@article {8543197, title = {Do mechanism-based social explanations make a case for methodological individualism?}, journal = {JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, year = {2019}, pages = {263{\textendash}282}, abstract = {

In the recent philosophy of social science literature, we notice an increasing support for mechanism-based social explanations. Earlier pleas for social mechanisms were often closely linked to defenses of methodological individualism. However, more recent contributions by, e.g. Daniel Little and Petri Ylikoski, seem to be loosening that link and develop a more sophisticated account-ascribing a less important role to microfoundations. In this paper, we want to review the impact of the social mechanisms-approach on methodological individualism and draw more radical conclusions with regard to the individualism/holism debate, severing the link between the social mechanisms-approach and individualism. Four steps will be taken in severing the link: (a) there are more than two levels of social explanation; (b) levels of explanation are perspectival, thus neither absolute, nor unique; (c) seeking microfoundations has a heuristic value, but so has seeking macrofoundations; (d) there are no general preference rules with respect to the level of social explanations. In conclusion, the answer to the title question is that the social mechanisms approach does not strengthen the case for methodological individualism.

}, keywords = {Methodological individualism, PLURALISM, REDUCTION, Scientific explanation, Social explanations, Social mechanisms}, issn = {0925-4560}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09446-w}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {8535753, title = {Beyond consensus? A reply to Alan Irwin}, journal = {SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY REVIEW AND REPLY COLLECTIVE}, volume = {6}, number = {10}, year = {2017}, pages = {48{\textendash}53}, keywords = {democracy, disclosure, meta-consensus, public participation in science, scientific consensus}, issn = {2471-9560}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Van Oudheusden, Michiel} } @article {2071, title = {Participation beyond consensus? Technology assessments, consensus conferences and democratic modulation. }, journal = {Social Epistemology}, volume = {31 (6)}, year = {2017}, chapter = {497}, abstract = {

In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats
that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus
conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how
these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong
appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and
informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies,
we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including
dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy.
Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between
four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and
agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides
opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and
democratic modulation{\textemdash}three aspirations that are at the heart of most
pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses
of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should
therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and
process in science and technology.

}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Van Oudheusden, Michiel} } @article {4443718, title = {Social epistemology meets the philosophy of the humanities}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {21 (1)}, year = {2016}, abstract = {

From time to time, when I explain to a new acquaintance that I’m a philosopher of science, my interlocutor will nod agreeably and remark that that surely means I’m interested in the ethical status of various kinds of scientific research, the impact that science has had on our values, or the role that the sciences play in contemporary democracies. Although this common response hardly corresponds to what professional philosophers of science have done for the past decades, or even centuries, it is perfectly comprehensible. For there are large questions of the kinds just indicated, questions that deserve to be posed and answered, and an intelligent person might well think that philosophers of science are the people who do the posing and the answering (Kitcher in Science, truth and democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. xi, 2001).

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-014-9372-0}, author = {Froeyman, Anton and Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {4346560, title = {Explicating ways of consensus-making in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus}, booktitle = {Experts and consensus in social science}, year = {2015}, pages = {71{\textendash}92}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this paper, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. Solomon (2007), Beatty \& Moore (2010) and Miller (2013) – as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon, 2007). Paying attention to this dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified.

}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Martini, Carlo and Boumans, Marcel} } @article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433-455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {4188922, title = {Towards democratic models of science: exploring the case of scientific pluralism}, journal = {Perspectives on science}, volume = {23}, number = {2}, year = {2015}, pages = {149{\textendash}172}, abstract = {

Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2001, Longino 2013, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Furthermore, the example of scientific pluralism is used to advocate the application of democratic theory to philosophy of science problems in general. Drawing on the parallels between models of science and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of research approaches in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple research approaches in the epistemically most productive way possible. This will not only improve our understanding of scientific plurality, but it can also help us stipulating how different research approaches should interact to constitute the most objective account possible or how the ideal of scientific consensus has to be understood. Ultimately, developing democratic models of science bears on the question of how deeply science and democracy are entwined.

}, issn = {1063-6145}, doi = {10.1162/POSC_a_00165}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {3120783, title = {Explanatory strategies beyond the individualism/holism debate}, booktitle = {Rethinking the individualism-holism debate}, volume = {372}, year = {2014}, pages = {153{\textendash}175}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Starting from the plurality of explanatory strategies in the actual practice of socialscientists, I introduce a framework for explanatory pluralism – a normative endorsement of the plurality of forms and levels of explanation used by social scientists. Equipped with thisframework, central issues in the individualism/holism debate are revisited, namely emergence,reduction and the idea of microfoundations. Discussing these issues, we notice that in recentcontributions the focus has been shifting towards relationism, pluralism and interaction, awayfrom dichotomous individualism/holism thinking and a winner-takes-all approach. Then, thechallenge of the debate is no longer to develop the ultimate individualistic approach ordefending the holist approach, but rather how to be combine individualism and holism; howcan they co-exist, interact, be integrated or develop some division of labour, while making thebest out of the strengths and limitations of the respective explanatory strategies of holists andindividualists? Thus, the debate shifts to how exactly pluralism should be understood as thenext leading question, going beyond the current individualism/holism debate. The paper endswith a discussion and evaluation of different understandings of explanatory pluralismdefended in the literature.

}, isbn = {9783319053431}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Finn, Collin and Zahle, Julie} } @incollection {4090467, title = {Pluralists about pluralism? Different versions of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry}, booktitle = {New directions in the philosophy of science}, year = {2014}, pages = {104{\textendash}119}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner{\textquoteright}s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism {\textendash} different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry {\textendash} namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the {\textquotedblleft}genuine dialogue{\textquotedblright} or shape {\textquotedblleft}the pluralistic attitude{\textquotedblright} Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations.

}, isbn = {9783319043814}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_8}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Galavotti, Maria Carla and Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Marcel} } @incollection {weber2013study, title = {How to Study Scientific Explanation?}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {25{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @proceedings {1856691, title = {The role of unification in explanations of facts}, journal = {EPSA Philosophy of Science 2009}, year = {2012}, pages = {403-413}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {

In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.

}, isbn = {9789400724037}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4\_33}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Lefevere, Merel}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Okasha, Samir and Hartmann, Stephan} } @incollection {1890996, title = {What is there beyond Mertonian and dollar green science? {E}xploring the contours of epistemic democracy}, booktitle = {Drunk on capitalism : an interdisciplinary reflection on market economy, art and science}, volume = {11}, year = {2012}, pages = {35{\textendash}48}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

The story is sometimes told as follows: Once science was a disinterested activity giving scientists the opportunity to freely solve the puzzle of nature to the benefit of all. Nowadays science seems more and more driven by the search for patents and dollars compelling scientists to follow the logic of capitalism and corporatization. Take-home lesson: science is for sale and we should do everything to reverse this evolution. In this contribution, I want to analyze the narrator{\textquoteright}s assumptions implicit in this account of science. In particular, the rosy description of earlier disinterested forms of scientific research will be questioned, as well as the lack of alternatives to the dichotomy disinterested versus corporatized. I will argue that beyond the dichotomy an interest-driven science can be conceived framed within an epistemic democracy.

}, isbn = {9789400720817}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Le Roy, Frederik and Stalpaert, Christel and Aerts, Diederik} } @incollection {VanBouwel2011, title = {An atlas for the social world: what should it (not) look like? {I}nterdisciplinarity and pluralism in the social sciences}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Worlds, Cultures and Society.}, series = {Worldviews, science and us : interdisciplinary perspectives on worlds, cultures and society}, year = {2011}, pages = {43{\textendash}72}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Starting from the analogy between theories and maps, I will spell out which interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences can provide us with the atlas we need to navigate in the social world. After comparing the features of theories and maps in section 1, I elaborate how different social theories can collaborate or get into a dialogue in section 2, summarizing the different strategies that have been defended for interdisciplinarity in social science: theory-, method-, metaphysics-, and question-driven interdisciplinarity, which I will illustrate with actual proposals made by, inter alia, World-Systems Analysis, Critical Realism and Economics Imperialism. Building on the framework of explanatory pluralism I have been developing before, I will make a case for question-driven interdisciplinarity in section 3. My argument for question-driven interdisciplinarity will be illustrated in section 4 by discussing recent developments in economics (i.e., the debate between the orthodoxy and heterodox theories, the pleas for pluralism, and the impact of globalisation {\textendash}and related institutional developments- on economics as a discipline). In conclusion, the contours of an adequate atlas for the social world should become clearer; when to use the different maps, how to activate the dialogue between social scientific disciplines in order to draw the different maps, and the risks of globalisation for social science (and adequate map making).

}, isbn = {9789814355056}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Pinxten, Rik and Wallerstein, Immanuel} } @incollection {1853233, title = {Explanation in the social sciences}, booktitle = {The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {2011}, pages = {632{\textendash}646}, publisher = {Sage Publications}, address = {London}, abstract = {

This chapter gives an overview of the philosophical debates concerning explanation in the social sciences.

}, isbn = {9781847874009}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Jarvie, Ian and Zamora-Bonilla, Jesus} } @article {1890961, title = {Indispensability arguments in favour of reductive explanations}, journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}46}, abstract = {

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction {\textendash} traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism {\textendash} can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.

}, issn = {0925-4560}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10838-011-9141-5}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {1054981, title = {Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: theory and practice}, journal = {Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics}, volume = {31}, number = {5}, year = {2010}, pages = {371{\textendash}390}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in any case be a difficult exercise.

}, issn = {1386-7415}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-010-9156-7}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {812480, title = {Why social emergence? {D}iscussing the use of analytical metaphysics in social theory}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : studies of analytical metaphysics}, year = {2010}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, organization = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

Recently the concept of emergence has been used in social theory to understand and defend social causation and nonreductive individualism (cf., Refs. 1, 2 and 3). In this paper, I want to analyse what the contribution of analytical metaphysics, and, in particular, the concept of emergence is, or might be, to the discussion in social theory. Especially Keith Sawyer{\textquoteright}s use of emergence in his defence of social explanation will be scrutinized. Therefore, it will be important to distinguish ontological from epistemological emergence. Where Sawyer focuses on ontological emergence, I will argue that social explanation might better be defended by putting emphasis on pragmatic aspects of explanation and considering emergence as an epistemological category.

}, isbn = {9789814295819}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814299053\_0010}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart} } @article {924987, title = {Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {301{\textendash}320}, abstract = {

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.698}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {812461, title = {The problem with(out) consensus: {T}he scientific consensus, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism.}, booktitle = {The social sciences and democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {121{\textendash}142}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {978-0230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {703844, title = {Understanding in political science: the plurality of epistemic interests}, booktitle = {Scientific Understanding. {P}hilosophical Perspectives}, year = {2009}, pages = {298{\textendash}313}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, isbn = {9780822943785}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {De Regt, Henk and Leonelli, Sabina and Eigner, Kai} } @incollection {924923, title = {Varieties of Democracy in Science Policy}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {181{\textendash}194}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {9780230224391}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {812495, title = {Where the Epistemic and the Political Meet.}, booktitle = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, series = {The Social Sciences and Democracy}, year = {2009}, pages = {1{\textendash}13}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, isbn = {978-0230224391}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {446322, title = {De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests.}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {423{\textendash}442}, abstract = {

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences-refining the conceptual tools of social scientists-and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

}, issn = {0163-8548}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {VanBouwel2008, title = {Explanatory Pluralism.}, booktitle = {Pluralist Economics}, year = {2008}, pages = {151-170}, publisher = {Zed Books}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Fullbrook, Edward} } @article {415578, title = {A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science.}, journal = {History and theory}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, month = {May}, pages = {168{\textendash}182}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

}, issn = {0018-2656}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @conference {812549, title = {The ambiguity of unification in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {2e Congr{\`e}s de la Soci{\'e}t{\'e} de Philosophie des Sciences}, year = {2007}, abstract = {

In the social sciences, the dream of unity often recurs. One of these contemporary unifying projects is economics imperialism. Its goal is to increase the degree of unification by applying rational choice theory beyond its original (economic) home in other territories like political science, sociology, anthropology, history, etc. In this paper, I want to evaluate the benefits and feasibility of this project from the perspective of explanatory pluralism and demonstrate the ambiguity of unification and unity. Revisiting debates concerning rational choice theory in feminist economics and historical sociology, I will delimit the benefits and shortcomings of economics imperialism and the idea of unification, making use of a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism {\textendash} based on the erotetic model of explanation {\textendash} elaborated in my earlier work (cf. Weber and Van Bouwel, 2002). A thorough analysis of these debates will result in a nuanced view on unification and unity, with on the one hand, a plea for taking the plurality of epistemic and non-epistemic interests in social scientific theories and explanation into account {\textendash} with the evident implications this has for the unity of science project {\textendash} but, on the other hand, an attempt to carve out a well-defined place for unification and the benefits it might bring to social science theory and explanation. This last exercise might take away the worries sometimes uttered by social scientists concerning the unificationist endeavour of economics imperialism.

}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {Weber2007, title = {Assessing the explanatory power of causal explanations.}, booktitle = {Rethinking Explanation}, year = {2007}, pages = {109{\textendash}118}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, address = {Dordrecht}, isbn = {978-1-4020-5580-5}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Persson, J. and Ylikoski, Petri} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {

One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {365927, title = {De idee van emergentie in de sociologie: perspectieven en problemen}, journal = {Tijdschrijft voor sociologie}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, year = {2006}, pages = {337{\textendash}350}, issn = {0777-883X}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {334986, title = {The division of labour in the social sciences versus the politics of metaphysics. {Q}uestioning Critical Realism{\textquoteright}s interdisciplinarity}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, year = {2006}, pages = {32{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

Some scholars claim that Critical Realism promises well for the unification of the social sciences, e.g., Unifying social science: A critical realist approach in this volume. I will first show briefly how Critical Realism might unify social science. Secondly, I focus on the relation between the ontology and methodology of Critical Realism, and unveil the politics of metaphysics. Subsequently, it is argued that the division of labour between social scientific disciplines should not be metaphysics-driven, but rather question-driven. In conclusion, I will therefore defend a question-driven pluralism as a guide for interdisciplinarity.

}, issn = {1572-3763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {VanBouwel2006, title = {The idea of social mechanisms in social scientific explanations.}, booktitle = {Progress in Social Psychology Research}, series = {Advances in social psychology research}, year = {2006}, pages = {83{\textendash}95}, publisher = {Nova Science}, isbn = {1594546584}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen}, editor = {Arlsdale, John Z.} } @article {334981, title = {Coping with inconsistencies: {E}xamples from the social sciences}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {89{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {334983, title = {Forms of causal explanation}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2005}, pages = {437{\textendash}454}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {334982, title = {Heeft er iemand een wetenschapsbeleid gezien? {O}ver wetenschap, democratie en de onderzoeksagenda}, journal = {Samenleving en politiek}, volume = {12}, number = {8}, year = {2005}, pages = {12{\textendash}18}, issn = {1372-0740}, url = {http://www.stichtinggerritkreveld.be/ECMS\_CLIENT/configuration/pages/artikel.php?aid=307}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {van2005towards, title = {Towards a framework for pluralisms in economics}, journal = {Post-Autistic Economics Review}, volume = {30}, year = {2005}, pages = {24{\textendash}27}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {382092, title = {The consequences of scientific pluralism for science policy}, booktitle = {Proceedings of V Jornadas Latinoamericanas de estudios sociales de la ciencia y de la tecnolog{\'\i}a}, year = {2004}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {307815, title = {Explanatory pluralism in economics: {A}gainst the mainstream?}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, year = {2004}, pages = {299{\textendash}315}, abstract = {

Recent pleas for more heterodoxy in explaining economic action have been defending a pluralism for economics. In this article, I analyse these defences by scrutinizing the pluralistic qualities in the work of one of the major voices of heterodoxy, Tony Lawson. This scrutiny will focus on Lawson{\textquoteright}s alternatives concerning ontology and explanation to mainstream economics. Subsequently, I will raise some doubts about Lawson{\textquoteright}s pluralism, and identify questions that will have to be addressed by heterodox economists in order to maintain the claim of pluralism.

}, issn = {1386-9795}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {307814, title = {Imperialistische tendensen in de economiebeoefening en politieke wetenschappen. {O}ver heterodoxie en pluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Ethiek \& maatschappij}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, year = {2004}, pages = {32{\textendash}45}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {307817, title = {Questioning structurism as a new standard for social scientific explanations}, journal = {Graduate Journal of Social Science}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, year = {2004}, pages = {204{\textendash}226}, abstract = {

As the literature on Critical Realism in the social sciences is growing, it is about time to analyse whether a new, acceptable standard for social scientific explanations is being introduced. In order to do so, I will discuss the work of Christopher Lloyd, who analysed contributions of social scientists that rely on (what he called) a structurist ontology and a structurist methodology, and advocated a third option in the methodological debate between individualism and holism. I will suggest modifications to three points of Lloyd{\textquoteright}s analysis, without abandoning Lloyd{\textquoteright}s intuitions completely. Firstly, the intuitions of the structurist ontology can be made explicit in a different way, without loosing the individual-society dualism. Secondly, opting for a structurist ontology does not necessarily imply opting for a structurist methodology. Ontology and methodology are related, but not as strongly as Lloyd supposes. Thirdly, the idea of a complete explanation, present in the structurist methodology, confuses causation and explanation while denying the pragmatics of explanation. A broader spectrum of explanatory forms can be defended. Criticizing Lloyd on these three points will lead me to the defence of an explanatory pluralism, which I relate to a minimal ontology. The intention of this reconceptualisation of structurism (and related Critical Realist applications) is to broaden possible perspectives on the explanatory praxis of the social scientist, and to question the reunification of the social sciences. It will also stipulate which form of interdisciplinarity is preferable for the social sciences.

}, issn = {1572-3763}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {219578, title = {Verklaringspluralisme in de sociale wetenschappen}, journal = {Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis – {R}evue belge d’histoire}, volume = {33}, number = {1{\textendash}2}, year = {2003}, pages = {303{\textendash}311}, issn = {0035-0869}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @phdthesis {PhD_Jeroen, title = {Verklaringspluralisme in de Sociale Wetenschappen. Een Wetenschapsfilosofische Verdediging met Toepassingen in de Geschiedbeoefening, de Theorie van Internationale Relaties en de Economische Wetenschappen}, year = {2003}, month = {January 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {219576, title = {When unveiling the epistemic fallacy ends with committing the ontological fallacy. {O}n the contribution of critical realism to the social scientific explanatory practice}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {71}, year = {2003}, pages = {81{\textendash}98}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {VanBouwel2002a, title = {The Living Apart Together Relationship between Causation and Explanation. {A} comment on {J}ean {L}achappelle.}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, year = {2002}, pages = {560-569}, doi = {10.1177/004839302237837}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {VanBouwel2002, title = {Remote Causes, Bad Explanations?}, journal = {The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, volume = {32}, year = {2002}, pages = {437-449}, doi = {10.1111/1468-5914.00197}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {152596, title = {Subject ingebed? {O}ver het methodologisch individualisme in de sociale wetenschappen.}, booktitle = {De terugkeer van het subject? {R}ecente Ontwikkelingen binnen de filosofie}, year = {2002}, pages = {169{\textendash}179}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, isbn = {90-5867-237-9}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Verdonck, Barbara}, editor = {Devos, Rob and Braeckman, Antoon} } @article {152660, title = {Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {259{\textendash}275}, abstract = {

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

}, issn = {0266-2671}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} }