@article {DeBalWeber2017, title = {Causation \& Technical Problem Solving: An analysis of causal knowledge underlying proposed solutions for technical problems.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper we analyse the causal underpinnings of remedy claims found in technical problem solving instructions. For these claims to be successful, they need to be based on causal relations that hold in the world and that have certain properties. These required properties are the focus of our paper. We first introduce several examples from car- and bike repair manuals that demarcate our topic and function as illustrations throughout the paper. We then formulate three success criteria for problem solving manuals: the efficiency requirement, the no harm requirement and the maximal assistance ideal. These criteria determine the required strength and properties of the causal relation, and are used to frame our analysis. We start from theories of causation by Ronald Giere, Ellery Eells and John Mackie and develop a series of definitions to capture the properties of the aforementioned causal relations. We conclude that remedy claims need to be based on causal relations with the following property: positive causal factorhood with weak context-unanimity. Moreover, it is desirable to look for Mackie causes, viz. causes that are sufficient in maximally normal contexts. We finally show that our analysis is not limited to means of conveyance (this is the field in which our initial examples are located) by means of a case study from a different field (radio repair manuals).

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Weber, Erik} } @article {2015, title = {Coarse Deontic Logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, year = {In Press}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {8678415, title = {{Classical term-modal logics}}, journal = {{JOURNAL OF LOGIC AND COMPUTATION}}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2021}, pages = {1026-1054}, abstract = {

{We introduce classical term-modal logics and argue that they are useful for modelling agent-relative notions of obligation, evidence and abilities, and their interaction with properties of and relations between the agents in question. We spell out the semantics of these logics in terms of neighborhood models, provide sound and strongly complete axiomatizations and establish the decidability of specific (agent-finite) variants.}

}, keywords = {Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous), CHOICE}, Hardware and Architecture, logic, Software, {Theoretical Computer Science}, issn = {{0955-792X}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exaa053}}, author = {Frijters, Stef and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2052, title = {Choosing the right concept of "right choices" (technical report)}, year = {2018}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {2055, title = {Co-Hyperintensionality}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {30}, year = {2017}, chapter = {270}, author = {Faroldi, Federico L. G.} } @conference {8122661, title = {Coarse Deontic Logic (short version)}, booktitle = {Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, year = {2016}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {1997, title = {Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {90}, year = {2015}, pages = {93-113}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Bal, Inge} } @incollection {perring_concept_2014, title = {The Concept of Disease and Our Responsibility for Children}, booktitle = {Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry}, year = {2014}, pages = {35{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

The author of this chapter argues that one’s understanding of the concept of what a disease is influences our way of behaving toward people we think of as diseased. The author asserts that our concept of disease is not non-committal and that an oversimplified approach can lead to non-critical reasoning which could have significant impact on children with diseases. The author develops a pluralistic approach to the concept of disease and uses ADHD as an example throughout the chapter.

}, isbn = {9780199645756}, doi = {10.1093/med/9780199645756.003.0003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Perring, Christian and Wells, Lloyd} } @incollection {D:JP, title = {The Consistency of {P}eano {A}rithmetic. {A} Defeasible Perspective}, booktitle = {Modestly Radical or Radically Modest. Festschrift for Jean Paul Van Bendegem on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday}, year = {2014}, pages = {11{\textendash}59}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

This paper proposes to replace \sys{PA}, Peano Arithmetic, by a theory \sys{APA} defined in terms of (i)\ a set of axioms that is classically equivalent to the Peano axioms and (ii)\ a defeasible logic that minimizes inconsistency, viz.\ an inconsistency-adaptive logic. If \sys{PA} is consistent, its set of theorems coincides with the set of \sys{APA}-theorems. If \sys{PA} is inconsistent, \sys{APA} is non-trivial and has the following remarkable property: there is a unique non-standard number that is its own successor and every {\textquoteleft}desirable{\textquoteright} \sys{PA}-theorem is retained if restricted to the other numbers. The restriction can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. And there is much more.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Allo, Patrick and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {3182109, title = {Causaliteit en de methodestrijd: naar een ge{\"\i}ntegreerd gebruik van kwalitatief en kwantitatief onderzoek in een praktisch geori{\"e}nteerde criminologie}, journal = {Panopticon}, volume = {34}, year = {2013}, pages = {115{\textendash}133}, abstract = {

In this article, we re-examine an old problem in criminology i.e the "battle of the methods". Even though the battle has become less explicit recently, it does have a contemporary named the incompatibility thesis in the field of mixed methods research in the social sciences. We look at this incompatibility thesis from the point of view of the philosophy of science, more precisely by discussing different forms of causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality are discussed. We argue that qualitative and quantitative methods each pursue a specific kind of knowledge, but that a functional integration of both is desirable. We conclude by referring to two main advantages of such integration, viz. the manipulation of causal relationships and extrapolation of research results in time and space.

}, issn = {0771-1409}, author = {Heylen, Ben and Weber, Erik} } @article {3143178, title = {The conceptual elusiveness of engineering functions: a philosophical analysis}, journal = {Philosophy and Technology}, volume = {26}, number = {2}, year = {2013}, pages = {159-185}, abstract = {

In this paper, we describe the conceptual elusiveness of the notion of function as used in engineering practice. We argue that it should be accepted as an ambiguous notion, and then review philosophical argumentations in which engineering functions occur in order to identify the consequences of this ambiguity. Function is a key notion in engineering, yet is used by engineers systematically in a variety of meanings. First, we demonstrate that this ambiguous use is rational for engineers by considering the role of functions in design methods and by analysing the ambiguity in terms of Kuhn’s notion of methodological incommensurability. Second, we discuss ontological and mereological analyses of engineering functions and describe a proof that subfunctions cannot formally be taken as parts of the functions they decompose. Engineering functions figure sometimes in philosophical work and are then typically taken as having an unambiguous, well-defined meaning. Finally, we therefore revisit work in philosophy of technology on the dual nature of technical artefacts, in philosophy of science on functional and mechanistic explanations, and in philosophy of biology on biological functions, and explore the consequences of the fact that engineering function is an ambiguous notion. It is argued that one of these consequences may be that also the notion of biological function has an ambiguous meaning

}, issn = {2210-5441}, doi = {10.1007/s13347-012-0096-1}, author = {Vermaas, Pieter and van Eck, Dingmar and Kroes, Peter} } @article {Seselja2013, title = {Concerning Peter Vickers{\textquoteright} Recent Treatment of {\textquoteright}Paraconsistencitis{\textquoteright}}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {325{\textendash}340}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2964109, title = {Can Pyrrhonists act normally?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {227{\textendash}289}, abstract = {

Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following I take up this systematic query, and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus{\textquoteright} ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to insure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.

}, issn = {1386-9795}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2012.696133}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2012carving, title = {Carving the world as we please}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {7{\textendash}24}, abstract = {

Nelson Goodman defends the seemingly radical view that, in a certain sense, all facts depend on our perspective on the matter. We make the world, rather than merely find it. The aim of this contribution is three-fold: to make sense of Goodman’s metaphysical perspectivalism, clearly explain how it differs from other branches of perspectivalism (epistemic and semantic), and put two issues on the agenda that deserve renewed attention.

}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {2977907, title = {Causality and explanation in the sciences}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {133{\textendash}136}, abstract = {

Editors{\textquoteright} introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik} } @article {2985552, title = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {123{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3094113, title = {A contextual type theory with judgemental modalities for reasoning from open assumptions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {55}, number = {220}, year = {2012}, pages = {579{\textendash}600}, abstract = {

Contextual type theories are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. The combination of a constructive language with a modal extension of contexts appears crucial to explore the attractive idea of a type-theoretical calculus of provability from refutable assumptions for non-monotonic reasoning. This paper introduces such a language: the modal operators are meant to internalize two different modes of correctness, respectively with necessity as the standard notion of constructive verification and possibility as provability up to refutation of contextual conditions.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {de2011complex, title = {On the complex behavior of simple tag systems — An experimental approach}, journal = {Theoretical Computer Science}, volume = {412}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {97{\textendash}112}, abstract = {

It is a well-know fact that apparently simple systems can give rise to complex behavior. But why exactly does a given system behave in a complex manner? There are two main approaches to tackle this and other related questions. One can take on a more theoretical approach or start from a more experimental study of the behavior of such systems with the help of the computer. In this paper, the experimental approach will be applied to very small tag systems. After a discussion of some of the main theoretical results on tag systems, several results from a computer-assisted and experimental study on tag systems will be analyzed. Special attention will be given to the well-known example Post provided and studied with only 2 symbols and a deletion number v = 3. These results will be combined with some theoretical results on tag systems in order to gain more insight into the computational power of simple tag systems.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {1855775, title = {The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim{\textquoteright}s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley{\textquoteright}s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {1998274, title = {On the curious historical coincidence of algebra and double-entry bookkeeping}, booktitle = {Foundations of the formal sciences VII : bringing together philosophy and sociology of science}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {32}, year = {2011}, pages = {109{\textendash}130}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {9781848900493}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/logic/?00021}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and L{\"o}we, Benedikt and M{\"u}ller, Thomas and Van Kerkhove, Bart} } @article {999416, title = {Can mechanisms really replace laws of nature?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {77}, number = {3}, year = {2010}, pages = {317{\textendash}340}, abstract = {

Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive-nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell{\textquoteright}s pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex-systems mechanisms onto-logically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell{\textquoteright}s account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account

}, issn = {0031-8248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/652959}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {weber2010causal, title = {Causal Methodology. A Comment on Nancy Cartwright{\textquoteright}s Hunting Causes and Using Them}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {318{\textendash}325}, doi = {10.1093/analys/anp045}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @conference {1166760, title = {Constructive contextual modal judgments for reasoning from open assumptions}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Computability in Europe 2010 Conference}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, organization = {Centre for Applied Mathematics and Information Technology, Department of Mathematics, University of Azores}, abstract = {

Dependent type theories using a structural notion of context are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. In particular, types with modalities are already used for distributed and staged computation. This paper introduces a type system extended with judgmental modalities internalizing epistemically different modes of correctness to explore a calculus of provability from refutable assumptions.

}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe}, editor = {Ferreira, F and Guerra, H and Mayordomo, E and Rasga, J} } @article {urbaniak2009capturing, title = {Capturing dynamic conceptual frames}, journal = {Logic Journal of {IGPL}}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {430{\textendash}455}, abstract = {

The main focus of this paper is to develop an adaptive formal apparatus capable of capturing arguments conducted within a conceptual framework. I first explain one of the most recent theories of concepts developed by cognitivists, in which a crucial part is played by the notion of a dynamic frame. Next, I describe how a dynamic frame may be captured by a finite set of formulas and how a formalized adaptive framework for reasoning within a dynamic frame can be developed.

}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @article {594869, title = {Causal discovery and the problem of ignorance: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {188{\textendash}205}, abstract = {

In this paper, I want to substantiate three related claims regarding causal discovery from non-experimental data. Firstly, in scientific practice, the problem of ignorance is ubiquitous, persistent, and far-reaching. Intuitively, the problem of ignorance bears upon the following situation. A set of random variables VV is studied but only partly tested for (conditional) independencies; i.e. for some variables A and B it is not known whether they are (conditionally) independent. Secondly, Judea Pearl{\textquoteright}s most meritorious and influential algorithm for causal discovery (the IC algorithm) cannot be applied in cases of ignorance. It presupposes that a full list of (conditional) independence relations is on hand and it would lead to unsatisfactory results when applied to partial lists. Finally, the problem of ignorance is successfully treated by means of ALIC, the adaptive logic for causal discovery presented in this paper.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, doi = {10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2007.11.004}, author = {Leuridan, Bert} } @article {924987, title = {Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {301{\textendash}320}, abstract = {

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.698}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {674351, title = {"Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (1550-1850)}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Pieters, Eva}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {924906, title = {Concepts of causation in historiography}, journal = {Historical methods}, volume = {42}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {116{\textendash}128}, abstract = {

Historians can use the concept of causation in a variety of ways. each of which is associated with different historiographical claims and different kinds of argumentation. The author shows that, contrary to the Usual view, historical narratives are causal (in a specific way), and microhistory can be seen as a response to a very specific causal problem of Braudelian macrohistory.

}, issn = {0161-5440}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924897, title = {Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {206}, year = {2009}, pages = {177{\textendash}190}, abstract = {

In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall{\textquoteright}s theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall{\textquoteright}s proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @conference {810575, title = {A constructive modal semantics for contextual verification}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Logic-Based Interpretation of Context: Modeling and Applications}, year = {2009}, publisher = {CEUR-Workshop Proceedings}, organization = {CEUR-Workshop Proceedings}, abstract = {

This paper introduces a non-standard semantics for a modal version of constructive KT for contextual (assumptions-based) verification. The modal fragment expresses verifiability under extensions of contexts, enjoying adapted validity and (weak) monotonicity properties depending on satisfaction of the contextual data.

}, url = {http://sunsite.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Publications/CEUR-WS/Vol-550/}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe} } @article {393211, title = {Causal (mis)understanding and the search for scientific explanations: a case study from the history of medicine.}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences}, volume = {39}, year = {2008}, pages = {14{\textendash}24}, abstract = {

In 1747, James Lind carried out an experiment which proved the usefulness of citrus fruit as a cure for scurvy. Nonetheless, he rejected the earlier hypothesis of Bachstrom that the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables was the only cause of the disease. I explain why it was rational for James Lind not to accept Bachstrom’s explanation. I argue that it was the urge for scientific understanding that guided Lind in his rejection and in the development of his alternative theory that humidity was the primary cause of the disease. Central in this process was the search for causal mechanisms which could provide understanding of how the disease developed and which fitted in with the knowledge of the time. Given that the relevant background knowledge and statistical methods were not yet available to Lind, he was right to prefer his own explanation to that of Bachstrom. Although his explanation turned out to be wrong, and Bachstrom’s right, from a historical point of view it offered deeper causal understanding of both the development of the disease and the preventive and curative effects of fresh vegetable food. This case study illustrates how the search for causal mechanisms can not only be enlightening, but also very misleading.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @incollection {417858, title = {A conceptual analysis of early arabic algebra}, booktitle = {The unity of science in the arabic tradition : science, logic, epistemology and their interactions}, year = {2008}, pages = {89{\textendash}128}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

Arabic algebra derives its epistemic value not from proofs but from correctly performing calculations using coequal polynomials. This idea of ‘mathematics as calculation’ had an important influence on the epistemological status of European mathematics until the seventeenth century. We analyze the basic concepts of early Arabic algebra such as the unknown and the equation and their subsequent changes within the Italian abacus tradition. We demonstrate that the use of these concepts has been problematic in several aspects. Early Arabic algebra reveals anomalies which can be attributed to the diversity of influences in which the al-jabr practice flourished. We argue that the concept of a symbolic equation as it emerges in algebra textbooks around 1550 is fundamentally different from the ‘equation’ as known in Arabic algebra.

}, isbn = {978-1-4020-8404-1}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/11276}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Rahman, Shahid and Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan} } @article {Ducheyne2008a, title = {Conference Report "Induction: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, {G}hent {U}niversity, 8–10 July 2008"}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {8-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {427052, title = {Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, year = {2008}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {vancausality, title = {Causality and conservation. Elements of the new metaphysics behind the mathematization of nature in the seventeenth century}, year = {2007}, institution = {VUB}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {386240, title = {The Concept of Causation in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Mechanical and Optical Work}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {16}, year = {2007}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {371044, title = {Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {197{\textendash}213}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {1904987354}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @incollection {M:ConEmp, title = {Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination.}, booktitle = {Images of empiricism: Essays on science and stances, with a reply from {B}as van {F}raassen}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

It is argued that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Bas van Fraassen nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his argument for constructive empiricism. It is explained that van Fraassen’s use of the notion of empirical equivalence in The Scientific Image has been widely misunderstood. A reconstruction of the main arguments for constructive empiricism is offered, showing how the passages that have been taken to be part of an appeal to the argument from underdetermination should actually be interpreted.

}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Monton, Bradley} } @incollection {D:cg_fpsp, title = {Content Guidance in Formal Problem Solving Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {121{\textendash}156}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

In this paper, a formal framework to problem-solving processes is presented. The framework is not complete. Nevertheless, even its present sophistication allows one to see that it is promising.\par The framework demonstrably allows one to understand scientific change as content-guided. It will be argued that a formal framework is required in order to make definite and precise statements about the content-guided aspects of scientific problem solving.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @incollection {397692, title = {Can intentional and functional explanations of actions coexist?}, booktitle = {Philosophical Antropology}, year = {2006}, pages = {135{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Philosophical Society of Turkey}, abstract = {

Do functional explanations eclipse the intentionality of human actions? Put differently, do intentional and functional explanations of actions conflict with each other? In this paper, I want to argue that both sorts of explanation, if conceived in a proper way, are compatible instruments. First, I will make a distinction between three kinds of explanatory pluralism of actions: a pluralism of theories of actions, a pluralism of sorts of explanations of actions, and a pluralism of methods for the explanation of actions. Intentional and functional explanations are sorts, not theories or methods, of explanation. Next, I will briefly distinguish intentional and functional explanations: intentional explanations refer to the beliefs and desires of an agent, and functional explanations refer to the function of a motive of an action (etiological functions), or to the function of a result of an action (system functions). Finally, I discuss possible conflicts between both sorts of explanation. In cases where real conflicts between functional and intentional explanations do arise, this is due to the lack of sufficient information or the misinterpretation of information of one or both explanations. Hence, such conflicts are not conflicts between sorts of explanations

}, isbn = {9757748404}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Voss, Stephen} } @article {732209, title = {Causal pluralism and scientific knowledge: an underexposed problem}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {77}, year = {2006}, pages = {125{\textendash}150}, abstract = {

Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology is heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological- methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological- methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {340414, title = {Closing the circle: An analysis of {E}mil {P}ost{\textquoteright}s early work}, journal = {Bulletin of symbolic logic}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {267{\textendash}289}, abstract = {

In 1931 Kurt G{\"o}del published his incompleteness results, and some years later Church and Turing showed that the decision problem for certain systems of symbolic logic has a negative solution. However, already in 1921 the young logician Emil Post worked on similar problems which resulted in what he called an “anticipation” of these results. For several reasons though he did not submit these results to a journal until 1941. This failure ‘to be the first’, did not discourage him: his contributions to mathematical logic and its foundations should not be underestimated. It is the purpose of this article to show that an interest in the early work of Emil Post should be motivated not only by this historical fact, but also by the fact that Post’s approach and method differs substantially from those offered by G{\"o}del, Turing and Church. In this paper it will be shown how this method evolved in his early work and how it finally led him to his results.

}, issn = {1079-8986}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @article {ELe:scurvy, title = {The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. {H}ow Modern was {J}ames {L}ind{\textquoteright}s Methodology?}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {55{\textendash}67}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {Ducheyne2005, title = {The Challenges for Early-Modern Philosophy: Editorial Introduction.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {5-10}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {334981, title = {Coping with inconsistencies: {E}xamples from the social sciences}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {89{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @conference {383110, title = {Computer Generated Images as Mathematical Tools}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Conference and Exhibition on Generative Art}, year = {2004}, abstract = {

Since the commercialisation of the computer, it became possible to visualise certain aspects of mathematics that were not possible to visualise before because of the complexity or the size of the datasets involved. Some of these computer generated images even have become the icons of certain mathematical theories like for example fractal geometry. One of the advantages of these visualisations is the fact that in using them, certain properties that involve complexity can be immediately shown. This possibility will be discussed through experiments done by the author.

}, author = {De Mol, Liesbeth} } @conference {382092, title = {The consequences of scientific pluralism for science policy}, booktitle = {Proceedings of V Jornadas Latinoamericanas de estudios sociales de la ciencia y de la tecnolog{\'\i}a}, year = {2004}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {291501, title = {Change in individuals without a name. {C}ontextual indicators \& the free change-adaptive logic}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11}, year = {2003}, pages = {213{\textendash}230}, abstract = {

Proof theory and semantics of an adaptive logic that deals adequately with change in individuals with or without a name are presented. New logical constants are introduced, viz. indicators. Within a given context they function as names, predicates and quantifiers at the same time. The thus extended language (of classical logic) has a big expressive power and solvespartly — the (classical) non-logical presuppositions with respect to ‘the existence of individuals’. Nevertheless, from a purely logical point of view, the here pre - sented logic requires nothing but a very intuitive selection of classical models of the premises, viz. the minimally abnormal ones.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2003.011}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @article {291051, title = {Changing one{\textquoteright}s position in discussions - Some adaptive approaches}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {277{\textendash}297}, abstract = {

This paper contains different approaches to solve the problem how to construct the ultimate position out of one’s interventions in a discussion after possibly one or more position changes. In all approaches it is the aim to come as close as possible to human reasoning. Therefore all logics are adaptive logics. The first logic is an extension of an adaptive translation into S5 of the Rescher-Manor mechanisms. The second one is a dynamic proof theory based on a technique using indices. In the end a satisfactory solution is given by a dynamic proof theory expressing the idea of prioritized compatibility, i.e. compatibility step by step

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:gluts, title = {Criteria Causing Inconsistencies. {G}eneral Gluts as Opposed to Negation Gluts}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {5{\textendash}37}, abstract = {

This paper studies the question: how should one handle inconsistencies that derive from the inadequacy of the criteria by which one approaches the world. I compare the approaches underlying several inconsistency-adaptive logics. I consider the Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations as well as adaptive logics defined from CLuN, CLuNs, LP, AN, and AL. The adaptive systems defined from CLuN appear to be superior to the others. They isolate inconsistencies rather than spreading them, and at the same time allow for genuine deductive steps from inconsistent and mutually inconsistent premises.

Nevertheless, the systems based on CLuN introduce an asymmetry between negated and non-negated formulas that seems hard to justify. To clarify and understand the source of the problem, the epistemological presuppositions of CLuN, viz. inadequate criteria, are investigated. This leads to a new type of paraconsistent logic that involves gluts with respect to all other logical constants. The larger part of the paper is devoted to this logic, to the adaptive logics defined from it, and to the study of the properties of these systems.

While this resulting logics are sensible and display interesting features, the search for variants of the justification leads to an unexpected justification for CLuN.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {DLn:induct2, title = {On Classical Adaptive Logics of Induction}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {255{\textendash}290}, abstract = {

This paper concerns the inference of inductive generalizations and of predictions derived from them. It improves on the adaptive logic of induction from \emph{On a Logic of Induction} (Batens, Logic and Philosophy of Science, IV, 1, 2006, pp. 3-32) by presenting logics that are formulated strictly according to the usual adaptive standards. It moreover extends that paper with respect to background knowledge.

We present logics that handle inductive generalizations as well as logics that handle prioritized background knowledge of three kinds: background generalizations, pragmatic background generalizations (the instances of which may be invoked even after the generalizations are falsified), and background theories. All logics may be combined into a single system.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Haesaert, Lieven} } @article {J:clau3, title = {Clausius{\textquoteright} discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. {A} paradigm of reasoning from inconsistencies}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {63}, year = {1999}, pages = {89{\textendash}117}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {D:cps, title = {Contextual Problem Solving and Adaptive Logics In Creative Processes}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, note = {Appeared 2001}, pages = {7{\textendash}31}, abstract = {

Creativity is commonly seen as beyond the scope of rationality. In the present paper, it is argued that available insights in epistemology and available results in logic enable us to incorporate creativity within an independently sensible view on human rationality.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {135002, title = {The creative growth of mathematics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {63}, year = {1999}, pages = {119{\textendash}152}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {weber1996comment, title = {Comment construit-on une explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique?}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, year = {1996}, pages = {183{\textendash}204}, abstract = {

Comment devons-nous appliquer notre savoir scientifique (lois de la nature, th{\'e}ries, etc.) pour qu{\textquoteright}il contribue {\`a} mieux comprendre les ph{\'e}nom{\`e}nes ({\'e}v{\'e}nements particuliers, regularit{\'e}, etc.) que nous observons? Le mod{\`e}le d{\'e}ductif-nomologique d{\textquoteright}explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d{\textquoteright}explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique, ne procure pas une r{\'e}ponse compl{\`e}te {\`a} cette question. Un des probl{\`e}mes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un ph{\'e}om{\`e}ne (une explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique), mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce type est construite. Afin de r{\'e}oudre ce probl{\`e}me, une m{\'e}thode pour construire des explications d{\'e}ductives-nomologiques est d{\'e}velopp{\'e}e.

}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {4164554, title = {A causal approach to explanations}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {30}, number = {117-118}, year = {1987}, pages = {51{\textendash}68}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {D:catm\&k, title = {A contextual approach to meaning and knowledge}, booktitle = {Science and Society}, year = {1987}, pages = {84{\textendash}110}, publisher = {VUB-Uitgaven}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Gosselin, M. and Demeyere, F.} } @incollection {D:cwm, title = {Creativiteit in wetenschap en muziek}, booktitle = {Liber Amicorum J.L. Broeckx}, year = {1986}, pages = {29{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Grafisch Bureau M \& Team}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {De Hen, Ferdinand J. and Riessauw, Anne-Marie and Sabbe, Herman} } @article {D:cpm, title = {A completeness-proof method for extensions of the implicational fragment of the propositional calculus}, journal = {Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic}, volume = {21}, year = {1980}, pages = {509{\textendash}517}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }