@article {432906, title = {J. B. {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}{D}e {T}empore{\textquoteright} as an influence on {I}saac {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute time}, journal = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {90}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {216{\textendash}228}, abstract = {

Here, I shall argue that Van Helmont needs to be added to the list of sources on which Newton drew when formulating his doctrine of absolute time. This by no means implies that Van Helmont is the factual source of Newton{\textquoteright}s views on absolute time (I have found no clear-cut evidence in support of this claim). It is by no means my aim to debunk the importance of the other sources, but rather to broaden them. Different authors help to explain different aspects of Newton{\textquoteright}s conception of absolute time.

}, issn = {0003-9101}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {441499, title = {JS {M}ill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction: From True Causes to Provisional Ones}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {361{\textendash}376}, abstract = {

In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill conceived of the certainty of inductive generalisations and to offer a systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of Mill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill{\textquoteright}s views on the certainty of knowledge changed over time and that this change was accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later editions of The System of Logic as conceived by the late Mill was no longer that by the Canons of Induction we can establish scientific certainty and true causes, but rather that the Canons are useful in establishing causal laws in a provisional way. Deduction is a game and induction a grievance. (Bagehot 1913, vol. 3, p. 37)

}, issn = {0144-5340}, doi = {10.1080/01445340802164377}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340802164377}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {362595, title = {Johannes {B}aptista {V}an {H}elmonts experimentele aanpak: een poging tot omschrijving}, journal = {Gewina, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Techniek}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}25}, issn = {0928-303X}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {354192, title = {Joan {B}aptiste {V}an {H}elmont and the question of experimental modernism}, journal = {Physis: Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza}, volume = {43}, year = {2005}, pages = {305{\textendash}332}, abstract = {

In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Joan Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as ‘‘modern.’’ Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice has been. I will argue – after having analysed some of Van Helmont’s experiments such as his tree experiment, ice experiment, and thermoscope experiment – that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and, ultimately, in relatively closed physical systems such as, paradigmatically, the vessel, globe, or sphere [vas, globus, sphera]). After having reviewed some alternative options, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification is the feature that best characterizes his contributions to ‘‘modern’’ experimentation.

}, issn = {0031-9414}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} }