@incollection {Christiaens2012, title = {Metaphysics and Cinema}, booktitle = {Worldviews, Science and Us: Bridging Knowledge and its Implications for our Perpectives on the World.}, year = {2012}, pages = {118-141}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, address = {Singapore}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @incollection {Christiaens2009, title = {La m{\'e}tamorphose gra{\c c}e au cin{\`e}ma.}, booktitle = {La m{\'e}tamorphose: d{\'e}finition, formes et th{\`e}mes}, year = {2009}, publisher = {G{\'e}rard Monfort Editeur}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Tatham, Anne-Marie and Bonnecase, Denis} } @incollection {Christiaens2007, title = {Some notes on {A}erts{\textquoteright} interpretation of the {E}{P}{R}-paradox and the violation of {B}ell-inequalities}, booktitle = {Probing the Structure of Quantum Mechanics: Nonlinearity, Nonlocality, Probability and Axiomatics}, year = {2007}, pages = {250{\textendash}286}, publisher = {World Scientific}, author = {Christiaens, Wim and Czachor, Marek}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Durt, Thomas} } @article {Christiaens2006a, title = {Basic Ontology and the Ontology of the Phenomenological Life World: A Proposal}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {11}, number = {3}, year = {2006}, pages = {249-274}, abstract = {

The condition of explicit theoretically discursive cognitive performance, as it culminates in scientific activity, is, I claim, the life world. I contrast life world and scientific world and argue that the latter arises from the first and that contrary to the prevailing views the scientific world (actually, worlds, since the classical world is substantially different from the quantum world) finds its completion in the life world and not the other way around. In other words: the closure we used to search in a complete and comprehensive scientific description of all aspects of experience by referring it back to underlying atoms, genes and other scientific objects and the covering laws ruling them, should be sought in a reintegrating and occasionally dissolving of the abstract scientific model in the self-organizational fluidity and superposition-like indeterminateness and non-locality of the life world: “We have to acknowledge the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon” (Merleau-Ponty in his The Phenomenology of Perception).

}, keywords = {metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, process ontology}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {10.1007/s10699-004-5909-y}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-004-5909-y}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {Christiaens2006, title = {Lichamelijkheid en cinema volgens een {A}posteliaanse ontologie}, journal = {Esthetica. Tijdschrift voor kunst en filosofie}, volume = {1}, year = {2006}, pages = {1{\textendash}8}, abstract = {

In 1998 verschenen twee opmerkelijke films, Saving Private Ryan van Steven Spielberg en The Thin Red Line van Terrence Malick. De overeenkomsten tussen deze producties zijn oppervlakkig: ze gaan beide over de Tweede Wereldoorlog en het zijn allebei grote Hollywoodproducties. De verschillen daarentegen zijn diepgaand en nodigen uit tot nadenken over de aard van film. Ik zal eerst enkele verschillen en contrasten tussen genoemde films schetsen, bij wijze van inleiding tot de thema’s ontologie, cinema en lichamelijkheid. Daarna komen in (2) de volgende onderwerpen aan de orde: (2.1) film is het tot stand komen van een lichamelijkheid binnen onze eigen lichamelijkheid; en voorts (2.2) lichamelijkheid is een ontologisch proces. De ontologie waarbinnen ik werk is gebaseerd op de inzichten van Leo Apostel. In dit deel zal ik daarom ook de centrale aspecten van de Aposteliaanse ontologie beschrijven. Ik zal verder (3.) een verband leggen tussen de cinema van Malick en de Aposteliaanse ontologie. Op basis van deze ontologie maak ik in (4.) een onderscheid tussen films zoals Saving Private Ryan, waarin het ontologische (de lichamelijkheid) impliciet gehouden wordt, en films zoals The Thin Red Line die dat niet doen.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {C:bioApo, title = {Biografie van Leo Apostel}, booktitle = {Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek}, year = {2005}, pages = {23-34}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {Christiaens2003, title = {The EPR-Experiment and Free Process Theory}, booktitle = {Process Theories. {C}ross-Disciplinary Studies on Dynamic Categories}, year = {2003}, pages = {267-284}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, abstract = {

As part of the ‘creation-discovery’ interpretation of quantum mechanics Diederik Aerts presented a setting with macroscopical coincidence experiments designed to exhibit significant conceptual analogies between portions of stuff and quantum compound entities in a singlet state in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bell-experiments (EPR-experiments). One important claim of the creation-discovery view is that the singlet state describes an entity that does not have a definite position in space and thus ‘does not exist in space’. ‘Free Process Theory’ is a recent proposal by Johanna Seibt of an integrated ontology, i.e., of an ontology suitable for the interpretation of theories of the macrophysical and microphysical domain (quantum field theory). The framework of free process theory allows us to show systematically the relevant analogies and disanalogies between Aerts’ experiment and EPR-experiments. From free process ontology it also follows quite naturally that the quantum compound entity described by the singlet state ‘does not exist in space.’

}, isbn = {978-1-4020-1751-3}, doi = {10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1044-3_11}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Seibt, Johanna} } @article {287734, title = {Non-spatiality and EPR-experiments according to the creation-discovery view}, journal = {Foundations of Physics Letters}, volume = {16}, number = {4}, year = {2003}, month = {August}, pages = {379{\textendash}387}, abstract = {

The creation-discovery interpretation of the EPR-experiments, developed by D. Aerts, draws our attention on the role of spacetime in our description of the physical world: the EPR-experiments give us reason to believe that quantum entities do not always exist in space. This interpretation of the quantum description would explain the peculiar correlations obtained in these experiments as arising from the most obvious candidate for a common cause, the entity described by the singlet state. The absence of unique and determinate localization as a criterium for individuation is met by a new physical ontology. We use it to obtain a better understanding of the interaction between quantum individuals and spacetime.

}, issn = {0894-9875}, doi = {10.1023/A:1025317910387}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {christiaens2003note, title = {A note concerning the place of contradictions in the ontologies of constitution}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {67{\textendash}72}, abstract = {

In this first section we start with defining the notions of inconsistency and para-consistency, we give an example of an inconsistency and clarify what according to us is the basic problem with respect to the occurrence of inconsistencies. We are then in a position to state the aim of this paper

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @phdthesis {PhD_Wim, title = {De Cirkel Sluiten. Aanzet tot een Wetenschappelijke Metafysica}, year = {2001}, note = {

Promotor: Diderik Batens

}, month = {January 19}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @article {christiaens2001universe, title = {This Universe Is the {\textquoteleft}Best{\textquoteright} of All Possible Worlds. {A} Tentative Reconstruction of the Metaphysical System of Leo Apostel}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {67}, year = {2001}, pages = {115-146}, abstract = {

After presenting Apostel’s views on scientific realism, I present definitions of the concepts of ontology and metaphysics. I then proceed to develop Apostel’s basic ontology and his metaphysics. Apostel proposed a particular understanding of existence based on his views on causation. He also developed a view of the universe as a causal self-explaining system. I discuss and illustrate three kinds of what he calls “metaphysical deductions” that aim to deliver such a view of the universe. The most important one is the Leibnizian variational method, that should allow us to deduce the existing universe as the ‘best’ of all possible worlds.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim} } @incollection {Christiaens2000, title = {De eenheid van de inhoud}, booktitle = {Natuurfilosofie. Voorbereidend werk voor een op de fysica gebaseerde ontologie}, year = {2000}, pages = {9-35}, publisher = {VUB}, abstract = {

In deze tekst richten we onze aandacht niet zozeer op het inleiding van manuscripten Natuurfilosofie en Oorsprong. Veelmeer belichten we de belangrijkste bouwstenen van Apostels project voor een metafysica en proberen we enkele centrale noties te verhelderen. Met de titel {\textquoteright}de eenheid van de inhoud{\textquoteright} wordt reed gewezen op het coherente onderbouwde idee{\"e}ngoed van Apostel. We zullen zien dat het begrip causaliteit als een rode draad doorheen Apostels filosofie loopt. We gaan er dan ook iets uitvoeriger op in. We kunnen hier evenwel niet uitgebreid ingaan op alle aspecten die we ter sprake brengen, maar zullen geregeld verwijzen naar publicaties in de voetnoten. We hopen op deze manier ge{\"\i}nteresseerden een instrument in handen te geven dat toelaat dieper in te gaan op de filosofie van Apostel.

}, author = {Christiaens, Wim}, editor = {Apostel, Leo} } @article {109728, title = {World Models and Inconsistencies.}, journal = {Foundations of Science}, volume = {3}, year = {1999}, pages = {285{\textendash}311}, abstract = {

A worldview has sic components. We concentrate on the first two: descriptive world model and the explanatory world model. In the first half of the paper we make some general remarks on the methodology of world construction. In the second part, we discuss inconsistencies in world models. Adding new fragments to our world model can lead to inconsistencies Three strategies are distinguished: (i) a partial return to instrumentalism, (ii) paraconsistency, and (iii) the adaptive option. The latter option is elaborated by means of several historical examples and by means of the EPR paradox.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Christiaens, Wim} }