@article {lycke2012formal, title = {A formal explication of the search for explanations: the adaptive logics approach to abductive reasoning}, journal = {Logic Journal of IGPL}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {497{\textendash}516}, abstract = {

Most logic–based approaches characterize abduction as a kind of backwards deduction plus additional conditions, which means that a number of conditions is specified that enable one to decide whether or not a particular abductive inference is sound (one of those conditions may e.g. be that abductive consequences have to be compatible with the background theory). Despite the fact that these approaches succeed in specifying which formulas count as valid consequences of abductive inference steps, they do not explicate the way people actually reason by means of abductive inferences. This is most clearly shown by the absence of a decent proof theory. Instead, search procedures are provided that enable one to determine the right abductive consequences. However, these do not by far resemble human reasoning. In order to explicate abductive reasoning more realistically, an alternative approach will be provided in this article, namely, one that is based on the adaptive logics programme. Proof theoretically, this approach interprets the argumentation schema affirming the consequent (AC: A ⊃ B, B |- A) as a defeasible rule of inference. This comes down to the fact that the abductive consequences obtained by means of AC are accepted only for as long as certain conditions are satis.ed—e.g. as long as their negation has not been derived from the background theory. In the end, only the unproblematic applications of AC are retained, while the problematic ones are rejected. In this way, the adaptive logics approach to abduction succeeds to provide a more realistic explication of the way people reason by means of abductive inferences. Moreover, as multiple abduction processes will be characterized, this article may be considered as the first step in the direction of a general formal approach to abduction based on the adaptive logics programme.

}, doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzq053}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @conference {872462, title = {An Adaptive Logic for the Formal Explication of Scalar Implicatures}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence: JSAI-isAI 2009 Workshops}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, organization = {Springer Verlag}, abstract = {

Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utterances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncertain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implicatures should be formally modeled as non{\textendash}monotonic or default rules of inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.

}, isbn = {978-3-642-14887-3}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14888-0\_20}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Nakakoji, Kumiyo and Murakami, Yohei and McCready, Eric} } @booklet {Lycke_addingthe, title = {Adding the Inference Rule Disjunctive Syllogism to Relevant Logics}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

In order to avoid trivial consequences, the derivability relation of relevant logics (RL) does not support the inference rule disjunctive syllogism (DS). In this paper, I will show that the inference rule DS can be added to this derivability relation in a way that doesn’t lead to trivial or irrelevant consequences. To do so, I will rely on the insights gained from the study of inconsistency–adaptive logics, the branch of adaptive logics that was devised to explicate reasoning based on inconsistent premise sets. Moreover, I will also point to the relations with some alternative proposals from the literature, and I will show that the inconsistency–adaptive framework has some major advantages over these.

}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {734645, title = {Inconsistency-adaptive modal logics: on how to cope with modal inconsistency}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {1-2}, year = {2010}, pages = {31{\textendash}61}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will characterize a new class of inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive logics, namely inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics. These logics cope with inconsistencies in a modal context. More specifically, when faced with inconsistencies, inconsistency{\textendash}adaptive modal logics avoid explosion, but still allow the derivation of sufficient consequences to adequately explicate the intended part of human reasoning.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, url = {http://www.logika.umk.pl/llp/pi.html}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Tanaka, Koji and Berto, Francesco and Mares, Edwin and Paoli, Francesco} } @incollection {767731, title = {On Relevance Conditions for Asserting Disjunctions}, booktitle = {The Logica Yearbook 2009}, year = {2010}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, publisher = {College Publications}, isbn = {1848900090}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pelis, Michal} } @conference {605786, title = {The Adaptive Logics Approach to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in {B}elgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {674595, title = {Fitch-style natural deduction for modal paralogics}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {207}, year = {2009}, pages = {193{\textendash}218}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will present a Fitch{\textendash}style natural deduction proof theory for modal paralogics (modal logics with gaps and/or gluts for negation). Besides the standard classical subproofs, the presented proof theory also contains modal subproofs, which express what would follow from a hypothesis, in case it would be true in some arbitrary world.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @article {380250, title = {An adaptive logic for relevant classical deduction}, journal = {Journal of Applied Logic}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {602{\textendash}612}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will show that it is possible to delete Ex Falso Quodlibet from Classical Logic, without depriving it of any of its deductive powers. This is done by means of the ambiguity{\textendash}adaptive logic AALns, which is equivalent to dCR, the deductive version of Neil Tennant{\textquoteright}s CR.

}, issn = {1570-8683}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @phdthesis {PhD_Hans, title = {Relevance in Reasoning: The Adaptive Logics Approach}, year = {2007}, month = {May 30}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Lycke, Hans} } @conference {322369, title = {An Adaptive Logic for Compassionate Relevantism}, booktitle = {Computational Models of Scientific Reasoning and Applications}, year = {2005}, publisher = {CENTRIA}, organization = {CENTRIA}, author = {Lycke, Hans}, editor = {Pereira, Luis Moniz and Wheeler, Gregory} }