@incollection {strasser2015withstanding, title = {Withstanding Tensions: {S}cientific Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance}, booktitle = {Heuristic Reasoning}, series = {Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics}, volume = {16}, year = {2015}, pages = {113{\textendash}146}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Many philosophers of science consider scientific disagreementto be a major promoter of scientific progress. However, we lack an ac-count of the epistemically and heuristically appropriate response scien-tists should have towards opposing positions in peer disagreements. Eventhough some scientific pluralists have advocated a notion of tolerance,the implications of this notion for one’s epistemic stance and, more gen-erally, for the scientific practice have been insuficiently explicated in theliterature. In this paper we explicate a characteristic tension in whichdisagreeing scientists are situated and on this basis we propose a notionof epistemic tolerance.

}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Wieland, Jan Willem}, editor = {Ippoliti, Emiliano} } @article {Strasser2014a, title = {Epistemic Justification in the Context of Pursuit: A Coherentist Approach}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {13}, year = {2014}, month = {May}, pages = {3111-3141}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of epistemic justification suitable for the context of theory pursuit, that is, for the context in which new scientific ideas, possibly incompatible with the already established theories, emerge and are pursued by scientists. We will frame our account paradigmatically on the basis of one of the influential systems of epistemic justification: Laurence Bonjour’s coherence theory of justification. The idea underlying our approach is to develop a set of criteria which indicate that the pursued system is promising of contributing to the epistemic goal of robustness of scientific knowledge and of developing into a candidate for acceptance. In order to realize this we will (a) adjust the scope of Bonjour’s standards—consistency, inferential density, and explanatory power, and (b) complement them by the requirement of a programmatic character. In this way we allow for the evaluation of the “potential coherence” of the given epistemic system.

}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-014-0476-4}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {Strasser2014, title = {Heuristic Reevaluation of the Bacterial Hypothesis of Peptic Ulcer Disease in the 1950s}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, year = {2014}, pages = {429{\textendash}454}, abstract = {

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) focused on two rivaling hypothesis: the “acidity” and the “bacterial” one. The latter was dismissed during the 1950s only to be revived with Warren’s and Marshall’s discovery of Helicobacter pylori in the 1980s. In this paper we investigate why the bacterial hypothesis was abandoned in the 1950s, and whether there were good epistemic reasons for its dismissal. Of special interest for our research question is Palmer’s 1954 large-scale study, which challenged the bacterial hypothesis with serious counter-evidence, and which by many scholars is considered as the shifting point in the research on PUD. However, we show that: 1. The perceived refutatory impact of Palmer’s study was disproportionate to its methodological rigor. This undermines its perceived status as a crucial experiment against the bacterial hypothesis. 2. In view of this and other considerations we argue that the bacterial hypothesis was worthy of pursuit in the 1950s.

}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152319, title = {Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {12}, year = {2013}, pages = {2195{\textendash}2217}, abstract = {

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung{\textquoteright}s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9964-y}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {Seselja2013, title = {Concerning Peter Vickers{\textquoteright} Recent Treatment of {\textquoteright}Paraconsistencitis{\textquoteright}}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, year = {2013}, pages = {325{\textendash}340}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {3152328, title = {Kuhn and the question of pursuit worthiness}, journal = {Topoi - An International review of philosophy}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}19}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn{\textquoteright}s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn{\textquoteright}s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.

}, issn = {0167-7411}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9144-9}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {2079125, title = {Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit?}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, year = {2012}, pages = {147{\textendash}159}, abstract = {

The revolution in geology, initiated with Alfred Wegener’s theory of continental drift, has been the subject of many philosophical discussions aiming at resolving the problem of rationality underlying this historical episode. Even though the debate included analyses in terms of scientific methodology, applications of concrete accounts of epistemic justification to this case study have been rare. In particular, the question as to whether Wegener’s theory was epistemically worthy of pursuit in the first half of the twentieth century, that is, in its early development, remained open or inadequately addressed. The aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this question. The evaluation of Drift will be done by means of an account of theory evaluation suitable for the context of pursuit, developed in \&\#353;e\&\#353;elja and Stra\&\#223;er (accepted for publication). We will argue that pursuing the theory of continental drift was rational, i.e., that it was irrational to reject its pursuit as unworthy

}, issn = {0039-3681}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.11.005}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Weber, Erik} } @article {2999523, title = {The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {51{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @phdthesis {PhD_Dunja, title = {Epistemic Evaluation in the Context of Pursuit and in the Argumentative Approach to Methodology}, year = {2011}, month = {September 22}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @article {1101225, title = {Towards the proof-theoretic unification of {D}ung{\textquoteright}s argumentation framework: an adaptive logic approach}, journal = {Journal of logic and computation}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, year = {2011}, pages = {133{\textendash}156}, abstract = {

The article presents a unifying adaptive logic framework for abstract argumentation. It consists of a core system for abstract argumentation and various adaptive logics based on it. These logics represent in an accurate sense all standard extensions defined within Dung{\textquoteright}s abstract argumentation system with respect to sceptical and credulous acceptance. The models of our logics correspond exactly to specific extensions of given argument systems. Additionally, the dynamics of adaptive proofs mirror the argumentative reasoning of a rational agent. In particular, the presented logics allow for external dynamics, i.e. they are able to deal with the arrival of new arguments and are therefore apt to model open-ended argumentations by providing provisional conclusions.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exq015}, author = {Stra{\ss}er, Christian and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja} } @incollection {944198, title = {How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?}, booktitle = {On Kuhn{\textquoteright}s Philosophy and its Legacy}, volume = {8}, year = {2010}, pages = {251{\textendash}282}, publisher = {CFCUL}, address = {Lisbon}, abstract = {

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such {\textquotedblleft}explanatory concepts{\textquotedblright} of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions {\textendash} Kuhn{\textquoteright}s, Thagard{\textquoteright}s, Chen{\textquoteright}s and Barker{\textquoteright}s, and Laudan{\textquoteright}s {\textendash} and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.

}, isbn = {978-989-8247-12-4}, author = {Weber, Erik and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja}, editor = {Torres, Juan Manuel} } @article {1078347, title = {Kuhn and coherentist epistemology}, journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {322{\textendash}327}, abstract = {

The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhn’s philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanen’s first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhn’s view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) ‘the weak notion of rationality’, and that Kuukkanen’s argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhn’s argument against it is not ‘ultimately empirical’, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.003}, author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} }