@article {raey, title = {Regress Argument Reconstruction}, journal = {Argumentation}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {489-503}, abstract = {

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.

}, keywords = {Argument, Charity, Infinite regress, Interpretation, Reconstruction}, issn = {0920-427X}, doi = {10.1007/s10503-012-9264-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {1980039, title = {Rules regresses}, booktitle = {AGPC 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {79{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, abstract = {

Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as {\textquoteright}if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p{\textquoteright}? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a {\textquoteright}dilemma of regress and idleness{\textquoteright}, as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.

}, url = {http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {1985316, title = {Relata-specific relations: a response to Vallicella}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {509{\textendash}524}, abstract = {

According to Vallicella{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley{\textquoteright}s Regress{\textquoteright} (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella{\textquoteright}s conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three feature-pairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relata-specificity/relata-unspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be relata-specific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition.

}, issn = {0012-2017}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01167.x}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Betti, Arianna} }