@article {verdee2013degrees, title = {Degrees of inconsistency. Carefully combining classical and paraconsistent negation.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

This paper is devoted to combining the negation of Classical Logic (CL) and the negation of Graham Priest{\textquoteright}s LP in a way that is faithful to central properties of the combined logics. We give a number of desiderata for a logic L which combines both negations. These desiderata include the following: (a) L should be truth functional, (b) L should be strictly non-explosive for the paraconsisent negation \~{} (i.e. if A and \~{}A both have a non-trivial set of consequences, then this should also be the case for the set containing both) and (c) L should be a conservative extension of CL and of LP. The desiderata are motivated by a particular property-theoretic perspective on paraconsistency. Next we devise the logic CLP. We present an axiomatization of this logic and three semantical characterizations (a non-deterministic semantics, an in nitely valued set-theoretic semantics and an in nitely valued semantics with integer numbers as values). We prove that CLP is the only logic satisfying all postulated desiderata. The in nitely valued semantics of CLP can be seen as giving rise to an interpretation in which inconsistencies and inconsistent properties come in degrees: not every sentence which involves inconsistencies is equally inconsistent.

}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {Meheus2014, title = {Deontic Reasoning on the Basis of Consistency Considerations}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

Deonticconflictsposeanimportantchallengetodeonticlogicians. The standard account —standard deontic logic, SDL— is not apt for addressing this challenge since it trivializes con flicts. Two main stratagems for gaining conflict-tolerance have been proposed: to weaken SDL in various ways, and to contextualize the reign of SDL to consistent subsets of the premise set. The latter began with the work of van Fraassen and has been further developed by Horty. In this paper we characterize this second approach in general terms. We also study three basic ways to contextualize SDL and supplement each of these with a dynamic proof theory in the framework of adaptive logics.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Meheus, Joke and Aleks Knoks} } @incollection {HA_DuAlJ, title = {Dutch Algebra and Arithmetic in Japan before the Meiji Restoration}, booktitle = {Navigating across Mathematical Cultures and Times: Exploring the Diversity of Discoveries and Proofs}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Co.}, abstract = {

This paper gives an overview of the scarce occasions in which Japan came into contact with Western arithmetic and algebra before the Meiji restoration of 1868. After the refutation of persistent claims on the influence through Japanese students at Leiden during the seventeenth century, it concentrates on the reception of Dutch works during the last decades of the Tokugawa shogunate and the motivations to study and translate these books. While some studies based on Japanese sources have already been published on this period,2 this paper draws from Dutch sources and in particular on witness accounts from Dutch officers at the Nagasaki naval school, responsible for the instruction of mathematics to selected samurai and rangakusha. Two Japanese textbooks on arithmetic from that period are viewed within the context of this naval training school.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Vandoulakis, I.M. and Dun, Liu} } @article {D:devisingOmega, title = {Devising the Set of Abnormalities for a Given Defeasible Rule}, journal = {Logicheskie Issledovaniya / Logical Investigations}, volume = {26}, number = {1 [To the memory of Prof.\ Alexander Karpenko]}, year = {2020}, note = {https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en}, pages = {9{\textendash}35}, abstract = {

Devising adaptive logics usually starts with a set of abnormalities and a deductive logic. Where the adaptive logic is ampliative, the deductive logic is the lower limit logic, the rules of which are unconditionally valid. Where the adaptive logic is corrective, the deductive logic is the upper limit logic, the rules of which are valid in case the premises do not require any abnormalities to be true. In some cases, the idea for devising an adaptive logic does not relate to a set of abnormalities, but to one or more defeasible rules, and perhaps also to one of the deductive logics. Defeasible rules are not universally valid, but are valid in {\textquoteleft}normal situations{\textquoteright} or for unproblematic parts of premise set.\  Where the idea is such, the set of abnormalities has to be delineated in view of the rules. The way in which this task may be tackled is by no means obvious and is the main topic studied in the present paper. The outcome is an extremely simple and transparent recipe. It is shown that, except for very special cases, the recipe leads to an adequate result.

}, doi = {10.21146/2074-1472-2020-26-1-9-35}, url = {https://logicalinvestigations.ru/article/view/557/561?lang=en}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {farolditudo, title = {Deontic Modals and Hyperintensionality}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, year = {2019}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @article {8543197, title = {Do mechanism-based social explanations make a case for methodological individualism?}, journal = {JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, year = {2019}, pages = {263{\textendash}282}, abstract = {

In the recent philosophy of social science literature, we notice an increasing support for mechanism-based social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms were often closely linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions by, e.g. Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski, seem to be loosening that link and develop a more sophisticated account-ascribing a less important role to microfoundations. In this paper, we want to review the impact of the social mechanisms-approach on methodological individualism and draw more radical conclusions with regard to the individualism/holism debate, severing the link between the social mechanisms-approach and individualism. Four steps will be taken in severing the link: (a) there are more than two levels of social explanation; (b) levels of explanation are perspectival, thus neither absolute, nor unique; (c) seeking microfoundations has a heuristic value, but so has seeking macrofoundations; (d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. In conclusion, the answer to the title question is that the social mechanisms approach does not strengthen the case for methodological individualism.

}, keywords = {Methodological individualism, PLURALISM, REDUCTION, Scientific explanation, Social explanations, Social mechanisms}, issn = {0925-4560}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09446-w}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {2016, title = {Doing Without Nature}, booktitle = {Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI)}, number = {VI}, year = {2017}, month = {9-11/7/2017}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Sapporro}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Tamminga, Allard and Duijf, Hein} } @incollection {5673678, title = {Data-driven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler{\textquoteright}s discoveries}, booktitle = {Logic, reasoning, and rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {59{\textendash}76}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of data-driven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of data-driven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler{\textquoteright}s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program{\textendash}-despite the claims being made{\textendash}-does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve data-driven induction. Finally, the value of the data-driven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.

}, isbn = {9789401790109}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6\_4}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @proceedings {Strasser, title = {Dynamic Derivations for Sequent-Based Deductive Argumentation}, journal = {COMMA 2014}, volume = {Computational Models of Argument}, year = {2014}, pages = {89{\textendash}100}, abstract = {

We introduce a general approach for representing and reasoning with argumentation-based systems. In our framework arguments are represented by Gentzen-style sequents, attacks (conflicts) between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems. This framework accommodates different languages and logics in which arguments may be represented, supports a variety of attack relations, and tolerates dynamic changes in the argumentation setting by revising derivations of assertions in light of new information.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Arieli, Ofer}, editor = {Parsons, Simon and Oren, Nir and Reed, Chris and Cerutti, Federico} } @book {4169996, title = {De Humanities: een bedreigde soort?}, series = {De uil van Minerva}, volume = {26}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, publisher = {UGent}, organization = {UGent}, editor = {De Vleminck, Jens and Froeyman, Anton} } @article {VanDePutte2013a, title = {Default Assumptions and Selection Functions: A Generic Framework for Non-monotonic Logics}, journal = {Proceedings of MICAI2013, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence}, volume = {8264}, year = {2013}, pages = {54-67}, abstract = {

We investigate a generalization of so-called default-assumption consequence relations, obtained by replacing the consequence relation of classical logic with an arbitrary supraclassical, compact Tarski-logic, and using arbitrary selection functions on sets of sets of defaults. Both generalizations are inspired by various approaches in non-monotonic logic and belief revision. We establish some meta-theoretic properties of the resulting systems. In addition, we compare them with two other frameworks from the literature on non-monotonic logic, viz. adaptive logics and selection semantics.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-45114-0_5}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {wieland2012pyrronistische, title = {De pyrronistische zaak}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}532}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @book {3173717, title = {Door denken en doen: essays bij het werk van Ronald Commers}, year = {2012}, pages = {375}, publisher = {Academia Press}, organization = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Deze bundel is een vriendenboek, uit erkentelijkheid aan Ronald Commers aangeboden naar aanleiding van zijn emeritaat. Ronald Commers was tot 2011 als hoogleraar verbonden aan de vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap van de Universiteit Gent. Zijn werk is breed en diepgaand en heeft velen ge{\"\i}nspireerd. De bijdragen in deze bundel dragen er de sporen van. Zo divers als de onderwerpen die Commers heeft behandeld, zo divers zijn ook de essays die hier zijn opgenomen. Ze zijn een blijk van waardering vanwege de auteurs voor de invloed die Commers door zijn denken en doen op hun werk en leven heeft gehad en nog steeds heeft. In alfabetische volgorde bevat dit boek essays van: Diderik Batens die nadenkt over bedoelingen, alledaagse principes, symbolische principes en {\textquoteleft}luie{\textquoteright} principes; Karel Boullart die naast een kleine diabologie ook een reflectie presenteert over het belang van het realisme voor de moraalfilosoof; Roger Burggraeve die de broederschap doordenkt als grondslag voor de noties gelijkheid en vrijheid; Tom Claes die op zoek gaat naar positieve effecten van seksualisering; Hubert Dethier die reflecteert over de geschiedenis van het humanisme; Raymond Detrez die het heeft over de visie van G. Schamelhout over de volken van Europa en hun nationale bewegingen; Jan De Vos die onderzoekt hoe hedendaagse vormen van psychologisering geworteld zitten in de moderniteit; Alicja Gescinska die de stelling verdedigt dat de esthetische ervaring nauw verbonden is met de ethische waardering; Freddy Mortier die ingaat op de relatie tussen Wagner en de vrijmetselarij; Rik Pinxten die het moraalwetenschappelijke project en de invloed hiervan op zijn en Commers{\textquoteright} werk traceert; Danny Praet die het intellectueel kader schetst van de Gentse godsdienst-historicus Franz Cumont; Stef Slembrouck die onderzoekt hoe meertaligheid zich voltrekt; Wim Vandekerckhove die parallellen aantoont tussen het 18de eeuwse slavenhandeldebat en het hedendaagse debat over kinderarbeid en {\textquoteleft}bonded labour;{\textquoteright} Gertrudis Van de Vijver die de vraag stelt wat de sofist nog voor de (post-)moderne denker kan betekenen; Eric Vanhaute die op zoek gaat naar de legitimering van de nieuwe wereldgeschiedenis; An Verlinden die de begeesterende indruk van Ronald Commers{\textquoteright} onderwijs, denken en activisme op haar eigen wijsgerig en ge{\"e}ngageerd werk en denken belicht; Etienne Vermeersch die een gedachtewisseling presenteert omtrent de mogelijkheid van de menselijke vrije wil; en Erik Weber die argumenteert dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme.

}, isbn = {9789038219431}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @article {VanDePutte2012, title = {The Dynamics of Relevance: Adaptive Belief Revision}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {187}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, month = {May}, pages = {1-42}, abstract = {

This paper presents eight (previously unpublished) adaptive logics for belief revision, each of which define a belief revision operation in the sense of the AGM framework. All these revision operations are shown to satisfy the six basic AGM postulates for belief revision, and Parikh’s axiom of Relevance. Using one of these logics as an example, we show how their proof theory gives a more dynamic flavor to belief revision than existing approaches. It is argued that this turns belief revision (that obeys Relevance) into a more natural undertaking, where analytic steps are performed only as soon as they turn out to be necessary in order to uphold certain beliefs.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0116-9}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {1101420, title = {A deontic logic framework allowing for factual detachment}, journal = {Journal of applied logic}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

Since our ethical and behavioral norms have a conditional form, it is of great importance that deontic logics give an account of deontic commitments such as “A commits you to do/bring about B”. It is commonly agreed that monadic approaches are suboptimal for this task due to several shortcomings, for instance their falling short of giving a satisfactory account of “Strengthening the Antecedent” or their difficulties in dealing with contrary-to-duty paradoxes. While dyadic logics are more promising in these respects, they have been criticized for not being able to model “detachment”: A and the commitment under A to do B implies the actual obligation to do B. “We seem to feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have things both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment.” (Lennart {\r A}qvis. Deontic logic. In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, p. 199, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002). In this paper I answer \&\#197;qvist{\textquoteright}s question with “Yes, we can”. I propose a general method to turn dyadic deontic logics in adaptive logics allowing for a defeasible factual detachment while paying special attention to specificity and contrary-to-duty cases. I show that a lot of controversy about detachment can be resolved by analysing different notions of unconditional obligations. The logical modeling of detachment is paradigmatically realized on basis of one of Lou Goble{\textquoteright}s conflict tolerant CDPM logics.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2010.11.001}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {939584, title = {Disentangling Causal Pluralism}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us. Studies of Analytical Metaphysics.}, year = {2010}, pages = {207{\textendash}223}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Causal pluralism is increasingly gaining interest as a promising alternative for monistic approaches toward causation. However, although the debate is scarcely out of the egg, the term {\textquoteleft}causal pluralism{\textquoteright} already covers diverse meanings. This creates confusion, and to remedy that confusion, it is necessary to discern different kinds of pluralistic approaches to causation and different possible positions within them. In this paper, I argue for a general distinction between conceptual causal pluralism, metaphysical causal pluralism and epistemological-methodological causal pluralism. I mainly focus on metaphysical approaches to causation and discern herein four possible positions: metaphysical causal constructivism, metaphysical causal monism, weak metaphysical causal pluralism, and strong metaphysical causal pluralism. Each of these positions are further related to their most obvious conceptual counterpart, specifically conceptual causal monism or conceptual causal pluralism.

}, isbn = {981-4295-81-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @conference {de_winter_distorted_2010, title = {The Distorted Research Agenda in the Health Sciences and James Robert Brown’s Policy Proposal.}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/preprints/De_Winter_(2012)_-_Brown.pdf}, author = {De Winter, Jan}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {1064451, title = {The division of labour in science: the tradeoff between specialisation and diversity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {37{\textendash}51}, abstract = {

Economics is a typical resource for social epistemology and the division of labour is acommon theme for economics. As such it should come as no surprise that the presentpaper turns to economics to formulate a view on the dynamics of scientific communities, with precursors such as Kitcher (1990), Goldman and Shaked (1991) andHull (1988). But although the approach is similar to theirs, the view defended isdifferent. M\&\#228;ki (2005) points out that the lessons philosophers draw from economicscan go either way depending on the model chosen. Thus, the aims of this paper are (1)to illustrate this flexibility by proposing an alternative model which assumes increasingreturns to adoption in science rather than the decreasing returns present in theaforementioned contributions; and (2) to outline the implications of this view forscientific pluralism and institutional design.

}, issn = {1350-178x}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/rogier/jemfinal.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier} } @article {677635, title = {De ontologische focus van sociaal-wetenschappelijke verklaringen.}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {3{\textendash}22}, abstract = {

The author presents a survey of different opinions about the ontological focus of social scientific explanations. The opinions discussed are: methodological collectivism, methodological individualism, methodological structurism, methodological physicalism, the sociobiological point of view, and explanatory pluralism. These approaches all provide an answer to the question ‘On which ontological level(s) should social scientific explanations concentrate?’ Because all other forms of explanatory pluralism, as well as the non-pluralistic answers to this question, have certain problems, the author introduces a new form of explanatory pluralism that avoids these problems: context-related explanatory pluralism. Context-related explanatory pluralism makes a critical attitude (in the philosophy of science) compatible with a fluently developing and progressing science. This means that it is not only the most plausible guideline regarding the ontological focus of social scientific explanations, but also allows us to solve the conflict between Steve Fuller and Thomas Kuhn.

}, author = {De Winter, Jan} } @article {Strasser2009, title = {A Deontic Logic Framework Allowing for Factual Detachment {\textendash}- Appendix}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {61{\textendash}80}, abstract = {

This Appendix contains in part A the semantic characterization of logics CDPM.2d and CDPM.2e defined in [3]. Soundness and completeness are proven. In part B the logical framework presented in [3] is generalized such that it is able to deal with nested permissible contexts.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {drouet2009determinism, title = {Is determinism more favorable than indeterminism for the causal Markov condition?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {662{\textendash}675}, abstract = {

The present text comments on Steel 2005, in which the author claims to extend from the deterministic to the general case, the result according to which the causal Markov condition is satisfied by systems with jointly independent exogenous variables. I show that Steel’s claim cannot be accepted unless one is prepared to abandon standard causal modeling terminology. Correlatively, I argue that the most fruitful aspect of Steel 2005 consists in a realist conception of error terms, and I show how this conception sheds new light on the relationship between determinism and the causal Markov condition.

}, doi = {10.1086/605797}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605797}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle} } @conference {678341, title = {Doing mathematics on the ENIAC. {V}on {N}eumann{\textquoteright}s and {L}ehmer{\textquoteright}s different visions}, booktitle = {Mathematical Practice and Development throughout History. Proceedings of the 18th Novembertagung on the History, Philosophy and Didactics of Mathematics}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Logos Verlag Berlin}, organization = {Logos Verlag Berlin}, abstract = {

In this paper we will study the impact of the computer on math- ematics and its practice from a historical point of view. We will look at what kind of mathematical problems were implemented on early electronic computing machines and how these implementations were perceived. By doing so, we want to stress that the computer was in fact, from its very beginning, conceived as a mathematical instru- ment per se, thus situating the contemporary usage of the computer in mathematics in its proper historical background. We will focus on the work by two computer pioneers: Derrick H. Lehmer and John von Neumann. They were both involved with the ENIAC and had strong opinions about how these new machines might influence (theoretical and applied) mathematics.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth}, editor = {Witzke, Ingo and Wilhelmus, E.} } @article {urbaniak2009doxastic, title = {Doxastic synonymy vs. logical equivalence}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {3}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {5-6}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {1019750, title = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {389{\textendash}400}, abstract = {

I show why Michael Friedman{\textquoteright}s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman{\textquoteright}s own terms.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {924965, title = {The debate between causal realism and causal constructivism: metaphilosophical reflections}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {59{\textendash}71}, abstract = {

In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {446322, title = {De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests.}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {423{\textendash}442}, abstract = {

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences-refining the conceptual tools of social scientists-and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

}, issn = {0163-8548}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {683583, title = {Disjunctive realism about color}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, series = {Acta philosophica Fennica}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {193{\textendash}200}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, abstract = {

Section 1: Analytical metaphysics and its methodology. Why the negations of false atomic propositions are true / Peter Simons {\textendash} The one over many / Anna-Sofia Maurin {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s conception of supervenience / Markku Keina\unmatched{0308}nen {\textendash} {\textacutedbl}Mirage realism{\textacutedbl} or {\textacutedbl}Positivism in naturalism{\textquoteright}s clothing{\textacutedbl}? / Panu Raatikainen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s metaphysical realism / Sami Pihlstro\unmatched{0308}m. Section 2: Laws of nature, dispositions, and modality. Some remarks on the metaphysical status of laws of nature / Wim Christiaens {\textendash} Dispositions pace Armstrong / Robrecht Vanderbeeken {\textendash} Armstrong on the metaphysics of modality: two dilemmas / Anssi Korhonen. Section 3: Mind and epistemology. Disjunctive realism about color / Tim De May {\textendash} On Armstrong{\textquoteright}s philosophy of perception / S. Albert Kivinen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s epistemology / Markus Lammenranta.

}, isbn = {9519264663}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {397684, title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {127{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, isbn = {9789519264660}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @article {365927, title = {De idee van emergentie in de sociologie: perspectieven en problemen}, journal = {Tijdschrijft voor sociologie}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {337{\textendash}350}, issn = {0777-883X}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {D:vddiag, title = {A Diagrammatic Proof Search Procedure as Part of a Formal Approach to Problem Solving}, booktitle = {Model Based Reasoning in Science and Engineering. {C}ognitive Science, Epistemology, Logic}, year = {2006}, pages = {265{\textendash}284}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, abstract = {

This paper aims at describing a goal-directed and diagrammatic method for proof search. The method (and one of the logics obtained by it) is particularly interesting in the context of formal problem solving. A typical property is that it consists of attempts to justify so-called bottom boxes by means of premise elements (diagrammatic elements obtained from premises) and logical elements. Premises are not preprocessed, whence most premises lead to a variety of premise elements.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @incollection {J:Jerzy, title = {Discussive Adaptive Logics: {H}andling Internal and External Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, series = {Pozna{\'n} Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {211-223}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {334986, title = {The division of labour in the social sciences versus the politics of metaphysics. {Q}uestioning Critical Realism{\textquoteright}s interdisciplinarity}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {32{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, e.g., Unifying social science: A critical realist approach in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might unify social science. Secondly, I focus on the relation between the ontology and methodology of Critical Realism, and unveil the politics of metaphysics. Subsequently, it is argued that the division of labour between social scientific disciplines should not be metaphysics-driven, but rather question-driven. In conclusion, I will therefore defend a question-driven pluralism as a guide for interdisciplinarity.

}, issn = {1572-3763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Liza, title = {De Disjunctie. Adaptief-Logische Formalisering van een aantal Griceaanse Implicaturen}, year = {2005}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {Ducheyne2005a, title = {De Inductione: where {B}acon{\textquoteright}s Idea of Induction meets {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Practice of it.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {115-128}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {322173, title = {De maat van het mogelijke: gedachte-experimenten en verbeelding}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {96}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {28{\textendash}39}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {JDa:ddp_cc, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs for Classical Compatibility}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {305{\textendash}317}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @incollection {290835, title = {Direct dynamic proofs for compatibility.}, booktitle = {Computer modeling of scientific reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {179{\textendash}187}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional Del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentinia}, isbn = {987-9281-89-6}, author = {Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @incollection {J:pcsr, title = {Do We Need Paraconsistency in Commonsense Reasoning?}, booktitle = {Computer Modeling of Scientific Reasoning}, year = {2003}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Universidad Nacional del Sur. EDIUNS}, address = {Bahia Blanca, Argentina}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Delrieux, Claudio and Legris, Javier} } @article {322176, title = {The dual nature of thought experiments}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

It is often assumed that thought experiments are either experiments or arguments. In this paper, I argue that this disjunction is not an exclusive one and that we can only account for the demonstrative force or evidential significance of thought experiments by conceiving of them as both experiments and arguments. First, I distinguish between three related, but nevertheless distinct problems that thought experiments in physics pose. In this context, I also show that the choice between an experiment view and an argument view on the nature of thought experiments pops up in connection with two of those problems: (1) the problem of the source of thought-experimental knowledge and (2) the problem of the evidential significance of thought experiments. Subsequently, I argue that as far as the issue of evidential significance is concerned, we should at least recognise that thought experiments have a dual structure: an experiment-like set up and an. argument-like winding up. Then I introduce Hans Radder{\textquoteright}s conceptual framework for the analysis of "real" experiments and I apply it to thought experimet:J.ts. Finally, I argue that Radder{\textquoteright}s distinction between the aspects of {\textquoteright}theoretical description or interpretation" and "material realization" allows us to move on from the recognition of the dual structure of thought experiments to a full-blown dual nature view of them.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {DT:ddp, title = {Direct Dynamic Proofs For the {R}escher{\textendash}{M}anor Consequence Relations: The Flat Case}, journal = {Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics}, volume = {12}, year = {2002}, pages = {63{\textendash}84}, abstract = {

It was shown in \cite{D:unific} that the flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}-the Free, Strong, Argued, C-Based, and Weak consequence relation{\textendash}-are all characterized by special applications of inconsistency-adaptive logics defined from the paraconsistent logic CLuN. As as result, these consequence relations are provided with a dynamic proof theory. In the present paper we show that the detour via an inconsistency-adaptive logic is not necessary. We present a direct dynamic proof theory, formulated in the language of Classical Logic, and prove its adequacy.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Vermeir, Timothy} } @article {152619, title = {Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Weber, Erik} } @phdthesis {PhD_Wim, title = {De Cirkel Sluiten. Aanzet tot een Wetenschappelijke Metafysica}, year = {2001}, note = {

Promotor: Diderik Batens

}, month = {January 19}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {D:Rpijl, title = {A Dynamic Characterization of the Pure Logic of Relevant Implication}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {30}, year = {2001}, pages = {267-280}, abstract = {

This paper spells out a dynamic proof format for the pure logic of relevant implication. (A proof is dynamic if a formula derived at some stage need not be derived at a later stage.) The paper illustrates three interesting points. (i)\ A set of properties that characterizes an inference relation on the (very natural) dynamic proof interpretation, need not characterize the same inference relation (or even any inference relation) on the usual set-theoretical interpretation. (ii)\ A proof format may display an internal dynamics (defeasible conclusions) in the absence of an external dynamics (non-monotonicity). (iii)\ A monotonic logic may have a non-monotonic characterization.

Keywords: dynamic proofs, relevant implication, non-monotonicity.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {Christiaens2000, title = {De eenheid van de inhoud}, booktitle = {Natuurfilosofie. Voorbereidend werk voor een op de fysica gebaseerde ontologie}, year = {2000}, pages = {9-35}, publisher = {VUB}, abstract = {

In deze tekst richten we onze aandacht niet zozeer op het inleiding van manuscripten Natuurfilosofie en Oorsprong. Veelmeer belichten we de belangrijkste bouwstenen van Apostels project voor een metafysica en proberen we enkele centrale noties te verhelderen. Met de titel {\textquoteright}de eenheid van de inhoud{\textquoteright} wordt reed gewezen op het coherente onderbouwde idee{\"e}ngoed van Apostel. We zullen zien dat het begrip causaliteit als een rode draad doorheen Apostels filosofie loopt. We gaan er dan ook iets uitvoeriger op in. We kunnen hier evenwel niet uitgebreid ingaan op alle aspecten die we ter sprake brengen, maar zullen geregeld verwijzen naar publicaties in de voetnoten. We hopen op deze manier ge{\"\i}nteresseerden een instrument in handen te geven dat toelaat dieper in te gaan op de filosofie van Apostel.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Apostel, Leo} } @article {J:d\&aal, title = {Deductive and Ampliative Adaptive Logics as Tools in the Study of Creativity}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {4}, year = {1999}, pages = {325{\textendash}336}, abstract = {

In this paper, I argue that logic has an important role to play in the methodological study of creativity. I also argue, however, that only special kinds of logic enable one to understand the reasoning involved in creative processes. I show that deductive and ampliative adaptive logics are appropriate tools in this respect.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:zinLAar, title = {De zin van Leo Apostels athe{\"\i}stische religiositeit. {E}en kennistheoretisch commentaar. {W}oord vooraf}, booktitle = {Athe{\"\i}stische Spiritualiteit}, year = {1998}, pages = {9{\textendash}21}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:dynsem, title = {Dynamic Semantics Applied to Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Logical Investigations}, volume = {5}, year = {1998}, pages = {74{\textendash}85}, address = {Moscow, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}NAUKA{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:dsial, title = {A Dynamic Semantics for Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, journal = {Bulletin of the Section of Logic}, volume = {27}, year = {1998}, pages = {15{\textendash}18}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {257908, title = {Default Reasoning in the Correction of Falsified System Descriptions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {13{\textendash}22}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:determinisme, title = {Determinisme en indeterminisme}, booktitle = {Verwijdering of ontmoeting?}, year = {1994}, pages = {183{\textendash}202}, publisher = {Pelckmans}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Verbeure, Frans and Apostel, Leo} } @incollection {D:ialddl, title = {De inconsistentie-adaptieve logica {D}{D}{L}}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {39{\textendash}45}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {J:nvfd, title = {De rationaliteit van persoonlijke inperkingen}, booktitle = {Aktueel Filosoferen}, year = {1993}, pages = {33{\textendash}38}, publisher = {Eburon}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {van Dooren, Wim and Hoff, Tineke} } @incollection {219925, title = {De verklarende kracht van statistische hypothesen}, booktitle = {Acta Filosofiedag 1990}, year = {1992}, pages = {53-56}, publisher = {Ebduron}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Commers, Ronald} } @incollection {D:hier, title = {Do we need a hierarchical model of science?}, booktitle = {Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations. {E}ssays in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1992}, pages = {199{\textendash}215}, publisher = {University of California Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Earman, John} } @article {4172217, title = {De asymmetrie van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, journal = {Algemeen nederlands tijdschrijft voor wijsbegeerte}, volume = {81}, year = {1989}, pages = {47{\textendash}58}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:dyn, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistent Logic. {E}ssays on the Inconsistent}, year = {1989}, pages = {187{\textendash}217}, publisher = {Philosophica Verlag}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Priest, Graham and Routley, Richard and Norman, Jean} } @article {D:ddfl, title = {Dialectical dynamics within formal logics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {29}, number = {114}, year = {1986}, pages = {161{\textendash}173}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:tool, title = {Dynamic Dialectical Logics as a Tool to Deal with and Partly Eliminate Unexpected Inconsistencies}, booktitle = {The Logic of Discovery and the Logic of Discourse}, year = {1985}, pages = {263{\textendash}271}, publisher = {Plenum Press}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Hintikka, Jaakko and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:d\&ci, title = {Deduction and contextual information}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {8}, year = {1975}, pages = {243{\textendash}277}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:rofidk, title = {De rol van ontische factoren in de kennisverzameling}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {6}, year = {1973}, pages = {51{\textendash}69}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }