@article {DeBalWeber2017, title = {Causation \& Technical Problem Solving: An analysis of causal knowledge underlying proposed solutions for technical problems.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper we analyse the causal underpinnings of remedy claims found in technical problem solving instructions. For these claims to be successful, they need to be based on causal relations that hold in the world and that have certain properties. These required properties are the focus of our paper. We first introduce several examples from car- and bike repair manuals that demarcate our topic and function as illustrations throughout the paper. We then formulate three success criteria for problem solving manuals: the efficiency requirement, the no harm requirement and the maximal assistance ideal. These criteria determine the required strength and properties of the causal relation, and are used to frame our analysis. We start from theories of causation by Ronald Giere, Ellery Eells and John Mackie and develop a series of definitions to capture the properties of the aforementioned causal relations. We conclude that remedy claims need to be based on causal relations with the following property: positive causal factorhood with weak context-unanimity. Moreover, it is desirable to look for Mackie causes, viz. causes that are sufficient in maximally normal contexts. We finally show that our analysis is not limited to means of conveyance (this is the field in which our initial examples are located) by means of a case study from a different field (radio repair manuals).

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Weber, Erik} } @article {DeBal2017epauth, title = {Epistemic authority: a pragmatic approach.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper, I investigate how we can legitimate that certain regularities get epistemic authority in specific contexts of scientific practice. With {\textquotedblleft}epistemic authority{\textquotedblright} I refer to the fact that regularities are trusted to achieve epistemic goals like prediction, explanation and manipulation. For my analysis, I use the Neuber rule, a regularity used to model creep in notches, as an exemplar. I distinguish two traditional ways of legitimating epistemic authority: a necessitarian approach and an epistemic mark approach. Throughout the paper, I argue that neither is, in its current form, sufficient to account for the epistemic authority of regularities like the Neuber rule. Regarding necessity, I expand arguments from Matthias Frisch{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of physics to show that (1) the Neuber rule is currently not successfully derived from (more) fundamental laws, (2) the idea that there are truly fundamental laws that can be used to represent any phenomenon is not unproblematic given the functioning of scientific practice, and (3) even if there are such fundamental laws, there is no guarantee that their necessity is undamaged by the modelling practices of science. I then present an alternative that resembles the basic idea behind the epistemic mark approach, but is significantly more informative. For this part, I build on insights from Sandra Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work in philosophy of biology. This results in a pragmatic approach to epistemic authority. At the same time, this paper functions as a defence and expansion of both Frisch and Mitchell{\textquoteright}s work. I also emphasize the benefits of combining insights from various philosophical disciplines.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @article {DeBal2017evid, title = {From one to many: generalisation and evidence in failure analysis.}, year = {Submitted}, abstract = {

In this paper, I use cases and reasoning from failure analysis (a part of engineering
science which deals with artefact failure and its causes) to draw attention to a relatively
unstudied problem of knowledge generalisation: when we are focusing on creating new
things; designing new artefacts and technologies. Using three cases from failure
analysis practice, I present a two-fold mechanism-based procedure to determine when
generalisations to non-existing artefacts are warranted. This procedure builds on (1)
Cartwright{\textquoteright}s notion of capacities (2) literature on mechanisms and (3) Steel{\textquoteright}s
comparative process tracing, developed for the biomedical sciences. I will show that,
while they provide guidance, these literatures and concepts are not enough to grasp
how we use information from current artefacts and failures to create new things - we
will need a lot more specific information and adequate ways to present it. The account
developed in this paper is relevant for both philosophers and failure analysts. For
philosophers, it can provide input for a theory of evidence. For failure analysts, it allows
them to present stronger arguments for their recommendations by making the required
evidence explicit. My account can furthermore provide inspiration for similar inferences
in other innovation contexts such as pharmacology.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge} } @article {1997, title = {Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {90}, year = {2015}, pages = {93-113}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Bal, Inge} } @article {DeBal2006, title = {A new approach to classical relevance.}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {82}, year = {2015}, pages = {1{\textendash}31}, abstract = {

n this paper we present a logic that determines when implications in a classical logic context express a relevant connection between antecedent and consequent. In contrast with logics in the relevance logic literature, we leave classical negation intact - in the sense that the law of non-contradiction can be used to obtain relevantly implications, as long as there is a connection between antecedent and consequent. On the other hand, we give up the requirement that our theory of relevance can define a new standard of deduction. We present and argue for a list of requirements that such a logical theory of classical relevance needs to meet and go on to formulate a system that respects each of these requirements. The presented system is a monotonic and transitive logic that extends the relevance logic ℜ with a richer relevant implication that allows for Disjunctive Syllogism and similar rules. This is achieved by interpreting the logical symbols in the antecedents in a stronger way than the logical symbols in consequents. A proof theory and an algebraic semantics are formulated and interesting metatheorems (soundness, completeness and the fact that it satisfies the requirements for classical relevance) are proven. Finally we give a philosophical motivation for our non-standard relevant implication and the asymmetric interpretation of antecedents and consequents.

}, author = {De Bal, Inge and Verd{\'e}e, Peter} }