@incollection {683583,
	title = {Disjunctive realism about color},
	booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong},
	series = {Acta philosophica Fennica},
	volume = {84},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {193{\textendash}200},
	publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica},
	abstract = {<p>Section 1: Analytical metaphysics and its methodology. Why the negations of false atomic propositions are true / Peter Simons {\textendash} The one over many / Anna-Sofia Maurin {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s conception of supervenience / Markku Keina\unmatched{0308}nen {\textendash} {\textacutedbl}Mirage realism{\textacutedbl} or {\textacutedbl}Positivism in naturalism{\textquoteright}s clothing{\textacutedbl}? / Panu Raatikainen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s metaphysical realism / Sami Pihlstro\unmatched{0308}m. Section 2: Laws of nature, dispositions, and modality. Some remarks on the metaphysical status of laws of nature / Wim Christiaens {\textendash} Dispositions pace Armstrong / Robrecht Vanderbeeken {\textendash} Armstrong on the metaphysics of modality: two dilemmas / Anssi Korhonen. Section 3: Mind and epistemology. Disjunctive realism about color / Tim De May {\textendash} On Armstrong{\textquoteright}s philosophy of perception / S. Albert Kivinen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s epistemology / Markus Lammenranta.</p>},
	isbn = {9519264663},
	author = {De Mey, Tim},
	editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku}
}
@incollection {397684,
	title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.},
	booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong},
	volume = {84},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {127{\textendash}154},
	publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica},
	isbn = {9789519264660},
	author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht},
	editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku}
}
@article {322170,
	title = {Secondary qualities in retrospect},
	journal = {Philosophica},
	volume = {68},
	year = {2001},
	pages = {41{\textendash}59},
	abstract = {<p>Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh{\textquoteright}s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different primary-secondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primary-secondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matter{\textquoteright}s other qualities.</p>},
	issn = {0379-8402},
	author = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku}
}
