = {

By the end of the twelfth century in the south of Europe, new methods of calculating with Hindu-Arabic numerals developed. This tradition of sub-scientific mathematical practices is known as the abbaco period and flourished during 1280{\textendash}1500. This paper investigates the methods of justification for the new calculating procedures and algorithms. It addresses in particular graphical schemes for the justification of operations on fractions and the multiplication of binomial structures. It is argued that these schemes provided the validation of mathematical practices necessary for the development towards symbolic reasoning. It is shown how justification schemes compensated for the lack of symbolism in abbaco treatises and at the same time facilitated a process of abstraction.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9311-x}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {Strasser2014a, title = {Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist Approach}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {13}, year = {2014}, month = {May}, pages = {3111-3141}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0476-4}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @incollection {4443651, title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {45-57}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {3120783, title = {Explanatory strategies beyond the individualism/holism debate}, booktitle = {Rethinking the individualism-holism debate}, volume = {372}, year = {2014}, pages = {153{\textendash}175}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of socialscientists, I introduce a framework for explanatory pluralism – a normative endorsement of the plurality of forms and levels of explanation used by social scientists. Equipped with thisframework, central issues in the individualism/holism debate are revisited, namely emergence,reduction and the idea of microfoundations. Discussing these issues, we notice that in recentcontributions the focus has been shifting towards relationism, pluralism and interaction, awayfrom dichotomous individualism/holism thinking and a winner-takes-all approach. Then, thechallenge of the debate is no longer to develop the ultimate individualistic approach ordefending the holist approach, but rather how to be combine individualism and holism; howcan they co-exist, interact, be integrated or develop some division of labour, while making thebest out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies of holists andindividualists? Thus, the debate shifts to how exactly pluralism should be understood as thenext leading question, going beyond the current individualism/holism debate. The paper endswith a discussion and evaluation of different understandings of explanatory pluralismdefended in the literature.

}, isbn = {9783319053431}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Finn, Collin and Zahle, Julie} } @article {4254489, title = {The epistemic integrity of NASA practices in the space shuttle program}, journal = {ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH - POLICIES AND QUALITY ASSURANCE}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {72{\textendash}92}, abstract = {

This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA{\textquoteright}s Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middle-level managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.

}, issn = {0898-9621}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2013.767122}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {2999532, title = {The epistemic integrity of scientific research}, journal = {SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS}, volume = {19}, year = {2013}, pages = {757{\textendash}774}, abstract = {

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.

}, issn = {1353-3452}, author = {De Winter, Jan and Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @phdthesis {PhD_Raoul, title = {Explanation in the Cognitive Sciences and Biology: Mechanisms, Laws and their Explanatory Virtues}, year = {2013}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {van2012extending, title = {Extending the standard format of adaptive logics to the prioritized case}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {220}, year = {2012}, pages = {601{\textendash}641}, abstract = {

This paper introduces a new format for reasoning with prioritized stan- dards of normality. It is applicable in a broad variety of contexts, e.g. dealing with (possibly conflicting) prioritized belief bases or combining different reasoning methods in a prioritized way. The format is a gener- alization of the standard format of adaptive logics (see [4]). Every logic that is formulated within it has a straightforward semantics in the style of Shoham’s selection semantics (see [22]) and a dynamic proof theory. Fur- thermore, it can count on a rich meta-theory that inherits the attractive features of the standard format, such as soundness and completeness, re- flexivity, idempotence, cautious monotonicity, and many other properties.

}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dunja, title = {Epistemic Evaluation in the Context of Pursuit and in the Argumentative Approach to Methodology}, year = {2011}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {1970192, title = {Ethical consistency and the logic of ought}, journal = {Theoretical and applied ethics}, volume = {1}, number = {3}, year = {2011}, pages = {45{\textendash}51}, abstract = {

In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for the presence of such conflicts within the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright}. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its contingency. In this paper, Williams{\textquoteright} characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams{\textquoteright} solution for consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright} is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of {\textquoteright}ought{\textquoteright}, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that {\textacutedbl}ought implies can{\textacutedbl}.

}, issn = {2156-7174}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @article {1931551, title = {Evidence-based medicine and progress in the medical sciences}, journal = {Journal of evaluation in clinical practice}, volume = {17}, number = {5}, year = {2011}, pages = {852{\textendash}856}, abstract = {

The question what scientific progress means for a particular domain such as medicine seems importantly different from the question what scientific progress is in general. While the latter question received ample treatment in the philosophical literature, the former question is hardly discussed. I argue that it is nonetheless important to think about this question in view of the methodological choices we make. I raise specific questions that should be tackled regarding scientific progress in the medical sciences and demonstrate their importance by means of an analysis of what evidence-based medicine (EBM) has, and has not, to offer in terms of progress. I show how critically thinking about EBM from the point of view of progress can help us in putting EBM and its favoured methodologies in the right perspective. My conclusion will be that blindly favouring certain methods because of their immediately tangible short-term benefits implies that we parry the important question of how best to advance progress in the long run. This leads us to losing sight of our general goals in doing research in the medical sciences.

}, issn = {1356-1294}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2753.2011.01715.x}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {1853233, title = {Explanation in the social sciences}, booktitle = {The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {632{\textendash}646}, publisher = {Sage Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This chapter gives an overview of the philosophical debates concerning explanation in the social sciences.

}, isbn = {9781847874009}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Jarvie, Ian and Zamora-Bonilla, Jesus} } @conference {heeffer2010estienne, title = {Estienne de la {R}oche’s appropriation of {C}huquet (1484)}, booktitle = {3rd International Conference of the European Society for the History of Science}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

The importance of Larismethique of de La Roche, published in 1520, has been seriously underestimated. One reason for the neglect is related to the inscrutable way he is referred to. Buteo and Wallis called him Stephanus {\`a} Rupe de Lyon. Other obscure references, such as Gosselin calling him Villafrancus Gallus have been overlooked by many commentators. His influence can be determined in several works that do not credit him but use problems or definitions from the Larismethique. However, most damaging for its historical assessment was Aristide Marre?s misrepresentation of the Larismethique as a grave case of plagiarism. Marre discovered that the printed work of 1520 by Estienne de la Roche contained large fragments that were literally copied from Chuquet?s manuscript of the Triparty. Especially on the Appendice, which contains the solution to a large number of problems, Marre writes repeatedly that it is a literal copy of Chuquet. However, he fails to mention that the structure of the text of de la Roche, his solution methods and symbolism differs significantly from Chuquet. De la Roche introduces several improvements, especially with regards to the use of the second unknown. We provide an in-depth comparison of some problems solved by the so-called regle de la quantite by Chuquet with those of de la Roche. We further report on the surprising finding that Christoff Rudolff?s solution to linear problems by means of the second unknown in his Behend vnnd Hubsch Rechnung of 1525 depends on Chuquet and de la Roche. As it is generally considered that algebra was introduced in Germany through Italy this provides a new light on the transmission of algebraic knowledge from France to the rest of Europe.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Hunger, Hermann} } @article {1096409, title = {Expertise doordacht: reflectie via klimaatanalyse}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {72{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

This paper analyses four theoretical problems concerning the notion of expertise and tries to formulate answers by scrutinizing these problems in light of scientific practice. The focus will be on the problems arising from the interference of experts in democratic decision making. I formulate my answers by referring to the Review-process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Analysing how expertise influences this particular scientific practice is an example of how social-epistemological research is done and has to be done.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo} } @article {924776, title = {Explanations in software engineering: the pragmatic point of view}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {277{\textendash}289}, abstract = {

This article reveals that explanatory practice in software engineering is in accordance with pragmatic explanatory pluralism, which states that explanations should at least partially be evaluated by their practical use. More specifically, I offer a defense of the idea that several explanation-types are legitimate in software engineering, and that the appropriateness of an explanation-type depends on (a) the engineer{\textquoteright}s interests, and (b) the format of the explanation-seeking question he asks, with this format depending on his interests. This idea is defended by considering examples that are representative for explanatory practice in software engineering. Different kinds of technological explanation are spelled out, and the dependence of their appropriateness on interests and question-formats is extensively illustrated.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9190-2}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Moor, James H} } @article {1054981, title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, volume = {31}, number = {5}, year = {2010}, pages = {371{\textendash}390}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

}, issn = {1386-7415}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {732259, title = {Epidemiology and causation}, journal = {Medicine, health care and philosophy}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {345{\textendash}353}, abstract = {

Epidemiologists{\textquoteright} discussions on causation are not always very enlightening with regard to the notion of {\textquoteleft}cause{\textquoteright} in epidemiology. Epidemiologists rightly work from a science-based approach to causation in epidemiology, but largely disagree about the matter. Disagreement may be partly due to confusion of the question of useful concepts for causal inference in epidemiological practice with the question of the metaphysical presuppositions of causal concepts used in epidemiology. In other words, epidemiologists seem to confuse the practical results of epidemiological research at the population level with the metaphysical views about the reality of disease causation at the individual level in their writings on causation.

}, issn = {1386-7423}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11019-009-9184-0}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Primiero2009a, title = {An epistemic logic for becoming informed}, journal = {Synthese (KRA Serie)}, volume = {167}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {363-389}, abstract = {

Various conceptual approaches to the notion of information can currently be traced in the literature in logic and formal epistemology. A main issue of disagreement is the attribution of truthfulness to informational data, the so called Veridicality Thesis (Floridi 2005). The notion of Epistemic Constructive Information (Primiero 2007) is one of those rejecting VT. The present paper develops a formal framework for ECI. It extends on the basic approach of Artemov’s logic of proofs (Artemov 1994), representing an epistemic logic based on dependent justifications, where the definition of information relies on a strict distinction from factual truth. The definition obtained by comparison with a Normal Modal Logic translates a constructive logic for “becoming informed”: its distinction from the logic of “being informed”—which internalizes truthfulness—is essential to a general evaluation of information with respect to truth. The formal disentanglement of these two logics, and the description of the modal version of the former as a weaker embedding into the latter, allows for a proper understanding of the Veridicality Thesis with respect to epistemic states defined in terms of information.

}, keywords = {Epistemic logic, Logic of justification, Modal logic, Philosophy of information}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-008-9413-8}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9413-8}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @incollection {771936, title = {Epistemic Modalities}, booktitle = {Acts of Knowledge: History, Philosophy and Logic}, series = {Tributes}, volume = {9}, year = {2009}, pages = {207{\textendash}232}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

I present an analysis of the notion of epistemic modalities, based on an appropriate interpretation of two basic constructivist issues: verification and epistemic agency. Starting from an historical analysis of conditions for judgments, I analyze first the reading of necessity with respect to apodictic judgements, and then that of possibility with respect to hypothetical judgement. The analysis results in a formal treatment of rules for judgemental modal operators, whose aim is to preserve epistemic states corresponding to verified and unverified assumptions in contexts. In the conclusion, further tracks of research are indicated for designing a semantic framework and defining multi-agents systems.

}, isbn = {978-1-904987-92-5}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Rahman, Shahid} } @article {818474, title = {On the epistemological foundations of the law of the lever}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {315{\textendash}318}, abstract = {

In this paper I challenge Paolo Palmieri’s reading of the Mach-Vailati debate on Archimedes’s proof of the law of the lever. I argue that the actual import of the debate concerns the possible epistemic (as opposed to merely pragmatic) role of mathematical arguments in empirical physics, and that construed in this light Vailati carries the upper hand. This claim is defended by showing that Archimedes’s proof of the law of the lever is not a way of appealing to a non-empirical source of information, but a way of explicating the mathematical structure that can represent the empirical information at our disposal in the most general way.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.001}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {427773, title = {The Emergence of Symbolic Algebra as a Shift in Predominant Models}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {149{\textendash}161}, abstract = {

Historians of science find it difficult to pinpoint to an exact period in which symbolic algebra came into existence. This can be explained partly because the historical process leading to this breakthrough in mathematics has been a complex and diffuse one. On the other hand, it might also be the case that in the early twentieth century, historians of mathematics over emphasized the achievements in algebraic procedures and underestimated the conceptual changes leading to symbolic algebra. This paper attempts to provide a more precise setting for the historical context in which this decisive step to symbolic reasoning took place. For that purpose we will consider algebraic problem solving as model-based reasoning and symbolic representation as a model. This allows us to characterize the emergence of symbolic algebra as a shift from a geometrical to a symbolic mode of representation. The use of the symbolic as a model will be situated in the context of mercantilism where merchant activity of exchange has led to reciprocal relations between money and wealth.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-008-9124-0}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {Ducheyne2008c, title = {Entry "{H}elmont, {J}ohannes ({J}oan) {B}aptista {V}an"}, booktitle = {New Dictionary of Scientific Biography}, volume = {III}, year = {2008}, pages = {277-281}, publisher = {Thomson Gale}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Pilchak, Angela} } @incollection {VanBouwel2008, title = {Explanatory Pluralism.}, booktitle = {Pluralist Economics}, year = {2008}, pages = {151-170}, publisher = {Zed Books}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Fullbrook, Edward} } @article {bb0d38ccf15f4c4eaa8ad14bcf81bd26, title = {Een maat en veel gewichten. Repliek op de proefvlucht van Buekens}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {99}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {211{\textendash}221}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Van de Vijver, Gertrudis} } @article {vanderbeeken2007endorsing, title = {Endorsing a pluralism between continental and analytic philosophy}, journal = {The Global Spiral}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {45{\textendash}58}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {J:ep\&aal, title = {Empirical Progress and Ampliative Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation. {E}ssays in Debate with {T}heo {K}uipers. Vol. 1}, series = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {83}, year = {2005}, pages = {193{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Festa, Roberto and Aliseda, Atocha and Peijnenburg, Jeanne} } @article {Verhoeven2005, title = {On the Exclusivity Implicature of {\textquoteleft}{O}r{\textquoteright} or on the Meaning of Eating Strawberries}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {19-24}, abstract = {

This paper is a contribution to the program of constructing formal representations of pragmatic aspects of human reasoning. We propose a formalization within the framework of Adaptive Logics of the exclusivity implicature governing the connective ‘or’.Keywords: exclusivity implicature, Adaptive Logics.

}, keywords = {Adaptive Logics, exclusivity implicature}, issn = {0039-3215}, doi = {10.1007/s11225-005-2767-8}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-005-2767-8}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza and Horsten, Leon} } @article {307815, title = {Explanatory pluralism in economics: {A}gainst the mainstream?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {299{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of heterodoxy, Tony Lawson. This scrutiny will focus on Lawson{\textquoteright}s alternatives concerning ontology and explanation to mainstream economics. Subsequently, I will raise some doubts about Lawson{\textquoteright}s pluralism, and identify questions that will have to be addressed by heterodox economists in order to maintain the claim of pluralism.

}, issn = {1386-9795}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Robrecht, title = {Een Pluralisme van Verklaringen van Acties}, year = {2003}, month = {March 14}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @incollection {Christiaens2003, title = {The EPR-Experiment and Free Process Theory}, booktitle = {Process Theories. {C}ross-Disciplinary Studies on Dynamic Categories}, year = {2003}, pages = {267-284}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

As part of the ‘creation-discovery’ interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bell-experiments (EPR-experiments). One important claim of the creation-discovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus ‘does not exist in space’. ‘Free Process Theory’ is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts’ experiment and EPR-experiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state ‘does not exist in space.’

}, isbn = {978-1-4020-1751-3}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Seibt, Johanna} } @conference {403803, title = {Explaining laws by reduction}, booktitle = {Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Scientific explanations have been intensively studied by philosophers of science during the last five decades. Explanations of laws did not receive as much attention as explanations of particular facts. In this article, I present a model for one type of explanations of laws: reductions of laws to phenomena at a micro-level. Examples of such reductions can be found in the natural sciences (the ideal gas law is probably the most famous example here) and in the social sciences (e.g., reduction of macroeconomic laws to the behaviour of individual economic agents).

}, isbn = {140201645X}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-2612-2_9}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Rojsczak, A and Cachro, J and Kurczewski, G} } @article {386237, title = {Explanation and thought experiments in history.}, journal = {History and Theory}, volume = {42}, year = {2003}, pages = {28{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts

}, issn = {0018-2656}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Weber, Erik} } @conference {152513, title = {Een adaptieve logica voor het beschrijven van inductie}, booktitle = {Handelingen van de 24ste {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, organization = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, author = {Haesaert, Lieven} } @phdthesis {PhD_Brenda, title = {Epistemologie}, year = {2002}, month = {September 6}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Casteleyn, Brenda} } @conference {provijn2002er, title = {Is er een diepe kloof tussen de heuristiek en de inferentieregels van een bewijstheorie? Een poging tot integratie.}, booktitle = {Handelingen van de 24ste {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag: Filosofie en Empirie}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, organization = {Universiteit Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In dit artikel wens ik in te gaan tegen het diepe onderscheid dat Hintikka voorstelt tussen de ‘definitory’ -en ‘strategic rules’ van een bewijstheorie. Ik doe dit door een integratie voor te stellen tussen de inferentieregels en de heuristiek van het formeel systeem Pc uit dat toelaat doelgerichte en efficifiente bewijzen te maken.

}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {319503, title = {Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {45}, number = {179{\textendash}180}, year = {2002}, pages = {299{\textendash}307}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and Verhoeven, Liza} } @conference {carnielli2001ex, title = {Ex contradictione non sequitur quodlibet}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2000 Advanced Reasoning Forum Conference}, year = {2001}, abstract = {

We summarize here the main arguments, basic research lines, and results on the foundations of the logics of formal inconsistency. These involve, in particular, some classes of well-known paraconsistent systems. We also present their semantical interpretations by way of possible-translations semantics and their applications to human reasoning and machine reasoning.

}, author = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Marcos, Jo{\~a}o} } @article {D:tolerance, title = {On the epistemological justification of pluralism and tolerance}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, year = {2000}, note = {Appeared 2002}, pages = {33{\textendash}54}, address = {Ghent}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {J:ana, title = {An Extremely Rich Paraconsistent Logic and the Adaptive Logic Based on It}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {189{\textendash}201}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {J:earlypos, title = {The early positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {81{\textendash}108}, abstract = {

In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the "positivists" (logical positivists and their immediate forerunners) have been criticised for their (alleged) neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists{\textquoteright} approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the {\textquoteright}friends of discovery{\textquoteright} seem to have forgotten. Contrary to what is generally accepted, I shall also show that there is no reason at all why the positivists should have ignored discovery.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {DK\&N, title = {Embedding and Interpolation for Some Paralogics. {T}he Propositional Case}, journal = {Reports on Mathematical Logic}, volume = {33}, year = {1999}, pages = {29{\textendash}44}, abstract = {

We consider the very weak paracomplete and paraconsistent logics that are obtained by a straightforward weakening of Classical Logic, as well as some of their maximal extensions that are a fragment of Classical Logic. We prove (for the propositional case) that these logics may be faithfully embedded in Classical Logic (as well as in each other), and that the interpolation theorem obtains for them.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and De Clercq, Kristof and Kurtonina, Natasha} } @article {J:eaip, title = {Erotetic arguments from inconsistent premises}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {49{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to generalize two basic concepts of Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s theory of questions, namely question evocation and question generation, to the inconsistent case. For both concepts, I shall present three alternative definitions. Each of these is based on a prioritized adaptive logic. I shall show that, for the consistent case, each of the alternative definitions leads to the same results as the original ones, and that, for inconsistent case, no other changes are introduced than those required for the sensible handling of inconsistencies. I shall also show that, in the generalized case, a new kind of question evocation can be defined (here called stong evocation). I shall demonstrate that if a question is strongly evoked by some inconsistent set of premmises, then each of its direct answers provides guidance on how the inconsistencies should be resolved.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {135143, title = {Editorial Preface.}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {41}, number = {164}, year = {1998}, pages = {269{\textendash}270}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:in10fg, title = {Een ontroerend intens streven naar kennis, naar beleving en naar de eenheid van beide}, booktitle = {Leo Apostel. {T}ien filosofen getuigen}, year = {1996}, pages = {135{\textendash}157}, publisher = {Hadewijch}, address = {Antwerpen/Baarn}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {257907, title = {Explaining, understanding and scientific theories}, journal = {Erkenntnis (Dordrecht)}, volume = {44}, year = {1996}, pages = {1{\textendash}23}, abstract = {

One of the functions of scientific knowledge is to provide the theories and laws we need in order to understand the world. My article deals with the epistemic aspect of understanding, i.e., with understanding as unification. The aim is to explicate what we have to do in order to make our scientific knowledge contribute to an increase of the degree to which the particular events we have observed, fit into our world-picture. The analysis contains two parts. First I define the concept of scientific epistemic explanation. Explanations of these type are the appropriate instruments for increasing the degree of unification of the particular events we have observed. In the second, largest part of the article I analyze the construction process of scientific epistemic explanations, focusing on the application of scientific theories.

}, issn = {1572-8420}, doi = {10.1007/BF00172851}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {J:nvfb, title = {Elk wetenschapper zijn onderzoeksprogramma?}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}67}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @incollection {241637, title = {Explanation, understanding and why-questions}, booktitle = {Nieuwe tendenzen in de geschiedenis en de filosofie van de wetenschappen}, year = {1994}, pages = {83-94}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Halleux, Robert and Bern{\'e}s, Anne-Cath{\'e}rine} } @incollection {D:plc, title = {Een pleidooi voor lokale consistentie}, booktitle = {Congresbundel Filosofiedag Antwerpen 1988}, year = {1989}, pages = {41{\textendash}46}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Berghs, H. and Thys, W.} } @incollection {LA\&D\&a, title = {An empirical investigation on scientific observation}, booktitle = {Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy}, year = {1979}, pages = {3{\textendash}36}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Apostel, Leo and Batens, Diderik and Breusegem, Erwin and De Coninck, Jan and De Waele, Danny and Pinxten, Rik and Swings, Jean and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Vandamme, Fernand}, editor = {Callebaut, Werner and De Mey, Marc and Pinxten, Rik and Vandamme, Fernand} }