@book {3259615, title = {Scientific explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {93}, publisher = {Springer}, organization = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is u sed as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give argume nts for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosoph ers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a cl ever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify wha t this approach consists in and defend it.

}, isbn = {9789400764453}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {1098767, title = {{\textquoteright}Since heaven has not yet destroyed this culture, what can the men of {K}uang do to me?{\textquoteright}: cosmological confucianism and the development of science}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {82}, year = {2008}, pages = {27{\textendash}53}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Dessein, Bart}, editor = {Weber, Erik} } @article {386236, title = {Social mechanisms, causal inference, and the policy relevance of social science}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, year = {2007}, pages = {348{\textendash}359}, abstract = {

The paper has two aims. First, to show that we need social mechanisms to establish the policy relevance of causal claims, even if it is possible to build a good argument for those claims without knowledge of mechanisms. Second, to show that although social scientists can, in principle, do without social mechanisms when they argue for causal claims, in reality scientific practice contexts where they do not need mechanisms are very rare.

}, issn = {0048-3931}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {LeE:ssce, title = {Searching for Singular Causal Explanations: a formal analysis}, year = {2003}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {152660, title = {Symposium on Explanation and Social Ontology 3: Can We Dispense with Structural Explanations of Social Facts?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, year = {2002}, pages = {259{\textendash}275}, abstract = {

Some social scientists and philosophers (e.g., James Coleman and Jon Elster) claim that all social facts are best explained by means of a micro-explanation. They defend a micro-reductionism in the social sciences: to explain is to provide a mechanism on the individual level. The first aim of this paper is to challenge this view and defend the view that it has to be substituted for an explanatory pluralism with two components: (1) structural explanations of P-, O- and T-contrasts between social facts are more efficient than the competing micro-explanations; and (2) whether a plain social fact (as opposed to a contrast) is best explained in a micro-explanation or a structural explanation depends on the explanatory interest. The second aim of the paper is to show how this explanatory pluralism is compatible with ontological individualism. This paper is motivated by our conviction that explanatory pluralism as defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit is on the right track, but must be further elaborated. We want to supplement their contribution, by (1) introducing the difference between explanations of facts and explanations of contrasts; (2) giving examples from the social sciences, instead of mainly from the natural sciences or common sense knowledge; and (3) emphasizing the pragmatic relevance of explanations on different levels –social, psychological, biological, etc. – which is insufficiently done by Jackson and Pettit.

}, issn = {0266-2671}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @article {135139, title = {Scientific revolutions, rationality and creativity}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {64}, year = {1999}, pages = {109{\textendash}128}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {267462, title = {Scientific explanation and the interrogative model of inquiry}, booktitle = {Knowledge and inquiry : essays on Jaakko Hintikka{\textquoteright}s epistemology and philosophy of science}, series = {Poznan Studies}, volume = {51}, year = {1997}, pages = {239{\textendash}259}, publisher = {Rodopi}, isbn = {9789042000803}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Sintonen, M} } @article {257909, title = {Some problems for {K}itcher{\textquoteright}s unification account of explanation}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {29}, year = {1996}, pages = {441{\textendash}456}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {Weber1995, title = {Scientific Arguments and Scientific Prediction.}, booktitle = {Special Fields and Cases. Proceedings on the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation}, volume = {IV}, year = {1995}, pages = {377-387}, publisher = {SicSat}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Van Eemeren, F. H. and Grootendorst, R. and Blair, J. and Willart, C.} } @article {241629, title = {Socialisatie, sociale controle en sociologische verklaringen van menselijke handelingen.}, journal = {TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN}, volume = {38}, year = {1994}, pages = {61{\textendash}68}, issn = {0040-7615}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {Weber1992, title = {Scientific Explanation}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {49}, year = {1992}, pages = {148{\textendash}154}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {3063666, title = {Scientific explanation, necessity and contingency}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA (GENT)}, volume = {44}, year = {1989}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} }