@article {2964109,
	title = {Can Pyrrhonists act normally?},
	journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
	volume = {15},
	number = {3},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {227{\textendash}289},
	abstract = {<p>Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following I take up this systematic query, and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus{\textquoteright} ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to insure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.</p>},
	issn = {1386-9795},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2012.696133},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}
}
@article {wieland2012carving,
	title = {Carving the world as we please},
	journal = {Philosophica},
	volume = {84},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {7{\textendash}24},
	abstract = {<p>Nelson Goodman defends the seemingly radical view that, in a certain sense, all facts depend on our perspective on the matter. We make the world, rather than merely find it. The aim of this contribution is three-fold: to make sense of Goodmans metaphysical perspectivalism, clearly explain how it differs from other branches of perspectivalism (epistemic and semantic), and put two issues on the agenda that deserve renewed attention.</p>},
	author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}
}
