@incollection {2020, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative Systems}, volume = {2}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {College Publications}, edition = {1}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {Forest2014, title = {Against the disorder/nondisorder dichotomy}, booktitle = {Defining Mental Disorders: Jerome Wakefield and his critics.}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {MIT Press}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Faucher, Luc and Forest, Denis} } @article {D:afs, title = {Adaptive Fregean Set Theory}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {108}, year = {2020}, note = {Published online: 10 November 2019}, pages = {903{\textendash}939 (e-published 10 NOV 2019)}, abstract = {

This paper defines provably non-trivial theories that characterize Frege{\textquoteright}s notion of a set, taking into account that the notion is inconsistent. By choosing an adaptive underlying logic, consistent sets behave classically notwithstanding the presence of inconsistent sets. Some of the theories have a full-blown presumably consistent set theory T as a subtheory, provided T is indeed consistent. An unexpected feature is the presence of classical negation within the language.

}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-019-09882-1}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {2068, title = {Adaptive Deontic Logics: A Survey}, journal = {IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, year = {2019}, pages = {523-608}, chapter = {523}, url = {http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00032.pdf}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:Abd, title = {Abduction Logics Illustrating Pitfalls Of Defeasible Methods}, booktitle = {Applications of formal philosophy: the road less travelled}, series = {Logic argumentation \& reasoning}, volume = {14}, year = {2017}, pages = {169{\textendash}193}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Berlin}, abstract = {On the one hand this paper offers an introduction to adaptive logics, focussing on properties that are imposed upon adaptive logics by the fact that they explicate defeasible reasoning. On the other hand new adaptive logics of abduction are presented and employed to illustrate those properties. These logics were developed in view of the criticism to existing adaptive logics of abduction.}, isbn = {978-3-319-58507-9,331958507X,978-3-319-58505-5}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-58507-9_8}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Rafa{\l} Urbaniak and Gillman Payette} } @article {strasser2014dynamic, title = {Adaptive Logic Characterizations of Input/output Logic}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {104}, year = {2016}, pages = {869-916}, chapter = {869}, abstract = {

We translate the unconstrained and constrained input/output-logics from [17, 18] to reflexive modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has various advantages. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our modal framework gives naturally rise to useful variants. Finally, the modal logics display a gain in expressive power over their original counterparts in the input/output framework.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {doi:10.1093/logcom/exu044, title = {Adaptive strategies and finite-conditional premise sets}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, number = {5}, year = {2016}, pages = {1517-1539}, doi = {10.1093/logcom/exu044}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exu044}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzu017, title = {Adaptive logics: a parametric approach}, journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL}, volume = {22}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, pages = {905-932}, chapter = {905}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, url = {+ http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzu017}, author = {Van De Putte, Frederik and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {D:llr10, title = {Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool for Relative Rationality. {I}ncluding a Section on Logical Pluralism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {1-25}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, I show that adaptive logics are required by my epistemological stand. While doing so, I defy the reader to cope with the problems I am able to cope with.

The last section of the paper contains a defense of a specific form of logical pluralism. Although this section is an integral part of the paper, it may be read separately.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {3152319, title = {Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {12}, year = {2013}, pages = {2195{\textendash}2217}, abstract = {

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung{\textquoteright}s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9964-y}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @incollection {jespersen2013alleged, title = {Alleged assassins: realist and constructivist semantics for modal modification}, booktitle = {Logic, Language, and Computation}, series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, volume = {7758}, year = {2013}, pages = {94{\textendash}114}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Modal modifiers such as Alleged oscillate between being subsective and being privative. If individual a is an alleged assassin (at some parameter of evaluation) then it is an open question whether a is an assassin (at that parameter). Standardly, modal modifiers are negatively defined, in terms of failed inferences or non-intersectivity or non-extensionality. Modal modifiers are in want of a positive definition and a worked-out logical semantics. This paper offers two positive definitions. The realist definition is elaborated within Tich{\'y}’s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and builds upon Montague’s model-theoretic semantics for adjectives as representing mappings from properties to properties. The constructivist definition is based on an extension of Martin-L{\"o}f’s Constructive Type Theory (CTT) so as to accommodate partial verification. We show that, and why, “a is an alleged assassin” and “Allegedly, a is an assassin” are equivalent in TIL and synonymous in CTT.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-36976-6_8}, author = {Jespersen, Bj{\o}rn and Primiero, Giuseppe} } @phdthesis {PhD_JanW, title = {And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy.}, year = {2013}, month = {February 25}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {3258356, title = {{\textquoteright}Argumentandi modus huius scientiae maxim{\`e} proprius: {\textquoteright} {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s mechanics and the question of mathematical principles}, booktitle = {Guidobaldo del {M}onte (1545-1607) : theory and practice of the mathematical disciplines from {U}rbino to {E}urope}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Edition Open Access}, isbn = {9783844242836}, url = {http://www.edition-open-access.de/media/proceedings/4/Proceedings4.pdf}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Becchi, Antonio and Bertoloni Meli, Domenico and Gamba, Enrico} } @article {3099682, title = {Abduction of generalizations}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {345{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hypotheses are formed for generalizations such as “pineapples taste sweet” or “rainbows appear when the sun breaks through the rain”. This phenomenon has received little attention in formal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and everyday reasoning. Second, the adaptive logic LA \&\#8704; is presented to explicate this process formally

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @article {3152442, title = {Adaptively applying modus ponens in conditional logics of normality}, journal = {Journal of applied non-classical logics}, volume = {22}, number = {1-2}, year = {2012}, pages = {125{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

This paper presents an adaptive logic enhancement of conditional logics of normality that allows for defeasible applications of Modus Ponens to conditionals. In addition to the possibilities these logics already offer in terms of reasoning about conditionals, this way they are enriched by the ability to perform default inferencing itself. The idea is to apply Modus Ponens defeasibly to a conditional A\&\#8605;B and a fact A on the condition that it is “safe” to do so concerning the factual and conditional knowledge at hand. It is for instance not safe if the given information describes exceptional circumstances: although birds usually fly, penguins are exceptional to this rule. The two adaptive standard strategies are shown to correspond to different intuitions, a skeptical and a credulous reasoning type, which manifest themselves in the handling of so-called floating conclusions.

}, issn = {1166-3081}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2012.682450}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @proceedings {3178952, title = {An adaptive logic based approach to abduction in {A}{I}}, journal = {Ninth International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Action and Change}, year = {2011}, pages = {1-6}, abstract = {

In a logic-based approach to abductive reasoning, the background knowledge is represented by a logical theory. A sentence \&\#934; is then considered as an explanation for ω if it satisfies some formal conditions. In general, the following three conditions are considered crucial: (1) Φ together with the background knowledge implies !; (2) Φ is logically consistent with what is known; and (3) Φ is the most ‘parsimonious’ explanation. But, since abductive reasoning is a non-monotonic form of reasoning, each time the background knowledge is extended, the status of previously abduced explanations becomes once again undefined. The adaptive logics program is developed to address these types of non-monotonic reasoning. In addition to deductive reasoning steps, it allows for direct implementation of defeasible reasoning steps, but it adds to each formula the explicit set of conditions that would defeat this formula. So, in an adaptive logic for abduction, a formula is an abduced hypothesis as long as none of its conditions is deduced. This implies that we will not have to recheck all hypotheses each time an extension to our background knowledge is made. This is the key advantage of this approach, which allows us to save repetitive re-computations in fast growing knowledge bases.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @phdthesis {PhD_Christian, title = {Adaptive Logic Characterizations of Defeasible Reasoning with Applications in Argumentation, Normative Reasoning and Default Reasoning}, year = {2011}, month = {April 5}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {Beirlaen2011, title = {Aristotle{\textquoteright}s Modal Proofs, by {A}driane {R}ini (review; in Dutch)}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {4}, number = {73}, year = {2011}, pages = {749-751}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu} } @incollection {VanBouwel2011, title = {An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? {I}nterdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society.}, series = {Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society}, year = {2011}, pages = {43{\textendash}72}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and question-driven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, World-Systems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for question-driven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for question-driven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation {\textendash}and related institutional developments- on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).

}, isbn = {9789814355056}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Pinxten, Rik and Wallerstein, Immanuel} } @conference {872462, title = {An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non{\textendash}monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.

}, isbn = {978-3-642-14887-3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14888-0\_20}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @article {1101409, title = {An adaptive logic framework for conditional obligations and deontic dilemmas}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {1-2}, year = {2010}, pages = {95{\textendash}128}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @booklet {Lycke_addingthe, title = {Adding the Inference Rule Disjunctive Syllogism to Relevant Logics}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

In order to avoid trivial consequences, the derivability relation of relevant logics (RL) does not support the inference rule disjunctive syllogism (DS). In this paper, I will show that the inference rule DS can be added to this derivability relation in a way that doesn’t lead to trivial or irrelevant consequences. To do so, I will rely on the insights gained from the study of inconsistency–adaptive logics, the branch of adaptive logics that was devised to explicate reasoning based on inconsistent premise sets. Moreover, I will also point to the relations with some alternative proposals from the literature, and I will show that the inconsistency–adaptive framework has some major advantages over these.

}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {1019205, title = {Algebraic partitioning problems from {L}uca {P}acioli{\textquoteright}s {P}erugia manuscript (Vat. Lat. 3129)}, journal = {Sources and Commentaries in Exact Sciences}, volume = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {3{\textendash}51}, issn = {1345-4617}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {1209545, title = {Anticipation and the constitution of time in the philosophy of {E}rnst {C}assirer}, journal = {Casys: International journal of computing anticipatory systems}, volume = {23}, year = {2010}, pages = {11}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, seen as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthermore, I will also argue, again with Cassirer and against Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different things-in-themselves (past, present and future).

}, issn = {1373-5411}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924341, title = {Anti-positionalism{\textquoteright}s regress}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, pages = {479{\textendash}493}, abstract = {

This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a{\textquoteright}s preceding b and b{\textquoteright}s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a{\textquoteright}s preceding b and b{\textquoteright}s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls prey to a regress argument which is to prove its failure. In the paper we spell out this worry, show that the worry is a serious one, and distinguish four possible strategies for Anti-Positionalism to deal with it.

}, issn = {1122-1151}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9097-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @conference {JMF:adera, title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called \sys{P2.1}$^r$, that is based on Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e${\textendash}-a bimodal extension of Goble{\textquoteright}s logic \sys{P} that invalidates aggregation for all \emph{prima facie} obligations. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ has several advantages with respect to \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}as much as possible{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than \sys{SDL}$a$\sys{P}$e$. The logic \sys{P2.1}$^r$ avoids Goble{\textquoteright}s criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the {\textquoteleft}toy examples{\textquoteright} from the literature as well as more complex ones.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14183-6\_12}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Beirlaen, Mathieu and Van De Putte, Frederik}, editor = {Governatori, Guido and Sartor, Giovanni} } @article {666246, title = {The Abbaco Tradition (1300-1500): its role in the development of {E}uropean algebra}, journal = {Suuri Kaiseki Kenkyuujo koukyuuroku}, volume = {1625}, year = {2009}, pages = {23{\textendash}33}, abstract = {

Abbaco algebra is a coherent tradition of algebraic problem solving mostly based in the merchant cities of fourteenth and fifteenth-century Italy. This period is roughly situated between two important works dealing with algebra: the Liber Abbaci by Fibonacci (1202) and the Summa di Arithmetica et Geometria by Lucca Pacioli (1492). Such continuous tradition of mathematical practice was hardly known before the first transcriptions of extant manuscripts by Gino Arrighi from the 1960{\textquoteright}s and the ground-breaking work by Warren van Egmond (1980). After some decades of manuscript study and the recent assessment of Jens H{\o}yrup (2007) we now have a better understanding of this tradition. In this paper we provide an overview of the basic characteristics of the abbaco tradition and discuss the role it played towards the new symbolic algebra as it emerged in sixteenth-century Europe. We argue that its influence on the sixteenth century has largely been ignored and that the new ars analytica from the French algebraists should be understood as establishing new foundations for the general practice of abbaco problem solving.

}, issn = {1880-2818}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @article {heeffer2009abbacus, title = {The Abbacus Tradition: the Missing Link between Arabic and Early Symbolic Algebra?}, year = {2009}, abstract = {

Abbaco algebra is a coherent tradition of arithmetical and algebraic problem solving, mostly based in the merchant cities of fourteenth and fifteenth-century Italy. This period is roughly situated between two impor- tant works dealing with algebra: the Liber Abbaci by Fibonacci (1202) [5] and the Summa di Arithmetica et Geometria by Luca Pacioli (1492) [20]. Such continuous tradition of mathematical practice was hardly known be- fore the first transcriptions of extant manuscripts by Gino Arrighi from the 1960{\textquoteright}s (most notably [1], [2], [3] and [4]) and the ground-breaking work by Warren van Egmond [28]. After some decades of manuscript study and the recent assessment of Jens H{\o}yrup [10] we now have a bet- ter understanding of this tradition. Here we provide an overview of the basic characteristics of the abbaco tradition and discuss the role it played towards the new symbolic algebra as it emerged in sixteenth-century Europe.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht} } @incollection {D:paraty, title = {Adaptive Cn Logics}, booktitle = {The Many Sides of Logic}, year = {2009}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This paper solves an old problem: to devise decent inconsistency-adaptive logics that have the \C{n} logics as their lower limit. Two kinds of logics are presented. Those of the first kind offer a maximally consistent interpretation of the premise set in as far as this is possible in view of logical considerations. At the same time, they indicate at which points further choices may be made on extra-logical grounds. The logics of the second kind allow one to introduce those choices in a defeasible way and handle them.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {862760, title = {Adaptive fuzzy logics for contextual hedge interpretation}, journal = {Journal of Logic, Language and Information}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}356}, abstract = {

The article presents several adaptive fuzzy hedge logics. These logics are designed to perform a specific kind of hedge detection. Given a premise set Γ that represents a series of communicated statements, the logics can check whether some predicate occurring in Γ may be interpreted as being (implicitly) hedged by technically, strictly speaking or loosely speaking, or simply non-hedged. The logics take into account both the logical constraints of the premise set as well as conceptual information concerning the meaning of potentially hedged predicates (stored in the memory of the interpreter in question). The proof theory of the logics is non-monotonic in order to enable the logics to deal with possible non-monotonic interpretation dynamics (this is illustrated by means of several concrete proofs). All the adaptive fuzzy hedge logics are also sound and strongly complete with respect to their [0,1]-semantics.

}, issn = {0925-8531}, doi = {10.1007/s10849-009-9084-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-009-9084-y}, author = {van der Waart van Gulik, Stephan} } @conference {605786, title = {The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in {B}elgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {680484, title = {Adaptive Logics using the Minimal Abnormality strategy are \${\textbackslash}Pi\^{ }1\_1\$-complex}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {167}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {93{\textendash}104}, abstract = {

In this article complexity results for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy are presented. It is proven here that the consequence set of some recursive premise sets is Pi(1)(1)-complete. So, the complexity results in ( Horsten and Welch, Synthese 158: 41- 60, 2007) are mistaken for adaptive logics using the minimal abnormality strategy.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9291-5}, author = {Verd{\'e}e, Peter} } @article {528863, title = {Anti-trinitarianism in {N}ewton’s {G}eneral {S}cholium to the {P}rincipia}, journal = {European Journal of Science and Theology}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}11}, abstract = {

Recent findings on Newton{\textquoteright}s heretical beliefs in the five draft versions of the General Scholium, which was added to the second edition of the Principia in 1713, are discussed here. We shall use these snapshots as a tool to gain understanding into the process of composition of the theological material from the General Scholium.

}, issn = {1841-0464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {GiJ:aavc, title = {Adaptive arbitration by variant counting on commutative bases with weights}, booktitle = {Fusion 2008: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Fusion}, year = {2008}, publisher = {IEEE}, organization = {IEEE}, abstract = {

In this paper a new logical arbitration protocol for fusion of inconsistent information is designed. It defines a selection of models of a premise set in a multi-modal logic that uses the standard format of adaptive logics. The selected models are obtained by a counting procedure on the derivable data conflicting among the various sources. Peculiar of this approach is the definition of weights for commutative bases, in terms of the distinction between partially and fully supported information. The results obtained are compared to standard arbitration protocols and they extend previous work on the adaptive majority protocol.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICIF.2008.4632371}, author = {Primiero, Giuseppe and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {381663, title = {Abduction as a strategy for concept formation in mathematics: {C}ardano postulating a negative.}, booktitle = {Abduction and the process of scientific discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {179{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da Universidade de Lisboa}, abstract = {

When dealing with abductive reasoning in scientific discovery, historical case studies are focused mostly on the physical sciences, as with the discoveries of Kepler, Galilei and Newton. We will present a case study of abductive reasoning in early algebra. Two new concepts introduced by Cardano in his Ars Magna, imaginary numbers and a negative solution to a linear problem, can be explained as a result of a process of abduction. We will show that the first appearance of these new concepts fits very well Peirce’s original description of abductive reasoning. Abduction may be regarded as one important strategy for the formation of new concepts in mathematics.

}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @article {JDa:gda, title = {Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {22/3}, number = {60}, year = {2007}, pages = {295{\textendash}304}, abstract = {

In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/12751}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {Ducheyne2007, title = {Abstraction vs. Idealization: A Conceptual Analysis.}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {9-10}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {380250, title = {An adaptive logic for relevant classical deduction}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {602{\textendash}612}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that it is possible to delete Ex Falso Quodlibet from Classical Logic, without depriving it of any of its deductive powers. This is done by means of the ambiguity{\textendash}adaptive logic AALns, which is equivalent to dCR, the deductive version of Neil Tennant{\textquoteright}s CR.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @incollection {J:ala, title = {Adaptive Logics for Abduction and the Explication of Explanation-Seeking Processes}, booktitle = {Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery}, year = {2007}, pages = {97{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Centro de Filosofia das Ci{\^e}ncias da U. de Lisboa}, address = {Lisboa}, abstract = {

In this paper, I illustrate the main characteristics of abductive reasoning processes by means of an example from the history of the sciences. The example is taken from the history of chemistry and concerns a very small episode from Lavoisier’s struggle with the ‘air’ obtained from mercury oxide. Eventually, this struggle would lead to the discovery of oxygen. I also show that Lavoisier’s reasoning process can be explicated by means of a particular formal logic, namely the adaptive logic LAr. An important property of LAr is that it not only nicely integrates deductive and abductive steps, but that it moreover has a decent proof theory. This proof theory is dynamic, but warrants that the conclusions derived at a given stage are justified in view of the insight in the premises at that stage. Another advantage of the presented logic is that, as compared to other existing systems for abductive reasoning, it is very close to natural reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Pombo, Olga and Gerner, Alexander} } @article {381569, title = {Algunas notas metodol{\'o}gicas sobre los experimentos de {J}.{B}. {V}an {H}elmont}, journal = {Azogue, Revista electr{\'o}nica dedicada al hist{\'o}rico cr{\'\i}tico de la alquimia}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {100{\textendash}107}, issn = {1575-8184}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @conference {812549, title = {The ambiguity of unification in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {2e Congr{\`e}s de la Soci{\'e}t{\'e} de Philosophie des Sciences}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

In the social sciences, the dream of unity often recurs. One of these contemporary unifying projects is economics imperialism. Its goal is to increase the degree of unification by applying rational choice theory beyond its original (economic) home in other territories like political science, sociology, anthropology, history, etc. In this paper, I want to evaluate the benefits and feasibility of this project from the perspective of explanatory pluralism and demonstrate the ambiguity of unification and unity. Revisiting debates concerning rational choice theory in feminist economics and historical sociology, I will delimit the benefits and shortcomings of economics imperialism and the idea of unification, making use of a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism {\textendash} based on the erotetic model of explanation {\textendash} elaborated in my earlier work (cf. Weber and Van Bouwel, 2002). A thorough analysis of these debates will result in a nuanced view on unification and unity, with on the one hand, a plea for taking the plurality of epistemic and non-epistemic interests in social scientific theories and explanation into account {\textendash} with the evident implications this has for the unity of science project {\textendash} but, on the other hand, an attempt to carve out a well-defined place for unification and the benefits it might bring to social science theory and explanation. This last exercise might take away the worries sometimes uttered by social scientists concerning the unificationist endeavour of economics imperialism.

}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {Weber2007, title = {Assessing the explanatory power of causal explanations.}, booktitle = {Rethinking Explanation}, year = {2007}, pages = {109{\textendash}118}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, isbn = {978-1-4020-5580-5}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Persson, J. and Ylikoski, Petri} } @article {DJDa:signed, title = {An Adaptive Characterization of Signed Systems for Paraconsistent Reasoning}, year = {2006}, abstract = {

In this paper we characterize the six (basic) signed systems from \cite{B\&S:sspr} in terms of adaptive logics. We prove the characterization correct and show that it has a number of advantages.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {J:AJ, title = {An Adaptive Logic Based on {J}a{\'s}kowski{\textquoteright}s Approach to Paraconsistency}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic}, volume = {35}, year = {2006}, pages = {539{\textendash}567}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present the modal adaptive logic AJ r (based on S5) as well as the discussive logic Dr2 that is defined from it. Dr2 is a (non-monotonic) alternative for Jaskowski’s paraconsistent system D 2 . Like D 2 , Dr2 validates all single-premise rules of Classical Logic. However, for formulas that behave consistently, D2 moreover validates all multiple-premise rules of Classical Logic. Importantly, and unlike in the case of D2 , this does not require the introduction of discussive connectives. It is argued that this has clear advantages with respect to one of the main application contexts of discussive logics, namely the interpretation of discussions.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @phdthesis {PhD_Maarten, title = {An Archaeology of Galileo{\textquoteright}s Science}, year = {2006}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {358125, title = {Are there ontological explanations?}, booktitle = {Essays in Logic and Ontology}, volume = {91}, year = {2006}, pages = {277{\textendash}283}, publisher = {Rodopi}, address = {Amsterdam/New York}, abstract = {

There is a huge philosophical literature on scientific explanation, and no one seriously denies that the sciences explain in one way or another. But what about ontology? I will argue that ontological laws and ontological theories can explain. And I will point at the differences between ontological explanations and their scientific counterparts.

}, isbn = {9042021306}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Malinowski, Jacek and Pietruszczak, Andrzej} } @article {Ducheyne2006, title = {The Argument(s) for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {419-447}, abstract = {

In this paper an analysis of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation is provided. In the past, the complexity of the argument has not been fully appreciated. Recent authors like George E. Smith and William L. Harper have done a far better job. Nevertheless, a thorough account of the argument is still lacking. Both authors seem to stress the importance of only one methodological component. Smith stresses the procedure of approximative deductions backed-up by the laws of motion. Harper stresses “systematic dependencies” between theoretical parameters and phenomena. I will argue that Newton used a variety of different inferential strategies: causal parsimony considerations, deductions, demonstrative inductions, abductions and thought-experiments. Each of these strategies is part of Newton’s famous argument.

}, keywords = {argumentative pluralism, Newton, Principia, Universal gravitation}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-005-3189-9}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-005-3189-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {352773, title = {Ascribing contemporary scientific concepts to past thinkers: towards a frame-work for handling matters more precisely}, journal = {Scientia Poetica}, volume = {10}, year = {2006}, pages = {274{\textendash}290}, issn = {1431-5041}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Lieven, title = {Adaptieve Inductielogica{\textquoteright}s. Theory en Praktijk van het Inductief Redeneren}, year = {2005}, month = {November 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Haesaert, Lieven} } @conference {322369, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Compassionate Relevantism}, booktitle = {Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications}, year = {2005}, publisher = {CENTRIA}, organization = {CENTRIA}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pereira, Luis Moniz and Wheeler, Gregory} } @incollection {J:al_iid, title = {Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and Deduction}, booktitle = {Induction and Deduction in the Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {93{\textendash}120}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Stadler, Friedrich} } @article {LeE:aalcd, title = {Applications of the Adaptive Logic for Causal Discovery}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {47}, number = {185{\textendash}188}, year = {2004}, pages = {33{\textendash}51}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {D:al_antw, title = {Adaptieve Logica{\textquoteright}s. {E}en precieze benadering van vertrouwde maar door logici verwaarloosde redeneervormen}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {95}, year = {2003}, pages = {174{\textendash}189}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {Urbaniak2003, title = {Analysis of Kotarbinski{\textquoteright}s reistic reasonings}, journal = {{Logiczne Podstawy Rozumowa{\'n}}, volume = {3}, year = {2003}, pages = {62{\textendash}81}, author = {Urbaniak, Rafal} } @incollection {J:alpt, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Pragmatic Truth}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {167{\textendash}185}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper presents the new adaptive logic APT. APT has the peculiar property that it enables one to interpret a (possibly inconsistent) theory Gamma {\textquoteright}as pragmatically as possible{\textquoteright}. The aim is to capture the idea of a partial structure (in the sense of da Costa and associates) that adequately models a (possibly inconsistent) set of beliefs Gamma. What this comes to is that APT localizes the {\textquoteright}consistent core{\textquoteright} of Gamma, and that it delivers all sentences that are compatible with this core. For the core itself, APT is just as rich as Classical Logic. APT is defined from a modal adaptive logic APV that is based itself on two other adaptive logics. I present the semantics of all three systems, as well as their dynamic proof theory. The dynamic proof theory for APV is unusual (even within the adaptive logic programme) in that it incorporates two different kinds of dynamics.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @incollection {JLMDa:abd, title = {Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, year = {2002}, pages = {39{\textendash}71}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Verhoeven, Liza and Van Dyck, Maarten and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {EM:cle, title = {Adaptive Logic and Covering Law Explanations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {237{\textendash}254}, abstract = {

In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductive-nomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductive-statistical explanations face the well-known problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {J:alqe, title = {Adaptive logics for question evocation}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {135{\textendash}164}, abstract = {

In this paper, I present two adaptive logics for Wisniewki{\textquoteright}s notion of question evocation. The first is based on an erotetic extension of Classical Logic, the second on an erotetic extension of S5. For both logics, I present the semantics and the dynamic proof theory. The latter is especially important in view of the fact that question evocation is a non-monotonic relation for which there is no positive test. Thanks to its dynamical character, the proof theory moreover solves the logical omniscience problem to which Wisniewski{\textquoteright}s static definition of question evocation leads.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {291776, title = {All premises are equal, but some are more equal than others.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {165{\textendash}188}, abstract = {

This paper proposes two adaptive approaches to inconsistent prioritized belief bases. Both approaches rely on a selection mechanism, that is not applied to the premises as they stand, but to the consequence sets of the belief levels. One is based on classical compatibility, the other on the modal logic T of Feys. For both approaches the two main strategies of inconsistency adaptive logics are formulated: the reliability strategy and the minimal abnormality strategy. All four systems are compared and found useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:dyndisc, title = {Aspects of the Dynamics of Discussions and Logics Handling Them}, year = {2001}, abstract = {

Although we are all familiar with discussions, spelling out their dynamics in a precise way involves many tough logical problems. This paper reports on a set of logical tools that are useful in this respect. Some concern the arguments produced in a discussion, possibly as a result of interventions of different participants, and the many forms of explicit and implicit agreement that are required to understand what is going on. Others concern the changing positions of participants. Nearly all of the tools are adaptive logics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {J:psic, title = {On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent Constraints}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {8}, year = {2000}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters when solving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meet these difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one to derive as many (interesting) consequences as possible, but that at the same time allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I show that the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @article {DJ:compat, title = {The Adaptive Logic of Compatibility}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {66}, year = {2000}, pages = {327{\textendash}348}, abstract = {

This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistency-adaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for S5 from which it follows that a specific subset of the standard worlds-models is characteristic for S5.

Keywords: compatibility, adaptive logic, ampliative reasoning, S5-semantics.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {121607, title = {Alternative mathematics: the vague way.}, booktitle = {Festschrift in honor of {N}ewton {C}.{A}. da {C}osta on the occasion of his seventieth birthday}, volume = {125}, year = {2000}, pages = {19{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, isbn = {N/A}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Krause, D{\'e}cio and French, Steven and Doria, Francisco A.} } @incollection {J:analog, title = {Analogical Reasoning in Creative Problem Solving Processes: Logico-Philosophical Perspectives}, booktitle = {Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {17{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Kluwer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Hallyn, Fernand} } @incollection {van2000analogy, title = {Analogy and metaphor as essential tools for the working mathematician}, booktitle = {Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {105{\textendash}123}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

It may perhaps sound strange if not bizarre to suggest that metaphors and analogies could and should play a role in the practice of mathematics, let alone to claim that they are essential in present-day mathematics. Yet, that will be precisely the claim I will defend in this paper. I do insist that present-day mathematics is the domain of investigation I have in mind. From a historical perspective, and as an example, no one seems to doubt that mathematics one way or another must have arisen out of a specific set of practices, usually referred to as counting and measuring, and that mathematical concepts are metaphorically related to these practices. That view of the matter, however, does not necessarily say anything about the situation today and, indeed, in most cases it does not.

}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-015-9442-4_7}, author = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul}, editor = {Hallyn, Fernand} } @article {109693, title = {Ambiguity-adaptive logic}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {159}, year = {1997}, pages = {261{\textendash}280}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Vanackere, Guido} } @book {D:ag, title = {Antropin{\`e} Gnos{\`e}. Mia Ekkl{\`e}s{\`e} gia mia Chr{\`e}sim{\`e} Ortologikot{\`e}ta}, year = {1996}, publisher = {Crete University Press}, organization = {Crete University Press}, address = {Athens/Eracleion}, abstract = {

Greek translation of "Menselijke Kennis" (Diderik Batens, Garant, 1992).

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:alaoetb, title = {Adaptieve logica{\textquoteright}s: een aanzet om elkaar te begrijpen}, booktitle = {Iedereen die niet denkt zoals ik, volge mij. {A}cta 16de {N}ederlands-{V}laamse Filosofiedag}, year = {1994}, pages = {13{\textendash}19}, publisher = {VUB-Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Bendegem, Jean Paul and Kornelis, Gustaaf} } @article {J:clau1, title = {Adaptive Logic in Scientific Discovery: the Case of {C}lausius}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {36}, number = {143-144}, year = {1993}, pages = {359{\textendash}389}, author = {Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {DJE:aoc, title = {Aspecten van ontdekking en creativiteit}, booktitle = {Gehelen en Fragmenten. {D}e vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1992}, month = {Leuven, September}, pages = {59}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} } @article {D:globpara, title = {Against Global Paraconsistency}, journal = {Studies in Soviet Thought}, volume = {39}, year = {1990}, pages = {209{\textendash}229}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:as, title = {Action science and the reunification of the social sciences and epistemology}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {40}, year = {1987}, pages = {109{\textendash}134}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }