@article {wieland2014sceptical,
	title = {Sceptical Rationality},
	journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
	volume = {55},
	number = {2},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {222{\textendash}238},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}
}
@article {wieland2013strong,
	title = {Strong and weak regress arguments},
	journal = {Logique \& Analyse},
	volume = {56},
	number = {224},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {439{\textendash}461},
	abstract = {<p>In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can in fact take both forms, and clearly set out the logical difference between them. Throughout the paper, I confine myself to metaphysical examples from the early Russell. Only now that we know they are valid can we start to discuss whether they are sound.</p>},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}
}
@article {wieland2011sceptic,
	title = {The Sceptic{\textquoteright}s Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress},
	journal = {Philosophical Papers},
	volume = {40},
	number = {3},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {359{\textendash}369},
	abstract = {<p>Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Paul Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers{\textquoteright} practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.</p>},
	doi = {10.1080/05568641.2011.634246},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}
}
