@incollection {strasser2015withstanding, title = {Withstanding Tensions: {S}cientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance}, booktitle = {Heuristic Reasoning}, series = {Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics}, volume = {16}, year = {2015}, pages = {113{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Ippoliti, Emiliano} } @incollection {Wieland2014, title = {Internalism Does Entail Scepticism}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, series = {Logic, Argumentation \& Reasoning}, volume = {5}, year = {2014}, pages = {247-260}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

Let Internalism be the view that our inferences are justified depending on whether we have knowledge of the logical rules on which they are based, and Scepticism the view that none of our inferences are justified. Boghossian has shown that Internalism entails Scepticism, and Philie has attempted to block the entailment by invoking an assumption on rationality. In this contribution, I enforce the entailment claim and argue that Philie’s solution misses the target: Internalism does entail Scepticism.

}, keywords = {Internalism, Knowledge, Regress, Rule, Scepticism}, isbn = {978-94-017-9010-9}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6_13}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {wieland2014sceptical, title = {Sceptical Rationality}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2014}, pages = {222{\textendash}238}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @phdthesis {PhD_JanW, title = {And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy.}, year = {2013}, month = {February 25}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2013belief, title = {Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato, by Katja Maria Vogt (review).}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {122}, number = {488}, year = {2013}, pages = {1204{\textendash}1207}, doi = {10.1093/mind/fzu012}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2013justification, title = {Is Justification Dialectical?}, journal = {International Journal for the Study of Skepticism}, volume = {3}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {182{\textendash}201}, abstract = {

Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they ha ve in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in ord er to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow tha t one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it agains t challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in its most interesting format. In this paper I zoom i n on this debate, and fix further details of Lammenranta’s lead. Specifically , I will side with skepticism that justification is dialectical, yet o nly if certain conditions are in place.

}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {3177520, title = {Oneindige regressieargumenten}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {105}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {1{\textendash}14}, abstract = {

Infinite regress arguments show up in many philosophical debates. But what actually is a regress argument? This article reviews two theories: the Paradox Theory and the Failure Theory. According to the Paradox Theory, regress arguments can be used to refute an existentially or universally quantified statement (e.g. to refute the statement that at least one discussion is settled, or the statement that discussions are settled only if there is an agreed-upon criterion to settle them). According to the Failure Theory, regress arguments can be used to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to solve an existentially or universally quantified problem (e.g. to demonstrate that a certain solution fails to settle all discussions, or that it fails to settle even one discussion). In the literature, the Paradox Theory is fairly well-developed, and this article shows that the Failure Theory can be supplied with similar tools.

}, issn = {0002-5275}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/ANTW2013.1.WIEL}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2013strong, title = {Strong and weak regress arguments}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {56}, number = {224}, year = {2013}, pages = {439{\textendash}461}, abstract = {

In the literature, regress arguments often take one of two different forms: either they conclude that a given solution fails to solve any problem of a certain kind (the strong conclusion), or they conclude that a given solution fails to solve all problems of a certain kind (the weaker conclusion). This gives rise to a logical problem: do regresses entail the strong or the weaker conclusion, or none? In this paper I demonstrate that regress arguments can in fact take both forms, and clearly set out the logical difference between them. Throughout the paper, I confine myself to metaphysical examples from the early Russell. Only now that we know they are valid can we start to discuss whether they are sound.

}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2013carroll, title = {What Carroll’s tortoise actually proves}, journal = {Ethical theory and moral practice}, volume = {16}, number = {5}, year = {2013}, pages = {983{\textendash}997}, abstract = {

Rationality requires us to have certain propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentions, etc.) given certain other attitudes that we have. Carroll’s Tortoise repeatedly shows up in this discussion. Following up on Brunero (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:557–569, 2005), I ask what Carroll-style considerations actually prove. This paper rejects two existing suggestions, and defends a third.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10677-012-9397-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {2964109, title = {Can Pyrrhonists act normally?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {227{\textendash}289}, abstract = {

Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following I take up this systematic query, and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus{\textquoteright} ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to insure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life.

}, issn = {1386-9795}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2012.696133}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2012carving, title = {Carving the world as we please}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {7{\textendash}24}, abstract = {

Nelson Goodman defends the seemingly radical view that, in a certain sense, all facts depend on our perspective on the matter. We make the world, rather than merely find it. The aim of this contribution is three-fold: to make sense of Goodman’s metaphysical perspectivalism, clearly explain how it differs from other branches of perspectivalism (epistemic and semantic), and put two issues on the agenda that deserve renewed attention.

}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2012pyrronistische, title = {De pyrronistische zaak}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}532}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {raey, title = {Regress Argument Reconstruction}, journal = {Argumentation}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {489-503}, abstract = {

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.

}, keywords = {Argument, Charity, Infinite regress, Interpretation, Reconstruction}, issn = {0920-427X}, doi = {10.1007/s10503-012-9264-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {924343, title = {Filling a typical gap in a regress argument}, journal = {Logique \& Analyse}, volume = {54}, number = {216}, year = {2011}, pages = {589{\textendash}597}, abstract = {

In the following we fix a typical regress argument, locate a typical gap in the argument, and try to supply a number of gap-filling readings of its first premise.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {1980049, title = {Proto-regress argument schemas}, booktitle = {ISSA 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {2000{\textendash}2007}, publisher = {Ghent University. Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @incollection {1980039, title = {Rules regresses}, booktitle = {AGPC 2010 Proceedings}, year = {2011}, pages = {79{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Ghent University, Department of Philosophy and moral sciences}, abstract = {

Is the content of our thoughts determined by norms such as {\textquoteright}if I know that p, then I ought to believe that p{\textquoteright}? Gluer and Wikforss (2009) set forth a regress argument for a negative answer. The aim of this paper is to clarify and evaluate this argument. In the first part I show how it (just like an argument from Wittgenstein 1953) can be taken as an instance of an argument schema. In the second part, I evaluate the relevant premises in some detail, and argue that the dialectical situation is slightly more complicated than a {\textquoteright}dilemma of regress and idleness{\textquoteright}, as Gluer and Wikforss have dubbed it.

}, url = {http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc10/}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {wieland2011sceptic, title = {The Sceptic{\textquoteright}s Tools: Circularity and Infinite Regress}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2011}, pages = {359{\textendash}369}, abstract = {

Important sceptical arguments by Sextus Empiricus, David Hume and Paul Boghossian (concerning disputes, induction, and relativism respectively) are based on circularities and infinite regresses. Yet, philosophers{\textquoteright} practice does not keep circularities and infinite regresses clearly apart. In this metaphilosophical paper I show how circularity and infinite regress arguments can be made explicit, and shed light on two powerful tools of the sceptic.

}, doi = {10.1080/05568641.2011.634246}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {924341, title = {Anti-positionalism{\textquoteright}s regress}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, year = {2010}, pages = {479{\textendash}493}, abstract = {

This paper is about the Problem of Order, which is basically the problem how to account for both the distinctness of facts like a{\textquoteright}s preceding b and b{\textquoteright}s preceding a, and the identity of facts like a{\textquoteright}s preceding b and b{\textquoteright}s succeeding a. It has been shown that the Standard View fails to account for the second part and is therefore to be replaced. One of the contenders is Anti-Positionalism. As has recently been pointed out, however, Anti-Positionalism falls prey to a regress argument which is to prove its failure. In the paper we spell out this worry, show that the worry is a serious one, and distinguish four possible strategies for Anti-Positionalism to deal with it.

}, issn = {1122-1151}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-010-9097-9}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} } @article {924352, title = {Metaphysical explanatory asymmetries}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {53}, number = {211}, year = {2010}, pages = {345{\textendash}365}, abstract = {

The general view is that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric. For instance, if resemblance facts can be explained by facts about their relata, then, by the asymmetry of explanation, these latter facts cannot in turn be explained by the former. The question however is: is there any reason to hold on to the asymmetry? If so, what does it consist in? In the paper we approach these questions by comparing them to analogous questions that have been investigated for scientific explanations. Three main asymmetry criteria have been proposed for the latter: (i) causation, (ii) unification, and (iii) explanatory dependence. We argue that the last criterion, but not the former two, can be of help to metaphysical explanation: metaphysical explanations are asymmetric if the explanatory dependence criterion (in modified format) holds of them.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Weber, Erik} } @article {1985316, title = {Relata-specific relations: a response to Vallicella}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {509{\textendash}524}, abstract = {

According to Vallicella{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley{\textquoteright}s Regress{\textquoteright} (2002), if relations are to relate their relata, some special operator must do the relating. No other options will do. In this paper we reject Vallicella{\textquoteright}s conclusion by considering an important option that becomes visible only if we hold onto a precise distinction between the following three feature-pairs of relations: internality/externality, universality/particularity, relata-specificity/relata-unspecificity. The conclusion we reach is that if external relations are to relate their relata, they must be relata-specific (and no special operator is needed). As it eschews unmereological complexes, this outcome is of relevance to defenders of the extensionality of composition.

}, issn = {0012-2017}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01167.x}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem and Betti, Arianna} } @article {924333, title = {What problem of universals}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {7{\textendash}21}, abstract = {

What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Wieland, Jan Willem} }