@article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9372-0}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @book {4169996, title = {De Humanities: een bedreigde soort?}, series = {De uil van Minerva}, volume = {26}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, publisher = {UGent}, organization = {UGent}, editor = {De Vleminck, Jens and Froeyman, Anton} } @phdthesis {3257462, title = {{\textquoteright}I began with the desire to speak with the dead{\textquoteright}: de ethiek als {\textquoteright}eerste filosofie{\textquoteright} van de geschiedschrijving}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, isbn = {9789083125053}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2977241, title = {Frank {A}nkersmit and {E}elco {R}unia: the presence and the otherness of the past}, journal = {Rethinking history}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {393{\textendash}415}, abstract = {

This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I give an in-depth comparison and analysis of the theories of Frank Ankersmit and Eelco Runia, in which I highlight their most important resemblances and differences. What both have in common is their notion of the presence of the past as a {\textquoteright}presence in absence{\textquoteright}. They differ, however, with respect to the character of this past and the role representation plays in making it present. Second, I also argue that for both Ankersmit and Runia, the presence of the past is always the present of our past, which excludes the experience of the otherness of the past, and which opens both theories to the criticisms of being self-centered and nationalistic.

}, issn = {1364-2529}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642529.2012.695065}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2125879, title = {On lawfulness in history and historiography}, journal = {HISTORY AND THEORY}, volume = {51}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {172{\textendash}192}, abstract = {

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward{\textquoteright}s notion of {\textacutedbl}invariance,{\textacutedbl}is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called {\textacutedbl}pragmatic laws{\textacutedbl}and {\textacutedbl}invariance{\textacutedbl}do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.

}, issn = {1468-2303}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00620.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2977237, title = {The ontology of causal process theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHIA}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {523{\textendash}538}, abstract = {

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of {\textacutedbl}causal process{\textacutedbl} does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe{\textquoteright}s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon{\textquoteright}s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair{\textquoteright}s phsyicalist reduction of causation.

}, issn = {0048-3893}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9329-2}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {2977245, title = {Psychoanalyse en geschiedfilosofie}, journal = {PSYCHOANALYTISCHE PERSPECTIEVEN}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {293{\textendash}306}, issn = {0771-5862}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {1207602, title = {Historische uitvoeringspraktijk}, journal = {De uil van minerva}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

In this paper, I offer some philosophical thoughts on the phenomenon of historical performance practice. I investigate the historical conditions of possibility of the {\textacutedbl}epistemologization{\textacutedbl} of historical performance practice and I argue for a more hermeneutical approach.

}, issn = {0772-4381}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {1209545, title = {Anticipation and the constitution of time in the philosophy of {E}rnst {C}assirer}, journal = {Casys: International journal of computing anticipatory systems}, volume = {23}, year = {2010}, pages = {11}, abstract = {

In this paper, I will argue with Ernst Cassirer that anticipation plays an essential part in the constitution of time from a transcendental perspective. Time is, as any transcendental concept, seen as basically relational and subjective and only in a derivative way objective and indifferent to us. This entails that memory is prior to history, and anticipation is prior to prediction. In this paper, I will give some examples in order to argue for this point. Furthermore, I will also argue, again with Cassirer and against Henri Bergson, that time should be seen as a functional unity, and not as a collection of three different things-in-themselves (past, present and future).

}, issn = {1373-5411}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924906, title = {Concepts of causation in historiography}, journal = {Historical methods}, volume = {42}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {116{\textendash}128}, abstract = {

Historians can use the concept of causation in a variety of ways. each of which is associated with different historiographical claims and different kinds of argumentation. The author shows that, contrary to the Usual view, historical narratives are causal (in a specific way), and microhistory can be seen as a response to a very specific causal problem of Braudelian macrohistory.

}, issn = {0161-5440}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {515799, title = {Betekenisverschuiving in het causaliteitsbegrip van Ernst Cassirer}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {733{\textendash}761}, abstract = {

Cassirer’s conception of causation has until now been treated largely on the basis of Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. In this article, I argue that a characterisation of this sort can not be complete. There appear to be several apparent contradictions (of which I discuss three) when we compare the concept of causality in Determinism and Indeterminism with treatments of the concept in other works, especially those of mythical causation. We need a general view of Cassirer’s conception of causality to account for these contradictions. I offer such a view, which is partly universal (in as far as it refers to universals as time and space) and partly contextual (in as far as it refers, through the conception of the object, to principles that are specific to certain symbolic forms). Then, I discuss the differences and the resemblances between theoretical and mythical causation, and, within the theoretical world view, between the natural, cultural and biological sciences.

}, issn = {0040-750X}, author = {Froeyman, Anton} } @article {924886, title = {Unravelling the methodology of causal pluralism}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {73{\textendash}89}, abstract = {

In this paper we try to bring some clarification in the recent debate on causal pluralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qua lify as a pluralistic theory of causation. We also show that there is currently no theory on the market which meets these criteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and De Vreese, Leen} }