@incollection {perring_concept_2014, title = {The Concept of Disease and Our Responsibility for Children}, booktitle = {Diagnostic Dilemmas in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry}, year = {2014}, pages = {35{\textendash}55}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

The author of this chapter argues that one’s understanding of the concept of what a disease is influences our way of behaving toward people we think of as diseased. The author asserts that our concept of disease is not non-committal and that an oversimplified approach can lead to non-critical reasoning which could have significant impact on children with diseases. The author develops a pluralistic approach to the concept of disease and uses ADHD as an example throughout the chapter.

}, isbn = {9780199645756}, doi = {10.1093/med/9780199645756.003.0003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen}, editor = {Perring, Christian and Wells, Lloyd} } @article {2985552, title = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {123{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {924897, title = {Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {206}, year = {2009}, pages = {177{\textendash}190}, abstract = {

In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall{\textquoteright}s theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall{\textquoteright}s proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {393211, title = {Causal (mis)understanding and the search for scientific explanations: a case study from the history of medicine.}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences}, volume = {39}, year = {2008}, pages = {14{\textendash}24}, abstract = {

In 1747, James Lind carried out an experiment which proved the usefulness of citrus fruit as a cure for scurvy. Nonetheless, he rejected the earlier hypothesis of Bachstrom that the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables was the only cause of the disease. I explain why it was rational for James Lind not to accept Bachstrom’s explanation. I argue that it was the urge for scientific understanding that guided Lind in his rejection and in the development of his alternative theory that humidity was the primary cause of the disease. Central in this process was the search for causal mechanisms which could provide understanding of how the disease developed and which fitted in with the knowledge of the time. Given that the relevant background knowledge and statistical methods were not yet available to Lind, he was right to prefer his own explanation to that of Bachstrom. Although his explanation turned out to be wrong, and Bachstrom’s right, from a historical point of view it offered deeper causal understanding of both the development of the disease and the preventive and curative effects of fresh vegetable food. This case study illustrates how the search for causal mechanisms can not only be enlightening, but also very misleading.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {427052, title = {Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, year = {2008}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {732209, title = {Causal pluralism and scientific knowledge: an underexposed problem}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {77}, year = {2006}, pages = {125{\textendash}150}, abstract = {

Causal pluralism is currently a hot topic in philosophy. However, the consequences of this view on causation for scientific knowledge and scientific methodology is heavily underexposed in the present debate. My aim in this paper is to argue that an epistemological-methodological point of view should be valued as a line of approach on its own and to demonstrate how epistemological- methodological causal pluralism differs in its scope from conceptual and metaphysical causal pluralism. Further, I defend epistemological- methodological causal pluralism and try to illustrate that scientific practice needs diverse causal concepts in diverse domains, and even diverse causal concepts within singular domains.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Vreese, Leen} } @article {ELe:scurvy, title = {The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. {H}ow Modern was {J}ames {L}ind{\textquoteright}s Methodology?}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {55{\textendash}67}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} }