@article {3086510, title = {Plausibility versus richness in mechanistic models}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {139{\textendash}152}, abstract = {

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver{\textquoteright}s continuum of how-possibly, to how-plausibly, to how-actually models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism{\textquoteright}s activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models.

}, issn = {0951-5089}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.633693}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {drouet2009probabilistic, title = {Probabilistic Analyses and the Humean Conception of the Relationship between Levels of Causality}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2008}, year = {2009}, pages = {68{\textendash}72}, publisher = {Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, address = {Brussel}, author = {Drouet, Isabelle}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {431737, title = {The practical value of spurious correlations: selective versus manipulative policy}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {298{\textendash}303}, issn = {0003-2638}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00756.x}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik and Van Dyck, Maarten} } @article {415578, title = {A pragmatist defense of non-relativistic explanatory pluralism in history and social science.}, journal = {History and theory}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, year = {2008}, month = {May}, pages = {168{\textendash}182}, abstract = {

Explanatory pluralism has been defended by several philosophers of history and social science, recently, for example, by Tor Egil Forland in this journal. In this article, we provide a better argument for explanatory pluralism, based on the pragmatist idea of epistemic interests. Second, we show that there are three quite different senses in which one can be an explanatory pluralist: one can be a pluralist about questions, a pluralist about answers to questions, and a pluralist about both. We defend the last position. Finally, our third aim is to argue that pluralism should not be equated with "anything goes": we will argue for non-relativistic explanatory pluralism. This pluralism will be illustrated by examples from history and social science in which different forms of explanation (for example, structural, functional, and intentional explanations) are discussed, and the fruitfulness of our framework for understanding explanatory pluralism is shown.

}, issn = {0018-2656}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00445.x}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {689055, title = {Protagoras en het kennistheoretisch relativisme}, booktitle = {Us and Them. Essays over filosofie, politiek, religie en cultuur van de Antieke Oudheid tot Islam in Europa ter ere van {H}erman {D}e {L}ey}, year = {2008}, pages = {181{\textendash}192}, publisher = {Academia Press}, address = {Gent}, isbn = {9789038212791}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Praet, Danny} } @conference {1895032, title = {A pragmatist approach to the plurality of explanations in international relations theory}, booktitle = {6th Pan-European conference on international relations, Proceedings}, year = {2007}, publisher = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, organization = {The Standing Group of International Relations of the ECPR}, abstract = {

One of the main problems scientists {\textendash}physicists and political scientists alike- face, is the problem of the plurality of explanations. Graham Allison{\textquoteright}s classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent example of problem-focused research and an intriguing instance of this problem in International Relations Theory. He leaves us with three versions of the events, which raised more questions than Allison could apparently answer: instructions for concerted action or discrimination between his {\textquoteleft}conceptual models{\textquoteright} remain very sketchy. This paper aims to show that replacing Allison{\textquoteright}s use of Hempel{\textquoteright}s (then fashionable but now rather outdated) covering-law model of explanation with a pragmatist account of explanation offers a way to break the deadlock Allison was faced with. In particular, we will show that a specification of the epistemic interests of the explainer enables us to narrow down the number of available explanations.

}, url = {http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/De\%20Langhe-SGIR\%20Rogier\%20De\%20Langhe\%20-\%20Erik\%20Weber\%20-\%20Jeroen\%20Van\%20Bouwel.pdf}, author = {De Langhe, Rogier and Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {weber2001pragmatic, title = {A Pragmatic Approach to the Explanation of Actions}, booktitle = {Social Science Methodology in the New Millenium}, series = {Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Logic and Methodology}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Leske \& Budrich}, address = {Keulen}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht}, editor = {Blasius, J{\"o}rg and Hox, J. and de Leeuw, E. and Schmidt, P.} } @article {276844, title = {The practical function and epistemology of causal beliefs}, journal = {Communication \& Cognition : Monographies}, volume = {31}, year = {1998}, pages = {297{\textendash}324}, abstract = {

Distinguant trois fonctions pratiques de la croyance causale : l{\textquoteright}affirmation de buts, la r{\'e}solution des probl{\`e}mes li{\'e}s {\`a} l{\textquoteright}action et la construction des probl{\`e}mes de d{\'e}cision, l{\textquoteright}A. montre que le premier implique {\`a} lui seul cinq conceptions diff{\`e}rentes de la croyance causale concernant : 1) les mouvements du corps; 2) les interactions causales; 3) la capacit{\'e} de certains objets {\`a} pr{\`e}server certaines caract{\'e}ristiques; 4) la causation structurale; 5) les influences causales permanentes. L{\textquoteright}A. cherche une m{\'e}thode {\`e}pist{\'e}mologique fiable (Salmon, Mackie) pour v{\'e}rifier et justifier la connaissance causale que nous pouvons avoir de ces cinq versions de la croyance causale

}, issn = {0378-0880}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {135140, title = {Prudential Arguments in the Realism Debate.}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {41}, number = {164}, year = {1998}, pages = {301{\textendash}312}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {241631, title = {Phenomenological Laws and their Application to Scientific Epistemic Explanation Problems}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {33}, number = {129-130}, year = {1990}, pages = {175{\textendash}189}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} }