@incollection {D:JP65, title = {Kennissystemen selectief wieden}, booktitle = {Laat ons niet ernstig blijven. Huldeboek voor Jean Paul Van Bendegem}, year = {2018}, pages = {227{\textendash}244}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent, Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {978-94-014-5589-3}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Fran{\c c}ois, Karen and Ducheyne, Steffen and Allo, Patrick} } @incollection {Ducheyne2012, title = {History and Philosophy of Science: From Peaceful Coexistence to Golden Age of Interdisciplinarity?}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {26-36}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {1854786, title = {Kant and {W}hewell on bridging principles between metaphysics and science}, journal = {Kant Studien}, volume = {102}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {22{\textendash}45}, abstract = {

In this essay, I call attention to Kant{\textquoteright}s and Whewell{\textquoteright}s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant{\textquoteright}s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or {\textquoteright}Mittelbegriffe{\textquoteright} (henceforth this problem is referred to as {\textquoteright}the bridging-problem{\textquoteright}). It will be argued, on the basis of a close reading of Whewell{\textquoteright}s Notebooks on Induction, that Whewell{\textquoteright}s account of the Idea of Cause (and by extension, his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas in general) grew out of his dissatisfaction with Kantian philosophy of science and its seeming inability to solve the bridging-problem. This analysis throws new light on the importance of Kantianism in Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy, for it will be shown that Whewell took over and transformed Kant{\textquoteright}s idea of a priori principles as conditions for the establishment of proper knowledge about the world (without always clinging to Kant{\textquoteright}s exact differentiation between them) and that Whewell was trying to address a typical Kantian topic: namely, to show how scientific knowledge could be both empirical and necessary and how the gap between metaphysics and physics could be bridged.

}, issn = {0022-8877}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/KANT.2011.002}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1234908, title = {Testing universal gravitation in the laboratory, or the significance of research on the mean density of the earth and big {G}, 1798-1898: changing pursuits and long-term methodological-experimental continuity}, journal = {Archive for History of Exact Sciences}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {181{\textendash}227}, abstract = {

This article seeks to provide a historically well-informed analysis of an important post-Newtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of {\textacutedbl}puzzle solving.{\textacutedbl} In this article, the author shows that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century experimental research on the mean density of the earth and the gravitational constant. As Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of universal gravitation was mainly based on astronomical observation, it remained to be shown that Newton{\textquoteright}s law of universal gravitation did not break down at terrestrial distances. In this context, Cavendish{\textquoteright} experiment and related nineteenth-century experiments played a decisive role, for they provided converging and increasingly stronger evidence for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation. More precisely, the author shall argue that, as the accuracy and precision of the experimental apparatuses and the procedures to eliminate external disturbances involved increasingly improved, the empirical support for the universality of Newton{\textquoteright}s theory of gravitation improved correspondingly.

}, issn = {0003-9519}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00407-010-0075-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1234635, title = {Fundamental questions and some new answers on philosophical, contextual and scientific {W}hewell: some reflections on recent {W}hewell scholarship and the progress made therein}, journal = {Perspectives on Science}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {242{\textendash}272}, issn = {1063-6145}, doi = {10.1162/posc.2010.18.2.242}, url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/perspectives\_on\_science/v018/18.2.ducheyne.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @booklet {pittphilsci5074, title = {The Status of Hypothesis and Theory}, year = {2010}, abstract = {

Nowadays, it is a truism that hypotheses and theories play an essential role in scientific practice. This, however, was far from an obvious given in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy. Different natural philosophers had different views on the role and status of hypotheses and theories, ranging from fierce promotion to bold rejection, and to both they ascribed varying meanings and connotations. The guiding idea of this chapter is that, in seventeenth-century British natural philosophy, the terms ?hypothesis???hypothetical? and ?theory???theoretical? were imbedded in a semantic network of interconnected epistemological and methodological notions ? such as ?knowledge?, ?method?, ?probability?, ?certainty?, ?induction?, ?deduction?, ?experimental philosophy?, ?speculative philosophy?, and the like). As these semantic networks changed overtime, the meaning and significance of ?hypothesis? and ?theory? likewise shifted. Without pretence of completeness, this chapter highlights chronologically some of the defining moments in the semantic transformation of these two terms within the context of seventeenth-century natural philosophy.

}, keywords = {Francis Bacon, history of natural-philosophical methodology, Hypothesis, Isaac Newton., John Locke, Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, speculative versus experimental seventeenth-century natural philosophy, theory}, url = {http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5074/}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {1234613, title = {Towards a fruitful formulation of {N}eedham{\textquoteright}s grand question}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2010}, pages = {9{\textendash}26}, abstract = {

As it stands, Needham’s Grand Question is simply too general and ill-posed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needham’s Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and fine-tuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needham’s Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, url = {http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/82-2.pdf}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {981629, title = {{W}hewell{\textquoteright}s tidal researches: scientific practice and philosophical methodology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {41}, number = {1}, year = {2010}, pages = {26{\textendash}40}, abstract = {

Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {528863, title = {Anti-trinitarianism in {N}ewton’s {G}eneral {S}cholium to the {P}rincipia}, journal = {European Journal of Science and Theology}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}11}, abstract = {

Recent findings on Newton{\textquoteright}s heretical beliefs in the five draft versions of the General Scholium, which was added to the second edition of the Principia in 1713, are discussed here. We shall use these snapshots as a tool to gain understanding into the process of composition of the theological material from the General Scholium.

}, issn = {1841-0464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {733505, title = {The Flow of Influence: {F}rom {N}ewton to {L}ocke … and Back}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {64}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay, the affinity between Locke{\textquoteright}s empiricism and Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy is scrutinized. Parallels are distinguished from influences. I argue, pace G.A.J. Rogers, that Newton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute space and time influenced Locke{\textquoteright}s Essay concerning Human Understanding (first edition: 1689, though bearing the year 1690 on its cover) from the second edition onwards. I also show that Newton used Lockean terminology in his criticism of Cartesianism. It is further argued that Locke{\textquoteright}s endorsement of corpuscularianism is merely methodological, i.e. he accepts it as a scientifically useful and psychologically intelligible paradigm, but not as a realist explanation of rerum natura. Like Newton, Locke was reluctant to accept the corpuscular theory of light. However, his reasons for doing so were different from those of Newton. This essay is divided into three parts: in the first, the stage is set by looking at the fundamentals of Locke{\textquoteright}s epistemology; in the second, several correspondences between Locke{\textquoteright}s and Newton{\textquoteright}s thought are explored and two cases of influence are argued for; and in the third, several arguments are provided for interpreting Locke{\textquoteright}s corpuscularianism as methodological.

}, issn = {0393-2516}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {683771, title = {Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}Of The Church{\textquoteright} Manuscript Description and Analysis of Bodmer Ms. in Geneva}, journal = {European journal of science and theology}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {25{\textendash}35}, abstract = {

In this essay, a manuscript description and analysis of Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s manuscript {\textquoteright}Of the Church{\textquoteright} (Bodmer Ms., Fondation Martin Bodmer, Geneva, Switzerland) is provided.

}, issn = {1841-0464}, url = {http://www.ejst.tuiasi.ro/issue.html}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Rusu, Iulian} } @article {1234666, title = {Newtonianism in {L}ocke, {H}ume, and {R}eid, or: how far can one stretch a label?}, journal = {Enlightenment and Dissent - Special}, volume = {25}, year = {2009}, pages = {62{\textendash}105}, issn = {0262-7612}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {Ducheyne2009, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s Theology and the Flow of Influence}, booktitle = {Future Perspectives on {N}ewton Scholarship and the {N}ewtonian Legacy}, year = {2009}, pages = {35-47}, publisher = {KVAB, Brussel}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009times, title = {The Times and Life of {J}ohn {T}h. {D}esaguliers (1683-1744): Newtonian and Freemason}, journal = {Revue belge de philologie et d{\textquoteright}histoire}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {349{\textendash}363}, abstract = {

Jean Theophile Desaguliers (1683-1744) (geboren : Desaguillers) was een centrale figuur in twee aan belang winnende stromingen : het Newtonianisme en de Vrijmetselarij. Desaguliers werd lid van de Royal Society en hij was een persoonlijke kennis van Isaac Newton. Hij schreef talrijke wetenschappelijke boeken en artikelen waarin hij de Newtoniaanse natuurfi losofi e verdedigde. Om deze reden was hij centraal voor de popularisering van het Newtonianisme. Terwijl hij in London verbleef, werd Desaguliers eveneens een cruciale fi guur binnen de Vrijmetselarij : in 1719 werd hij grootmeester van de Grootloge van Londen en hij was rechtstreeks betrokken in de totstandkoming van James Andersons The Constitutions of the Free-masons (1723).

}, doi = {10.3406/rbph.2009.7676}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2009treat, title = {“To treat of the world”: {P}aul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s ontology and epistemology and the circle of knowledge}, journal = {Journal of Documentation}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {223{\textendash}244}, abstract = {

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to document how Paul Otlet, founding-father of what is termed at present as “information science”, attempted to provide a complete “image of the world” (and reality in general) by establishing the scientific discipline he dubbed “documentation”. The paper also aims to focus on how Otlet represented human knowledge and reality in a systematic and unified way. Design/methodology/approach – A close reading of Otlet{\textquoteright}s primary works and some of his personal archives was undertaken. Findings – Most importantly, it is shown that Otlet{\textquoteright}s views on documentation were immersed in a cosmological, objectivist, humanitarian and ontological framework that is alien to contemporary information science. Correspondingly, his alleged affinity with positivism is reassessed. Originality/value – The philosophical foundations of the origins of information science are highlighted. Indirectly, this paper is relevant to the ongoing debate on realism and anti-realism in information science.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2009a, title = {Understanding (in) {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Argument for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {2}, year = {2009}, pages = {227-258}, abstract = {

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.

}, keywords = {1713, 1726), Actio in distans, D. Dieks, Discours de la cause de la pesanteur (1690), H. de Regt, Huygens, Incommensurability, Newton, Principia (1687, Scientific understanding, Spherical vortex cosmology, Theoretical virtues, Universal gravitation}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {10.1007/s10838-009-9096-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9096-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {981621, title = {Whewell, necessity and the inductive sciences: a philosophical-systematic survey}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, year = {2009}, pages = {333{\textendash}358}, abstract = {

In this paper Whewell{\textquoteright}s concept of necessity is scrutinized and its historical development is outlined (ca. 1833-1860). Particular attention will be paid to how Whewell interpreted the laws of the inductive sciences as being necessary since the laws of nature are concretizations of the Fundamental Ideas which can be partially described by Axioms.

}, issn = {0258-0136}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2008a, title = {Conference Report "Induction: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, {G}hent {U}niversity, 8–10 July 2008"}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {8-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @incollection {Ducheyne2008c, title = {Entry "{H}elmont, {J}ohannes ({J}oan) {B}aptista {V}an"}, booktitle = {New Dictionary of Scientific Biography}, volume = {III}, year = {2008}, pages = {277-281}, publisher = {Thomson Gale}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen}, editor = {Pilchak, Angela} } @article {444488, title = {Galileo and {H}uygens on free fall: Mathematical and methodological ifferences}, journal = {Dynamis}, volume = {28}, year = {2008}, pages = {243{\textendash}274}, abstract = {

In this essay, I will scrutinize the differences between Galileo{\textquoteright}s and Huygens{\textquoteright}s demonstrations of free fall, which can be found respectively in the Discorsi and the Horologium, from a mathematical, representational and methodological perspective. I argue that more can be learnt from such an analysis than the thesis that Huygens re-styled Galilean mechanics which is a communis opinio. I shall argue that the differences in their approach on free fall highlight a significantly different mathematical and methodological outlook.

}, issn = {0211-9536}, doi = {10.4321/S0211-95362008000100011}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {432906, title = {J. B. {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteright}{D}e {T}empore{\textquoteright} as an influence on {I}saac {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s doctrine of absolute time}, journal = {Archiv f{\"u}r Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {90}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {216{\textendash}228}, abstract = {

Here, I shall argue that Van Helmont needs to be added to the list of sources on which Newton drew when formulating his doctrine of absolute time. This by no means implies that Van Helmont is the factual source of Newton{\textquoteright}s views on absolute time (I have found no clear-cut evidence in support of this claim). It is by no means my aim to debunk the importance of the other sources, but rather to broaden them. Different authors help to explain different aspects of Newton{\textquoteright}s conception of absolute time.

}, issn = {0003-9101}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {441499, title = {JS {M}ill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction: From True Causes to Provisional Ones}, journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {361{\textendash}376}, abstract = {

In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill conceived of the certainty of inductive generalisations and to offer a systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of Mill{\textquoteright}s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill{\textquoteright}s views on the certainty of knowledge changed over time and that this change was accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later editions of The System of Logic as conceived by the late Mill was no longer that by the Canons of Induction we can establish scientific certainty and true causes, but rather that the Canons are useful in establishing causal laws in a provisional way. Deduction is a game and induction a grievance. (Bagehot 1913, vol. 3, p. 37)

}, issn = {0144-5340}, doi = {10.1080/01445340802164377}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340802164377}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {981623, title = {A preliminary study of the appropriation of {V}an {H}elmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in {B}ritain in chymistry, medicine and natural philosophy}, journal = {Ambix}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {122{\textendash}135}, abstract = {

Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s work was of major importance in seventeenth-century medicine, chymistry and natural philosophy. His work was a source of inspiration and mystery and an authoritas. His oeuvre was, together with that of many others, the culminating point of an ongoing process, starting in the Middle Ages, of turning medicine into a scientific discipline. In this essay, the appropriation, that is, the process of assimilation of an author{\textquoteright}s work by other scholars, of Van Helmont{\textquoteright}s oeuvre in England will be studied among chymists, physicians and natural philosophers (the distinctions between these three groups is primarily conceptual, but in practice hard to distinguish). Appropriation reminds us that the process of assimilating ideas of an author by contemporaries or later generations is not a passive activity, for scholars actively adapt and interpret them in new ways not initially envisaged by its original author.

}, issn = {0002-6980}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/174582308X255479}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2008b, title = {Review of {F}lorian {E}beling{\textquoteright}s The Sectret History of Hermes}, journal = {Annals of Science}, volume = {66}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, pages = {294{\textendash}295}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2008, title = {Some Worries for J.D. {N}orton’s Material Theory of Induction}, journal = {Philosophia Naturalis}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {37 - 46}, abstract = {

In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton, 2003). I attempt to show (1) that his “principle argument” is based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2008d, title = {Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models}, journal = {Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, year = {2008}, pages = {119-127}, abstract = {

Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspondingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no full-blown theory—containing all ontological issues involved—is provided, I make several distinctions and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are relevant for individuating scientific models.

}, keywords = {Abstraction, Idealisation, Ontology of scientific models}, issn = {1437-2053}, doi = {10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {445650, title = {Whewell{\textquoteright}s metaphorical usage of light and the ultimate reality underlying it}, journal = {Semiotica}, volume = {172}, number = {1-4}, year = {2008}, month = {November}, pages = {269{\textendash}278}, abstract = {

In this article, I seek to study Whewell as writer of philosophical doctrines by focusing on his frequent usage of the metaphor of light, which symbolized (human) knowledge. It is my primary claim that Whewell choose to visually illustrate his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, which are the bearers of ultimate reality and meaning in Whewell{\textquoteright}s epistemology, by means some key metaphors that made reference to light.

}, issn = {0037-1998}, doi = {10.1515/SEMI.2008.098}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2007, title = {Abstraction vs. Idealization: A Conceptual Analysis.}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {9-10}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {381569, title = {Algunas notas metodol{\'o}gicas sobre los experimentos de {J}.{B}. {V}an {H}elmont}, journal = {Azogue, Revista electr{\'o}nica dedicada al hist{\'o}rico cr{\'\i}tico de la alquimia}, volume = {5}, year = {2007}, pages = {100{\textendash}107}, issn = {1575-8184}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {386240, title = {The Concept of Causation in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Mechanical and Optical Work}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {16}, year = {2007}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen and Weber, Erik} } @article {ducheyne2007huygens, title = {Huygens{\textquoteright}s understanding of trajectory: Via media between {G}alileo and {N}ewton}, journal = {Historia scientiarum, International Journal of the History of Science Society of Japan}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {1{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

In this essay, I shall argue that Huygens can be truly seen as the via media between Galileo and Newton as far as conceptualizing orbital motion is concerned. Contrary to Galileo (who endorsed a concept of circular inertia when dealing with orbital motion), Huygens subscribed to our modern idea of rectilinear motion. Huygens was unable to integrate adequately in his worldview of vortical mechanics. However, he was aware of the utter importance of studying nascent motions (as Joella G. Yoder has pointed out before) It will be shown that an adequate account of orbital motion required three necessary ingredients: (1) an adequate conceptual framework (rectilinear inertia), (2) a fruitful metaphysical outlook (the existence of voids) and an appropriate mathematical machinery (with a focus on nascent motion). All three components were successfully put to practice by Newton.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2007a, title = {"Ignorance is Bliss": On {B}ernard {N}ieuwentijt{\textquoteright}s {D}octrina {I}gnorantia and His Contribution to Our Understanding of Scientific Idealisation}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2007}, pages = {699-710}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {362595, title = {Johannes {B}aptista {V}an {H}elmonts experimentele aanpak: een poging tot omschrijving}, journal = {Gewina, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis der Geneeskunde, Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Techniek}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}25}, issn = {0928-303X}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2007noodzakelijkheid, title = {Noodzakelijkheid bij {W}illiam {W}hewell: De ontwikkeling Van een concept}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2007}, pages = {239{\textendash}265}, abstract = {

The immense oeuvre of William Whewell (1794-1886), a Victorian monument by itself, has to some extent been treated in a stepmotherly fashion by philosophers and historiansof philosophy. This paper attempts to conceptually clarify Whewell{\textquoteright}s notion of necessity, which was a core notion in his philosophical project. The author also sketches in broad lines the historical development of this notion in Whewell{\textquoteright}s thinking and points tothe intertwinement between Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophy and theology. Whewell{\textquoteright}s philosophical work was deeply based on the history of science and his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas can be interpreted as an attempt to historicize Kant{\textquoteright}s transcendental categories.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2006, title = {The Argument(s) for Universal Gravitation}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {419-447}, abstract = {

In this paper an analysis of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation is provided. In the past, the complexity of the argument has not been fully appreciated. Recent authors like George E. Smith and William L. Harper have done a far better job. Nevertheless, a thorough account of the argument is still lacking. Both authors seem to stress the importance of only one methodological component. Smith stresses the procedure of approximative deductions backed-up by the laws of motion. Harper stresses “systematic dependencies” between theoretical parameters and phenomena. I will argue that Newton used a variety of different inferential strategies: causal parsimony considerations, deductions, demonstrative inductions, abductions and thought-experiments. Each of these strategies is part of Newton’s famous argument.

}, keywords = {argumentative pluralism, Newton, Principia, Universal gravitation}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-005-3189-9}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-005-3189-9}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {352773, title = {Ascribing contemporary scientific concepts to past thinkers: towards a frame-work for handling matters more precisely}, journal = {Scientia Poetica}, volume = {10}, year = {2006}, pages = {274{\textendash}290}, issn = {1431-5041}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {345101, title = {Galileo{\textquoteright}s interventionist notion of "cause"}, journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas}, volume = {67}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {443{\textendash}464}, abstract = {

In this essay, I shall argue that Galileo introduced a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality was an interventionist notion, according to which causal relations can be discovered by actively exploring and manipulating natural processes. The presence of this conception can be seen from Galileo{\textquoteright}s explanation of floating bodies and his theory of the tides. I shall point to the similarity between Galileo{\textquoteright}s notion of "cause" and recent interventionist accounts of causation in the philosophy of science (especially James Woodward{\textquoteright}s).

}, issn = {0022-5037}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {326144, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s onto-theology versus {D}escartes{\textquoteright}s and {L}eibniz{\textquoteright}s: or on the relevance of unificatory tendencies in the secularization-process}, journal = {Theology and Science}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {71{\textendash}85}, issn = {1474-6700}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {345102, title = {Optical versus Mechanical Models: Newton{\textquoteright}s "Failure" to Construct an Optical Theory}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {49}, number = {194}, year = {2006}, pages = {199{\textendash}223}, abstract = {

In this essay, I take up both Shapiro’s and Hakfoort’s suggestion that Newton tried to apply the same method he used in the Principia (first edition: 1687) to The Opticks (first edition: 1704). Why did Newton’s method, which was apparently so successful in the realm of mechanics, fail when applied to optics? I shall argue that both empirical as well as methodological aspects are needed to explain Newton’s failure. Newton’s repugnance to introduce hypotheses in published texts forced him to explore, in the demonstrative part of science, a conceptually poor framework. Such framework has limited inferential power, i.e. the set of consequences which can be deduced from it is limited. This will be contrasted with the Principia where a richer conceptual framework was at hand and its deduced effects could by confirmed by experiment. The conceptual framework in the Principia allowed Newton to a priori deduce the celestial motions. As I have argued elsewhere, a priori deducing the phenomena under investigation was one of Newton’s most central methodological ideals. In this essay, I shall attempt to explain why a priori deduction of phenomena was impossible in optics.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {337658, title = {Reid{\textquoteright}s adaptation and radicalization of Newton{\textquoteright}s natural philosophy.}, journal = {History of European Ideas}, volume = {32}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {173{\textendash}189}, abstract = {

For Thomas Reid, Isaac Newton{\textquoteright}s scientific methodology in natural philosophy was a source of inspiration for philosophical methodology in general. I shall look at how Reid adapted Newton{\textquoteright}s views on methodology in natural philosophy. We shall see that Reid radicalized Newton{\textquoteright}s methodology (especially his view on causal explanation) and, thereby, begins to pave the way for the positivist movement, of which the origin is traditionally associated with the Frenchman Auguste Comte. In the Reidian adaptation of Newtonianism, we can already notice the beginnings of the anti-causal trend that would become so popular in the age of positivism.

}, issn = {0191-6599}, doi = {10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2006.02.001}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Steffen, title = {Virtuosi at Work: Historical-Philosophical Essays on Causality and Methodology in the Natural Philosophy of Galileo, Huyghens and Newton}, year = {2006}, month = {March 1}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2005, title = {The Challenges for Early-Modern Philosophy: Editorial Introduction.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {5-10}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {Ducheyne2005a, title = {De Inductione: where {B}acon{\textquoteright}s Idea of Induction meets {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Practice of it.}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {76}, year = {2005}, pages = {115-128}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {354192, title = {Joan {B}aptiste {V}an {H}elmont and the question of experimental modernism}, journal = {Physis: Rivista Internazionale di Storia della Scienza}, volume = {43}, year = {2005}, pages = {305{\textendash}332}, abstract = {

In this paper, I take up the question to what extent and in which sense we can conceive of Joan Baptista Van Helmont’s (1579-1644) style of experimenting as ‘‘modern.’’ Connected to this question, I shall reflect upon what Van Helmont’s precise contribution to experimental practice has been. I will argue – after having analysed some of Van Helmont’s experiments such as his tree experiment, ice experiment, and thermoscope experiment – that Van Helmont had a strong preference to locate experimental designs in places wherein variables can be more easily controlled (and, ultimately, in relatively closed physical systems such as, paradigmatically, the vessel, globe, or sphere [vas, globus, sphera]). After having reviewed some alternative options, I shall argue that Van Helmont’s usage of relatively isolated physical systems and a moderate degree of quantification is the feature that best characterizes his contributions to ‘‘modern’’ experimentation.

}, issn = {0031-9414}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2005lessons, title = {Lessons from {G}alileo: The pragmatic model of shared characteristics of scientific representation}, journal = {Philosophia naturalis}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {214{\textendash}234}, abstract = {

In this paper I will defend a new account of scientific representation. I will begin by looking at the benefits and drawbacks of two recent accounts on scientific representation: Hughes’ DDI account and Su{\'a}rez’ inferential account. Next I use some of Galileo’s models in the Discorsi as a heuristic tool for a better account of scientific representation. Next I will present my model. The main idea of my account, which I refer to as the pragmatic model of shared characteristics (PMSC), is that a model represents, if and only if, (1) a person accepts that there is a set of shared characteristics between the model and its target; (2) this set has the inferential power to generate results which can be tested empirically; (3) and the corresponding test(s) of these results is/are in agreement with our data and the specific cognitive goals we have in mind.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {300874, title = {Mathematical models in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Principia: a new view of the {\textquoteright}{N}ewtonian Style{\textquoteright}.}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

In this essay I argue against I. Bernard Cohen’s influential account of Newton’s methodology in the Principia: the ‘Newtonian Style’. The crux of Cohen’s account is the successive adaptation of ‘mental constructs’ through comparisons with nature. In Cohen’s view there is a direct dynamic between the mental constructs and physical systems. I argue that his account is essentially hypothetical-deductive, which is at odds with Newton’s rejection of the hypothetical-deductive method. An adequate account of Newton’s methodology needs to show how Newton’s method proceeds differently from the hypothetical-deductive method. In the constructive part I argue for my own account, which is model based: it focuses on how Newton constructed his models in Book I of the Principia. I will show that Newton understood Book I as an exercise in determining the mathematical consequences of certain force functions. The growing complexity of Newton’s models is a result of exploring increasingly complex force functions (intra-theoretical dynamics) rather than a successive comparison with nature (extra-theoretical dynamics). Nature did not enter the scene here. This intra-theoretical dynamics is related to the ‘autonomy of the models’.

}, issn = {0269-8595}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2005newton, title = {Newton’s notion and practice of unification}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {36}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

In this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newton’s Principia. I will clarify Newton’s notion (as can be found in Newton’s utterances on unification) and practice of unification (its actual occurrence in his scientific work). In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis (Kitcher, Salmon and Schurz). I will argue, after showing that neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’s account aptly capture Newton’s notion and practice of unification, that Salmon’s later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmon’s account in order to answer the question at stake.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.12.004}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {321509, title = {Newton{\textquoteright}s training in the {A}ristotelian textbook tradition: From effects to causes and back}, journal = {History of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {141}, year = {2005}, pages = {217{\textendash}237}, issn = {0073-2753}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {ducheyne2005paul, title = {Paul {O}tlet{\textquoteright}s theory of knowledge and linguistic objectivism}, journal = {Knowledge Organization}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {110{\textendash}116}, abstract = {

In this paper, I point to the importance of an often neglected objectivist strand in Paul Otlet{\textquoteright}s (1868-1944) thinking: his linguistic objectivism. Linguistic objectivism consists in the view that linguistic atoms uniquely correspond to certain discrete and well-defined elements in the world and further combinations of these linguistic atoms can objectively capture "the order of the world". This analysis tempers some of the past claims on the influence of positivism on Otlet.

}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {326990, title = {Review of {I}. {B}ernard {C}ohen and {G}eorge {E}. {S}mith ({E}{D}s.), The {C}ambridge companion to {N}ewton}, journal = {PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, year = {2005}, pages = {506{\textendash}508}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {324419, title = {Secularizerende Tendenzen in {I}saac {N}ewtons Onto-theologie}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {98}, number = {1}, year = {2005}, pages = {18{\textendash}33}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} } @article {152512, title = {Isaac Newton on space and time: metaphysician or not?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2002}, pages = {77{\textendash}114}, abstract = {

But whereas we can blame Bohr, Schrodinger and Einstein for our problems, Newton has only God to blame for his. (Tamny, 1979: 58). After all, if Newton does not believe in the reality of space and time themselves, over and above the material inhabitants of them, who does? (Sklar, 1990: 68).

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen} }