@incollection {DeMey2010, title = {William {H}arvey en de ontdekking van de bloedsomloop.}, booktitle = {Fascinerend Leven. {M}arkante Figuren en Idee{\"e}n uit de Geschiedenis van de Biologie.}, year = {2010}, note = {

In print

}, publisher = {Nieuwezijds}, address = {Amsterdam}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Provijn, Dagmar}, editor = {Van Speybroeck, Linda and Braeckman, Johan} } @incollection {683583, title = {Disjunctive realism about color}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, series = {Acta philosophica Fennica}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {193{\textendash}200}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, abstract = {

Section 1: Analytical metaphysics and its methodology. Why the negations of false atomic propositions are true / Peter Simons {\textendash} The one over many / Anna-Sofia Maurin {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s conception of supervenience / Markku Keina\unmatched{0308}nen {\textendash} {\textacutedbl}Mirage realism{\textacutedbl} or {\textacutedbl}Positivism in naturalism{\textquoteright}s clothing{\textacutedbl}? / Panu Raatikainen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s metaphysical realism / Sami Pihlstro\unmatched{0308}m. Section 2: Laws of nature, dispositions, and modality. Some remarks on the metaphysical status of laws of nature / Wim Christiaens {\textendash} Dispositions pace Armstrong / Robrecht Vanderbeeken {\textendash} Armstrong on the metaphysics of modality: two dilemmas / Anssi Korhonen. Section 3: Mind and epistemology. Disjunctive realism about color / Tim De May {\textendash} On Armstrong{\textquoteright}s philosophy of perception / S. Albert Kivinen {\textendash} Armstrong{\textquoteright}s epistemology / Markus Lammenranta.

}, isbn = {9519264663}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {397684, title = {Dispositions pace Armstrong.}, booktitle = {Problems from Armstrong}, volume = {84}, year = {2008}, pages = {127{\textendash}154}, publisher = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, isbn = {9789519264660}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} } @incollection {683245, title = {Middeleeuwse en Arabische Wijsbegeerte}, booktitle = {De rivier van Herakleitos: Een eigenzinnige visie op de wijsbegeere}, year = {2008}, pages = {93{\textendash}101}, publisher = {Houtekiet}, isbn = {978 90 8924 035 4}, url = {http://lib.ugent.be/catalog/pug01:683245}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Vermeersch, Etienne and Braeckman, Johan} } @incollection {683520, title = {Ockhams theorie van evidente kennis en het epistemologisch externalisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. {E}ssays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {227{\textendash}239}, publisher = {Academia Press}, isbn = {978-90-382-1279-1}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @article {683834, title = {Imagination{\textquoteright}s Grip on Science}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {222{\textendash}239}, abstract = {

In part because {\textacutedbl}imagination{\textacutedbl} is a slippery notion, its exact role in the production of scientific knowledge remains unclear. There is, however, one often explicit and deliberate use of imagination by scientists that can be (and has been) studied intensively by epistemologists and historians of science: thought experiments. The main goal of this article is to document the varieties of thought experimentation, not so much in terms of the different sciences in which they occur but rather in terms of the different functions they fulfil. I argue that thought experimentation (and hence imagination) plays a role not only in theory choice but in singular causal analysis and scientific discovery as well. I pinpoint, moreover, some of the rules governing the use of thought experiments in theory choice and in singular causal analysis, that is, some of the criteria they should meet in order to fulfil those functions successfully.

}, issn = {0026-1068}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {683842, title = {Kuhn{\textquoteright}s paradox of thought experiments resolved}, journal = {The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {111{\textendash}125}, issn = {1944-3676}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {683494, title = {Remodeling the past}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {10}, year = {2005}, pages = {47{\textendash}66}, abstract = {

In some of the papers in which she develops and defends the mental modelview of thought experiments in physics, Nersessian expresses the belief that her account has implications for thought experiments in other domains as well. In this paper, I argue, firstly, that counterfactual reasoning has a legitimate place in historical inquiry, and secondly, that the mental model view can account for such "alternative histories". I proceed as follows. Firstly, I review the main accounts of thought experiments in physics and point at some explanatory advantages of the mental model view. Subsequently, I argue that historians cannot dispense with counterfactual reasoning altogether and qualify a number of principled objections against the explicit use of alternative histories for theoretical purposes. Finally, I show that the mental model view can account for such thought experiments in history.

}, issn = {1572-8471}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {322177, title = {Tales of the Unexpected: Incongruity-Resolution in Joke Comprehension, Scientific Discovery and Thought Experimentation}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {69{\textendash}88}, abstract = {

Some scholars suspect that thought experiments have something in common with jokes. Moreover, Thomas Kuhn has suggested that what happens to someone who thinks through a thought experiment “is very similar to what happens to a man, like Lavoisier, who must assimilate the result of a new unexpected experimental discovery” (1964: 321). In this paper, I pinpoint the presumed commonalities. I identify, more specifically, what cognitive linguists call “incongruity-resolution” as the problem-solving process not only involved in humor comprehension, but in scientific discovery and thought experimentation as well

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {322173, title = {De maat van het mogelijke: gedachte-experimenten en verbeelding}, journal = {Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte}, volume = {96}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {28{\textendash}39}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @incollection {DeMey2004, title = {Mere Logical Possibility: A Bridge too Far}, booktitle = {Modal Epistemology}, year = {2004}, pages = {53-62}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @book {322175, title = {Modal epistemology.}, year = {2004}, pages = {106 p.}, publisher = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke {V}laamse {A}cademie van {B}elgi{\"e}}, isbn = {N/A}, editor = {Weber, Erik and De Mey, Tim} } @article {322176, title = {The dual nature of thought experiments}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

It is often assumed that thought experiments are either experiments or arguments. In this paper, I argue that this disjunction is not an exclusive one and that we can only account for the demonstrative force or evidential significance of thought experiments by conceiving of them as both experiments and arguments. First, I distinguish between three related, but nevertheless distinct problems that thought experiments in physics pose. In this context, I also show that the choice between an experiment view and an argument view on the nature of thought experiments pops up in connection with two of those problems: (1) the problem of the source of thought-experimental knowledge and (2) the problem of the evidential significance of thought experiments. Subsequently, I argue that as far as the issue of evidential significance is concerned, we should at least recognise that thought experiments have a dual structure: an experiment-like set up and an. argument-like winding up. Then I introduce Hans Radder{\textquoteright}s conceptual framework for the analysis of "real" experiments and I apply it to thought experimet:J.ts. Finally, I argue that Radder{\textquoteright}s distinction between the aspects of {\textquoteright}theoretical description or interpretation" and "material realization" allows us to move on from the recognition of the dual structure of thought experiments to a full-blown dual nature view of them.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {386237, title = {Explanation and thought experiments in history.}, journal = {History and Theory}, volume = {42}, year = {2003}, pages = {28{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and contrasts. Then, we pinpoint the functions thought experiments fulfill in arriving at weighted explanations of contrasts

}, issn = {0018-2656}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Weber, Erik} } @article {322172, title = {Hoe geschiedenis tot lering strekt}, journal = {Ethiek en Maatschappij}, volume = {6}, year = {2003}, pages = {47{\textendash}54}, abstract = {

How History Can Teach Us – Counterfactual questions (hypothetical questions of which the premises contradict the historical facts) are not often explicitly used in historical research to identify causes of particular facts. The methodology of thought experiments offers nevertheless important opportunities to contemporary historiography. One could even ask oneself if historical research is possible at all without so called ‘what if…’-questions. Just like analogies, thought experiments are necessary to complete the mental process which interpretes causes and effects of human behaviour in history. Therefore, counterfactual thought experiments can easily be traced in the construction of historical explanations.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tim, title = {Thinking Through Thought Experiments}, year = {2003}, note = {

Promotor: Erik Weber

}, month = {March 24}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @incollection {DeMey2002, title = {Qualia, spectruminversie en filosofische zombies.}, booktitle = {Het bewustzijn in de fysische wereld: Filosofische essays over materialisme en fenomenaal bewustzijn}, year = {2002}, pages = {171-194}, publisher = {Peeters}, address = {Leuven}, author = {De Mey, Tim}, editor = {J. Leilich, P. Reynaert and Veldeman, J.} } @article {152486, title = {Thought experiments, conceivability arguments and conceptual blending}, journal = {Odense Working Papers in Language and Communication}, volume = {24}, year = {2002}, pages = {143{\textendash}156}, issn = {0906-7612}, author = {De Mey, Tim} } @article {322170, title = {Secondary qualities in retrospect}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {68}, year = {2001}, pages = {41{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

Although the importance, both historically and systematically, of the seventeenth century distinction between primary and secondary qualities is commonly recognised, there is no consensus on its exact nature. Apparently, one of the main difficulties in its interpretation is to tell the constitutive from the argumentative elements. In this paper, we focus on the primary-secondary quality distinctions drawn by Boyle and Locke. We criticise, more specifically, MacIntosh{\textquoteright}s analysis of them. On the one hand, MacIntosh attributes too many different primary-secondary quality distinctions to Boyle and Locke. On the other hand, he forbears to attribute a particular primary-secondary quality distinction to them, which, at least in the case of Boyle, differs genuinely from his main distinction between the mechanical affections of matter and all of matter{\textquoteright}s other qualities.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {De Mey, Tim and Kein{\"a}nen, Markku} }