@incollection {1986, title = {The Feasibility of Modeling Hypothetical Reasoning by Formal Logics. Including an Overview of Adaptive Logics for Singular Fact Abduction}, booktitle = {Handbook of Model-Based Science}, year = {In Press}, publisher = {Springer}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo and Bertolotti, Tommaso} } @phdthesis {PhD_Tjerk, title = {Patterns of Hypothesis Formation}, year = {2014}, month = {March 31}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {4341742, title = {To envision a new particle or change an existing law? Hypothesis formation and anomaly resolution for the curious spectrum of beta decay}, journal = {STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS}, volume = {45}, year = {2014}, pages = {27{\textendash}45}, abstract = {

This paper addresses the question of how scientists determine which type of hypothesis is most suitable for tackling a particular problem by examining the historical case of the anomalous {\ss} spectrum in early nuclear physics (1927-1934), a puzzle that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown that such determinations are most often implicitly informed by scientists’ individual perspectives on the hierarchical relations between various elements of the theory and the problem at hand. In addition to this main result, it is suggested that Wolfgang Pauli’s neutrino idea may well have been an adaptation of Ernst Rutherford’s original and older neutron idea, which would provide evidence that the adaptation of older ideas is a more common practice than is often thought.

}, issn = {1355-2198}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.11.002}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {3178933, title = {Modelling abduction in science by means of a modal adaptive logic}, journal = {FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, year = {2013}, pages = {611{\textendash}624}, abstract = {

Scientists confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses as a result of their abductive inferences, generally want to reason further on the different hypotheses one by one. This paper presents a modal adaptive logic MLA (s) that enables us to model abduction in such a way that the different explanatory hypotheses can be derived individually. This modelling is illustrated with a case study on the different hypotheses on the origin of the Moon.

}, issn = {1233-1821}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9293-8}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @incollection {3178949, title = {Pauli{\textquoteright}s idea of the neutrino: how models in physics allow to revive old ideas for new purposes}, booktitle = {Model-based reasoning in science and technology : theoretical and cognitive issues}, year = {2013}, pages = {449-461}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Abstract Models have proven themselves to be the key catalyst of many new ideas in science. However, it is not yet fully clarified why models can fulfill such an important heuristic role. The two main reasons stated in the literature—the mental simulation of various scenarios and the wide cross-fertilization across various disciplines—seem to leave out one of the most obvious features of models: they are designed for a purpose. Therefore I investigated why, while the construction of models is a goal-oriented task with a predefined purpose, the use of models yields so many new ideas in science. This paper presents my conceptual analysis together with a detailed historical case study. The functional design of models forces scientists to explore vigorously older ideas to adapt them: as the lacunas in a functional model are also functional, scientists need to modify older ideas (that were formulated for different purposes) to fit the present functional gaps in their models. As such, they construct new ideas. The detailed historical case study exemplifies this by showing how Pauli’s original suggestion of the neutrino was, in fact, such an adaptation of Rutherford’s earlier idea of the neutron. The present analysis and case study suggest that functional adaptations are salient but often overlooked features of model based investigation.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Magnani, Lorenzo} } @article {3099682, title = {Abduction of generalizations}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, year = {2012}, pages = {345{\textendash}364}, abstract = {

Abduction of generalizations is the process in which explanatory hypotheses are formed for generalizations such as “pineapples taste sweet” or “rainbows appear when the sun breaks through the rain”. This phenomenon has received little attention in formal logic and philosophy of science. The current paper remedies this lacuna by first giving an overview of some general characteristics of this process, elaborating on its ubiquity in scientific and everyday reasoning. Second, the adaptive logic LA \&\#8704; is presented to explicate this process formally

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk and Van De Putte, Frederik} } @proceedings {3178954, title = {The problem of multiple explanatory hypotheses}, journal = {PhDs in Logic III}, year = {2012}, pages = {45-53}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

In abduction – the process of finding explanatory hypotheses for puzzling phenomena – one is often confronted with multiple explanatory hypotheses. In science one generally wants to test further the different hypotheses one by one. But, if we try to model this in a logic and make it possible to derive the differen t hypotheses apart from each other, we generally can derive their conjunction too. An elegant solution within the framework of adaptive logics is provided in Gauderis (2011). But this approach is not restricted to science. While it is true that a lot of cases in everyday reasoning require a more practical approach – in which one acts on the knowledge that all the different hypotheses might be the case – there are also a considerable amount of situations in which the more theoretical approach of the scientist is needed. In this paper we try to illustrate this by using this logic to model reasoning within detective literature.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk}, editor = {Demey, Lorenz and Devuyst, Jonas} } @proceedings {3178952, title = {An adaptive logic based approach to abduction in {A}{I}}, journal = {Ninth International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Action and Change}, year = {2011}, pages = {1-6}, abstract = {

In a logic-based approach to abductive reasoning, the background knowledge is represented by a logical theory. A sentence \&\#934; is then considered as an explanation for ω if it satisfies some formal conditions. In general, the following three conditions are considered crucial: (1) Φ together with the background knowledge implies !; (2) Φ is logically consistent with what is known; and (3) Φ is the most ‘parsimonious’ explanation. But, since abductive reasoning is a non-monotonic form of reasoning, each time the background knowledge is extended, the status of previously abduced explanations becomes once again undefined. The adaptive logics program is developed to address these types of non-monotonic reasoning. In addition to deductive reasoning steps, it allows for direct implementation of defeasible reasoning steps, but it adds to each formula the explicit set of conditions that would defeat this formula. So, in an adaptive logic for abduction, a formula is an abduced hypothesis as long as none of its conditions is deduced. This implies that we will not have to recheck all hypotheses each time an extension to our background knowledge is made. This is the key advantage of this approach, which allows us to save repetitive re-computations in fast growing knowledge bases.

}, author = {Gauderis, Tjerk} } @article {1096460, title = {Report LRR10: Logic, reasoning and rationality}, journal = {The Reasoner}, volume = {4}, number = {11}, year = {2010}, pages = {165{\textendash}166}, url = {http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol4/TheReasoner-4(11).pdf}, author = {Beirlaen, Mathieu and Gauderis, Tjerk and Gervais, Raoul and Kosolosky, Laszlo} }