@incollection {2045,
	title = {Logics of (formal and informal) provability},
	booktitle = {Handbook of Formal Philosophy},
	year = {In Press},
	publisher = {Springer},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Pawlowski, Pawel},
	editor = {Hansson, Sven Ove and Hendricks, Vincent F.}
}
@article {Urbaniak2009b,
	title = {Leitgeb, {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}about{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright}, {Y}ablo},
	journal = {Logique et Analyse},
	volume = {52},
	number = {207},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {239-254},
	abstract = {<p>Leitgeb (2002) objects against the clarity of the debate about the alleged (non-)circularity of Yablos paradox, arguing that there actually are at least two notions of self-reference and circularity at play.One, on which Yablos paradox is not circular, is defined via thereference of the constituents of a sentence, and another, on which the paradox is circular, is defined via syntactic mappings and fixedpoints. More importantly, Leitgeb argues that both definitions arent satisfactory and that before we can undertake a serious debate about the circularity of Yablos paradox we first need to clarify the notions involved. I will focus on Leitgebs criticism of the first definition<sup>1</sup>and will argue that the problems arise not as much on the level of our definition of circularity as on the level of our definition of reference of sentences (aboutness). Leitgebs main worry is the failure of a requirement called Equivalence Condition, which says that if a formula is self-referential, any formula logically equivalent to it should also be self-referential. I will argue that preservation under logical equivalence is unreasonable with respect to self-reference,but is indeed needed with respect to aboutness. Since Leitgeb sown tentative notion of aboutness doesnt satisfy the requirement, I will suggest another approach which fixes this problem. I also explain why the intuitions that circularity should satisfy the equivalence condition are misled. Next, I argue that the new notion of aboutness is not susceptible to slingshot arguments. Finally, I compare it with Goodmans notion of absolute aboutness, emphasizing those features of Goodmans approach that make his notion inapplicable in the present discussion. <sup>[1]I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who discussed earlier versions of this paper with me: Hannes Leitgeb, Jeffrey Ketland, Karl Georg Niebergall, Diderik Batens, Joke Meheus, Maarten Van Dyck, Stefan Wintein, Martin Bentzen, Christian Stra{\ss}er, Ghent Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science members, and the participants of <em>PhDs in Logic</em> workshop (Gent 2009)</sup></p>},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}
}
@article {urbaniak2008lesniewski,
	title = {Le{\'s}niewski and Russell{\textquoteright}s paradox: some problems},
	journal = {History and Philosophy of Logic},
	volume = {29},
	number = {2},
	year = {2008},
	pages = {115{\textendash}146},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal}
}
