@incollection {DeVreese2012,
	title = {An Interdisciplinary Focus on the Concept of Causation: What philosophy can learn from psychology},
	booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {55-71},
	publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company},
	address = {Singapore},
	abstract = {<p>In philosophy of science, it is still a mainstream practice to search for the {\textquoteleft}truth{\textquoteright} about fundamental scientific concepts in isolation, blind to knowledge achieved in other domains of science. I focus on the topic of causation. I argue that it is worthwhile for philosophy of science to leave its metaphysical tower in order to pick up knowledge from other domains where empirical research on causal reasoning is carried out, such as psychology. I will demonstrate what the psychologist Peter White{\textquoteright}s theory, on the origin and development of causal reasoning, can impart to philosophy of causation. It concerns different but interre- lated subjects with respect to the philosophy of causation: conceptual pluralism, a core causal concept of causation, the analysis of \what cau- sation is", epistemological pluralism, causation as a secondary quality and weak causal realism. The divide between metaphysical and epis- temological approaches to causation|and hence between philosophy and psychology|may be much smaller than is often presupposed. Keywords: philosophy of causation, developmental psychology, causal pluralism, interdisciplinarity</p>},
	author = {De Vreese, Leen},
	editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole}
}
@article {1890961,
	title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations},
	journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
	volume = {42},
	number = {1},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {33{\textendash}46},
	abstract = {<p>Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.</p>},
	issn = {0925-4560},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5},
	author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen}
}
