@proceedings {2973606,
	title = {An {A}ndersonian deontic logic with contextualized sanctions},
	journal = {11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, DEON2012},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {151-169},
	publisher = {Springer},
	abstract = {<p>We present a refinement of Anderson{\textquoteright}s reduction of deontic logic to modal logic with only alethic modalities. The refined proposal contextualizes the Andersonian sanction constant s by replacing it with a unary sanction operator S that is dependent on the concrete normative requirement that is violated. A formula S B is then for instance interpreted as ldquo B causes a sanctionrdquo or as ldquo B provides a reason for (the applicability of) a sanctionrdquo. Due to its modified sanction operator, the resulting logic DSL invalidates some instances of the inheritance principle. This gives rise to new interesting features. For instance, DSL consistently allows for the presence of conflicting obligations. Moreover, it provides novel insights in various central {\textquoteleft}paradoxes{\textquoteright} in deontic logic such as the Ross paradox, the paradox of the good Samaritan, and Forrester{\textquoteright}s {\textquoteleft}gentle murderer{\textquoteright} paradox.</p>},
	isbn = {9783642315695},
	author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and Beirlaen, Mathieu},
	editor = {Agotnes, Thomas and Broersen, Jan and Elgesem, Dag}
}
@proceedings {1861627,
	title = {A paraconsistent multi-agent framework for dealing with normative conflicts},
	journal = {12th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XII)},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {312-329},
	publisher = {Springer},
	abstract = {<p>In a multi-agent deontic setting, normative conflicts can take a variety of different logical forms. In this paper, we present a very general characterization of such conflicts, including both intra- and inter-agent normative conflicts, conflicts between groups of agents, conflicts between obligations and permissions, and conflicts between contradictory norms. In order to account for the consistent possibility of this wide variety of conflict-types, we present a paraconsistent deontic logic, i.e. a logic that invalidates the classical principle of non-contradiction. Next, we strengthen this logic within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The resulting inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic interprets a given set of norms {\textquoteright}as consistently as possible{\textquoteright}.</p>},
	isbn = {9783642223587},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22359-4},
	author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Stra{\ss}er, Christian},
	editor = {Leite, Joao and Torroni, Paolo and Agotnes, Thomas and Boella, Guido and van der Torre, Leon}
}
