@article {Pawlowski2017,
	title = {Paradoxes of informal provability and many-valued indeterministic provability logic},
	year = {Submitted},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Pawlowski, Pawel}
}
@incollection {Pawlowski2017a,
	title = {Philosophical Aspects of an Alleged Connection Between the Axiom of Choice and Predicting the Future},
	booktitle = {Applications of Formal Philosophy The Road Less Travelled},
	year = {2017},
	pages = {213-220},
	publisher = {Springer},
	author = {Pawlowski, Pawel},
	editor = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Gillman, Payette}
}
@article {4443770,
	title = {Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation},
	journal = {Synthese},
	volume = {191},
	number = {7},
	year = {2014},
	pages = {1605{\textendash}1626},
	abstract = {<p>One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objects-sets. On this view claims like {\textquoteright}some logicians admire only each other{\textquoteright} involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidates-substitutional and set-theoretic-only the latter can provide the language of plurals with the desired expressive power (given that the nominalist seems committed to the assumption that there can be at most countably many names). To counter this approach I develop a modal-substitutional semantics of plural quantification (on which plural variables, roughly speaking, range over ways names could be) and argue for its nominalistic acceptability.</p>},
	issn = {0039-7857},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0354-5},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}
}
@article {3148385,
	title = {{\textquoteright}Platonic{\textquoteright} thought experiments: how on earth},
	journal = {Synthese},
	volume = {187},
	number = {2},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {731{\textendash}752},
	abstract = {<p>Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a, 1991b; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004; Thought experiments, 2008) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs "platonic"). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them as arguments for logical reasons: there is no logic that can adequately model such phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, "platonic" TEs provide us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against this approach by describing how "platonic" TEs can be modeled within the logical framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by Brown, Galileo{\textquoteright}s TE involving falling bodies.</p>},
	issn = {0039-7857},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0008-4},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}
}
@article {Urbaniak,
	title = {PhD{\textquoteright}s in Logic - report (with S. Wintein)},
	journal = {The Reasoner},
	volume = {3},
	number = {4},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {6{\textendash}7},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}
}
