@article {DeLanghe2012,
	title = {The Problem of Kuhnian Rationality},
	journal = {Philosophica},
	volume = {86},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {11-31},
	abstract = {<p>According to Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970), science is characterized by two levels, one within and one between paradigms. The problem of Kuhnian rationality concerns the choice between paradigms, for which no rational basis appears to exist because this choice is inevitably circular to some extent. This is the main reason why Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view is perceived to glorify irrationality. (ibid. 199) I present two interpretations of the problem of Kuhnian rationality, one based on concepts (the neo-positivist interpretation) and one based on values. I also describe two notions of rationality, optimizing and satisficing. Neither interpretation supports the notion of optimizing, but the values-interpretation supports satisficing, suggesting that if Kuhnian scientists are rational, as Kuhn insisted, they are satisficers. An agent-based model demonstrates that aggregating the behaviour of satisficing agents can account for Kuhn{\textquoteright}s view on the dynamics of scientific change.</p>},
	author = {De Langhe, Rogier}
}
@conference {1895032,
	title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory},
	booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings},
	year = {2007},
	publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR},
	organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR},
	abstract = {<p>One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.</p>},
	url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf},
	author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen}
}
