@article {2125879,
	title = {On lawfulness in history and historiography},
	journal = {HISTORY AND THEORY},
	volume = {51},
	number = {2},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {172{\textendash}192},
	abstract = {<p>The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is-or should be-is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward{\textquoteright}s notion of {\textacutedbl}invariance,{\textacutedbl}is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called {\textacutedbl}pragmatic laws{\textacutedbl}and {\textacutedbl}invariance{\textacutedbl}do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples-from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion-have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history.</p>},
	issn = {1468-2303},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00620.x},
	author = {Leuridan, Bert and Froeyman, Anton}
}
@phdthesis {PhD_Bert,
	title = {Laws of Nature and Causality in the Special Sciences: A Philosophical and Formal Analysis},
	year = {2008},
	month = {March 13},
	publisher = {Ghent University},
	type = {phd},
	author = {Leuridan, Bert}
}
