@article {4443682, title = {The {\textquoteright}green cheese{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteright}red herring{\textquoteright} problems reconsidered. Epistemological versus methodological tasks for Philosophers of Science}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, year = {2015}, pages = {433-455}, author = {Weber, Erik and Gervais, Raoul and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {4443651, title = {Explaining capacities: Assessing the explanatory power of models in the cognitive sciences}, booktitle = {Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {45-57}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {Gervais2014, title = {A framework for inter-level explanations: Outlines for a new explanatory pluralism.}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {48}, year = {2014}, pages = {1{\textendash}9}, abstract = {

According to explanatory pluralism, the appropriate explanatory level is determined by pragmatic factors, and there are no general exclusion or preference rules concerning higher- or lower-level explanations. While I agree with the latter claim, I will argue that the former is in need of revision. In particular, I will argue that by distinguishing cases of two explanations being descriptions of one underlying causal process, and two explanations being descriptions of two distinct causal processes, it becomes clear that the grain size of an explanation is in fact determined by the interplay of various pragmatic and non-pragmatic factors. Within these constraints, positive guidelines can be developed to direct us to the appropriate explanatory level. This gives us the outlines for a general framework for classifying various types of relations between explanations on different levels. After making a comparison between this new framework and standard explanatory pluralism, I end by suggesting some ways in which the framework could be further developed.

}, doi = {10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.07.002}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {5685708, title = {Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the {\textquoteright}mere description{\textquoteright} worry}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {192}, number = {1}, year = {2014}, pages = {43{\textendash}66}, abstract = {

In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the ‘mere description’ worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.

}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @phdthesis {PhD_Raoul, title = {Explanation in the Cognitive Sciences and Biology: Mechanisms, Laws and their Explanatory Virtues}, year = {2013}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {4118013, title = {Inferential explanations in biology}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, volume = {44}, year = {2013}, pages = {356{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without construct- ing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic expla- nations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right. In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.

}, issn = {1369-8486}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {4269435, title = {Non-cognitive values and objectivity in scientific explanation: the case of the {M}ovius line}, journal = {PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE}, volume = {21}, year = {2013}, pages = {429{\textendash}452}, abstract = {

Although it is now widely accepted that in science, non-cognitive values play a role, it is still debated whether this has implications for its objectivity. It seems that the task of philosophers here is twofold: to flesh out what kinds of non-cognitive values play what kinds of roles, and to evaluate the implications for objectivity. I attempt to contribute to both tasks by introducing the value of egalitarianism, and showing how this non-cognitive value shapes three alternative explanations of the Movius Line. It is argued that although these explanations are motivated by egalitarianism, they are nevertheless objective.

}, issn = {0926-3977}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/POSC\_a\_00111}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @article {3086510, title = {Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {139{\textendash}152}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver{\textquoteright}s continuum of how-possibly, to how-plausibly, to how-actually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism{\textquoteright}s activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.

}, issn = {0951-5089}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.633693}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {3171382, title = {The status of functional explanation in psychology: reduction and mechanistic explanation}, journal = {THEORY \& PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {23}, year = {2013}, pages = {145{\textendash}163}, abstract = {

The validity of functional explanations as they are commonly used in psychology has recently come under attack. Kim’s supervenience argument purports to prove that higher-level generalizations have no causal powers of their own, and hence are explanatorily irrelevant. In a nutshell, the supervenience argument forces us to either embrace epiphenomenalism of higher- level properties, or accept Kim’s specific brand of reductionism. However, with the current emphasis on mechanistic explanations, the literature on explanation in psychology has undergone some drastic changes. It could be argued, therefore, that Kim’s argument targets an outdated concept of functional explanations. In any case, these developments warrant a reassessment of the implications of his argument, which is the purpose of the present paper. First, we argue that the metaphysics behind the supervenience argument is incompatible with that of mechanisms. Second, we argue that Kim’s proposed brand of reductionism does not accurately describe the explanatory practices of cognitive science.

}, issn = {0959-3543}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354312453093}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Looren de Jong, Huib} } @article {1854847, title = {Op het snijvlak van cognitie, wetenschap en filosofie: intertheoretische relaties in de twintigste eeuw}, journal = {ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE}, volume = {104}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {21{\textendash}38}, abstract = {

This article provides a critical survey of the debate on intertheoretic relations, with particular emphasis on the cognitive sciences. I begin by distinguishing two opposing sides, reductionism and antireductionism, and proceed by tracking the changes these positions underwent in the twentieth century. It appears that these changes consist to a significant degree in smoothing out the rough edges of both, so that the original positions can be understood as crude extremes. The monistic accounts of intertheoretic relations were traded in for more tolerant and nuanced approaches, a tendency that is chiefly inspired by an increasing focus on actual scientific practice.

}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Gervais, Raoul} } @incollection {Gervais2012, title = {Pragmatic approaches to explanation applied to the cognitive sciences: two types of explanation-seeking questions compared}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II}, year = {2012}, pages = {131{\textendash}137}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, author = {Gervais, Raoul}, editor = {Van Kerkhove, Bart and Libert, Thierry and Vanpaemel, Geert and Marage, Pierre} } @article {1855775, title = {The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim{\textquoteright}s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley{\textquoteright}s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {1096460, title = {Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {165{\textendash}166}, url = {http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner-4(11).pdf}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Gauderis, Tjerk and Gervais, Raoul and Kosolosky, Laszlo} }