@incollection {3258356, title = {{\textquoteright}Argumentandi modus huius scientiae maxim{\`e} proprius: {\textquoteright} {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s mechanics and the question of mathematical principles}, booktitle = {Guidobaldo del {M}onte (1545-1607) : theory and practice of the mathematical disciplines from {U}rbino to {E}urope}, year = {2013}, pages = {9{\textendash}34}, publisher = {Edition Open Access}, isbn = {9783844242836}, url = {http://www.edition-open-access.de/media/proceedings/4/Proceedings4.pdf}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Becchi, Antonio and Bertoloni Meli, Domenico and Gamba, Enrico} } @article {3063631, title = {Rationally evaluating inconsistent theories}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {83{\textendash}99}, abstract = {

What happens if one applies the "evaluation methodology" of The Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the "problem solving methodology" of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers{\textquoteright} methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan{\textquoteright}s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutins to these problems.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {1043033, title = {From the second unknown to the symbolic equation}, booktitle = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {57{\textendash}102}, publisher = {College Publications}, abstract = {

The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of- ten pointed at Francois Vi{\`e}te as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like to emphasize the foundations on which Vi{\`e}te could base his logistica speciosa. The period between Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae of 1539 and Gosselin’s De arte magna of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build- ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the so-called “second unknown” or the Regula quantitates steered the development of an adequate symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur- ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate from previous notions of what we call “co-equal polynomials”.

}, isbn = {978-1-84890-017-2}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @book {1042976, title = {Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early Modern Mathematics}, series = {Studies in Logic}, volume = {26}, year = {2010}, pages = {302}, publisher = {College Publications}, organization = {College Publications}, abstract = {

This book presents a selection of peer-reviewed papers which were presented on a conference organized in Ghent, Belgium, from 27 till 29 August, 2009. The conference was given the title Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in Early modern Science and Mathematics (PASR). For this book we selected papers which deal with the consequences for mathematics in particular, hence the omission of {\textquoteleft}science{\textquoteright} in the title of this book. Another selection, dealing with the understanding of nature and a broader range of topics, will appear in the journal Foundations of Science. The conference was sponsored by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and Ghent University, which indirectly made this book possible. We also have to thank the other members of the programme committee Marco Panza, Chikara Sasaki, and Erik Weber and our keynote speakers Jens H{\o}yrup, Doug Jesseph, Eberhard Knobloch, Marco Panza, Mathias Schemmel and Michel Serfati. Five of their papers are included in this volume. Most of the papers benefited from valuable and sometimes substantive comments by our referees which must remain anonymous. Special thanks to Michael Barany who assisted in the editorial process.

}, isbn = {978-1-84890-017-2}, editor = {Heeffer, Albrecht and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {1019750, title = {Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {76}, number = {5}, year = {2009}, pages = {389{\textendash}400}, abstract = {

I show why Michael Friedman{\textquoteright}s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain a way to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman{\textquoteright}s own terms.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {818474, title = {On the epistemological foundations of the law of the lever}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {315{\textendash}318}, abstract = {

In this paper I challenge Paolo Palmieri’s reading of the Mach-Vailati debate on Archimedes’s proof of the law of the lever. I argue that the actual import of the debate concerns the possible epistemic (as opposed to merely pragmatic) role of mathematical arguments in empirical physics, and that construed in this light Vailati carries the upper hand. This claim is defended by showing that Archimedes’s proof of the law of the lever is not a way of appealing to a non-empirical source of information, but a way of explicating the mathematical structure that can represent the empirical information at our disposal in the most general way.

}, issn = {0039-3681}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.001}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {0003-2638}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {vancausality, title = {Causality and conservation. Elements of the new metaphysics behind the mathematization of nature in the seventeenth century}, year = {2007}, institution = {VUB}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {M:ConEmp, title = {Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination.}, booktitle = {Images of empiricism: Essays on science and stances, with a reply from {B}as van {F}raassen}, year = {2007}, pages = {11{\textendash}31}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, abstract = {

It is argued that, contrary to prevailing opinion, Bas van Fraassen nowhere uses the argument from underdetermination in his argument for constructive empiricism. It is explained that van Fraassen’s use of the notion of empirical equivalence in The Scientific Image has been widely misunderstood. A reconstruction of the main arguments for constructive empiricism is offered, showing how the passages that have been taken to be part of an appeal to the argument from underdetermination should actually be interpreted.

}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten}, editor = {Monton, Bradley} } @phdthesis {PhD_Maarten, title = {An Archaeology of Galileo{\textquoteright}s Science}, year = {2006}, month = {May 15}, publisher = {Ghent University}, type = {phd}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415528, title = {Gravitating towards stability: {G}uidobaldo{\textquoteright}s Aristotelian-Archimedean synthesis}, journal = {History of science}, volume = {44}, number = {146}, year = {2006}, pages = {373{\textendash}407}, issn = {0073-2753}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10929}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415526, title = {The paradox of conceptual novelty and {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s use of experiments}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {72}, number = {5}, year = {2005}, pages = {864{\textendash}875}, abstract = {

Starting with a discussion of what I call ‘Koyr{\'e}’s paradox of conceptual novelty’, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although their view on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way, Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.

}, issn = {0031-8248}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/1854/10928}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {vanweighing, title = {Weighing Falling Bodies. {G}alileo{\textquoteright}s Thought Experiment in the Development of his Dynamical Thinking.}, year = {2005}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @article {324230, title = {The roles of one thought experiment in interpreting quantum mechanics: {W}erner {H}eisenberg meets {T}homas {K}uhn}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {72}, year = {2003}, pages = {79{\textendash}103}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten} } @incollection {JLMDa:abd, title = {Ampliative Adaptive Logics and the Foundation of Logic-Based Approaches to Abduction}, booktitle = {Logical and Computational Aspects of Model-Based Reasoning}, year = {2002}, pages = {39{\textendash}71}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {

In this paper, we propose a reconstruction of logic-based approaches to abductive reasoning in terms of ampliative adaptive logics. The advantages of this reconstruction are important: the resulting logics have a proper theory (that leads to justified conclusions even for undecidable fragments), they nicely integrate deductive and abductive steps, and they are much closer to natural reasoning than the existing systems.
We present two new adaptive logics for abduction, CP1 and CP2. CP1 enables one to generate explanations for novel facts from a consistent theory. CP2 moreover enables one to abduce explanatory hypotheses for novel facts and for anomalous facts from a possibly inconsistent theory. We illustrate both logics with some examples from the history of the sciences (the discovery of Uranus and of Neptune), and present some alternatives to CP1 and CP2 that are better suited for non-creative forms of abductive reasoning and for practical reasoning.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Verhoeven, Liza and Van Dyck, Maarten and Provijn, Dagmar} } @article {152661, title = {Unification and explanation - {A} comment on {H}alonen and {H}intikka, and {S}churz.}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, year = {2002}, pages = {145{\textendash}154}, abstract = {

In this article we criticize two recent articles that examine the relation between explanation and unification. Halonen and Hintikka (1999), on the one hand, claim that no unification is explanation. Schurz (1999), on the other hand, claims that all explanation is unification. We give counterexamples to both claims. We propose a pluralistic approach to the problem: explanation sometimes consists in unification, but in other cases different kinds of explanation (e.g., causal explanation) are required; and none of these kinds is more fundamental.

}, issn = {0039-7857}, doi = {10.1023/A:1015005529380}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {EM:cle, title = {Adaptive Logic and Covering Law Explanations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {44}, number = {173-175}, year = {2001}, pages = {237{\textendash}254}, abstract = {

In his theory of explanation Hempel introduced two basic types of covering law explanations for particular events: deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical. In this article we argue that there is more than one reason why adaptive logics provide the right tools for analyzing the argument patterns involved in these covering law explanations. To this end we claim that in the case of inconsistent knowledge systems, neither classical logic, nor a paraconsistent logic suffice to capture the right class of permissible arguments that can make up a deductive-nomological explanation, whereas an adaptive logic gives just the right results. The arguments behind inductive-statistical explanations face the well-known problem of inductive ambiguities, which Hempel tried to solve by his requirement of maximal specifity. We show how this requirement can be nicely incorporated in a logic for these arguments, again using an adaptive logic (which we describe in some detail).

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} }