@incollection {RaD:i,
	title = {Induction},
	booktitle = {Handbook of Formal Philosophy},
	year = {2018},
	publisher = {Springer},
	keywords = {induction, logic, probability},
	isbn = {978-3-319-77433-6},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Batens, Diderik},
	editor = {Hansson, Sven Ove and Hendricks, Vincent F.}
}
@article {4443727,
	title = {Induction from a single instance: {I}ncomplete frames},
	journal = {Foundations of science},
	volume = {18},
	number = {4},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {641{\textendash}653},
	abstract = {<p>In this paper we argue that an existing theory of concepts called dynamic frame theory, although not developed with that purpose in mind, allows for the precise formulation of a number of problems associated with induction from a single instance. A key role is played by the distinction we introduce between complete and incomplete dynamic frames, for incomplete frames seem to be very elegant candidates for the format of the background knowledge used in induction from a single instance. Furthermore, we show how dynamic frame theory provides the terminology to discuss the justification and the fallibility of incomplete frames. In the Appendix, we give a formal account of incomplete frames and the way these lead to induction from a single instance.</p>},
	issn = {1233-1821},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9295-6},
	author = {Urbaniak, Rafal and Van De Putte, Frederik}
}
