@article {1234908, title = {Testing universal gravitation in the laboratory, or the significance of research on the mean density of the earth and big {G}, 1798-1898: changing pursuits and long-term methodological-experimental continuity}, journal = {Archive for History of Exact Sciences}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {181{\textendash}227}, abstract = {

This article seeks to provide a historically well-informed analysis of an important post-Newtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of {\textacutedbl}puzzle solving.{\textacutedbl} In this article, the author shows that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century experimental research on the mean density of the earth and the gravitational constant. As Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of universal gravitation was mainly based on astronomical observation, it remained to be shown that Newton{\textquoteright}s law of universal gravitation did not break down at terrestrial distances. In this context, Cavendish{\textquoteright} experiment and related nineteenth-century experiments played a decisive role, for they provided converging and increasingly stronger evidence for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation. More precisely, the author shall argue that, as the accuracy and precision of the experimental apparatuses and the procedures to eliminate external disturbances involved increasingly improved, the empirical support for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation improved correspondingly.

}, issn = {0003-9519}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00407-010-0075-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1234613, title = {Towards a fruitful formulation of {N}eedham{\textquoteright}s grand question}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2010}, pages = {9{\textendash}26}, abstract = {

As it stands, Needham’s Grand Question is simply too general and ill-posed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needham’s Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and fine-tuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needham’s Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/82-2.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009times, title = {The Times and Life of {J}ohn {T}h. {D}esaguliers (1683-1744): Newtonian and Freemason}, journal = {Revue belge de philologie et d{\textquoteright}histoire}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {349{\textendash}363}, abstract = {

Jean Theophile Desaguliers (1683-1744) (geboren : Desaguillers) was een centrale figuur in twee aan belang winnende stromingen : het Newtonianisme en de Vrijmetselarij. Desaguliers werd lid van de Royal Society en hij was een persoonlijke kennis van Isaac Newton. Hij schreef talrijke wetenschappelijke boeken en artikelen waarin hij de Newtoniaanse natuurfi losofi e verdedigde. Om deze reden was hij centraal voor de popularisering van het Newtonianisme. Terwijl hij in London verbleef, werd Desaguliers eveneens een cruciale fi guur binnen de Vrijmetselarij : in 1719 werd hij grootmeester van de Grootloge van Londen en hij was rechtstreeks betrokken in de totstandkoming van James Andersons The Constitutions of the Free-masons (1723).

}, doi = {10.3406/rbph.2009.7676}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009treat, title = {“To treat of the world”: {P}aul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s ontology and epistemology and the circle of knowledge}, journal = {Journal of Documentation}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {223{\textendash}244}, abstract = {

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to document how Paul Otlet, founding-father of what is termed at present as “information science”, attempted to provide a complete “image of the world” (and reality in general) by establishing the scientific discipline he dubbed “documentation”. The paper also aims to focus on how Otlet represented human knowledge and reality in a systematic and unified way. Design/methodology/approach – A close reading of Otlet{\textquoteright}s primary works and some of his personal archives was undertaken. Findings – Most importantly, it is shown that Otlet{\textquoteright}s views on documentation were immersed in a cosmological, objectivist, humanitarian and ontological framework that is alien to contemporary information science. Correspondingly, his alleged affinity with positivism is reassessed. Originality/value – The philosophical foundations of the origins of information science are highlighted. Indirectly, this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on realism and anti-realism in information science.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2008d, title = {Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models}, journal = {Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {119-127}, abstract = {

Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspondingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no full-blown theory—containing all ontological issues involved—is provided, I make several distinctions and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are relevant for individuating scientific models.

}, keywords = {Abstraction, Idealisation, Ontology of scientific models}, issn = {1437-2053}, doi = {10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} }