@incollection {weber2013study, title = {How to Study Scientific Explanation?}, booktitle = {Scientific Explanation}, year = {2013}, pages = {25{\textendash}37}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

This paper investigates the working-method of three important philosophers of explanation: Carl Hempel, Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon. We argue that they do three things: (i) construct an explication in the sense of Carnap, which then is used as a tool to make (ii) descriptive and (iii) normative claims about the explanatory practice of scientists. We also show that they did well with respect to (i), but that they failed to give arguments for their descriptive and normative claims. We think it is the responsibility of current philosophers of explanation to go on where Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon failed. However, we should go on in a clever way. We call this clever way the “pragmatic approach to scientific explanation.” We clarify what this approach consists in and defend it.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {3145156, title = {Het debat tussen {\textquoteright}groene spellers{\textquoteright} en {\textquoteright}witte spellers{\textquoteright} ge{\"e}valueerd vanuit een sociaal-epistemologische invalshoek}, journal = {Ethiek \& Maatschappij}, volume = {14}, number = {4}, year = {2012}, pages = {61{\textendash}78}, abstract = {

In the Netherlands and Flanders, a debate on the Dutch spelling has been raging between, on the one hand, the ‘green spellers’, who follow the official ‘green spelling’, and, on the other hand, the protesting ‘white spellers’, who espouse an alternative spelling. In the present article, this debate will be approached from a socio-epistemological perspective. Using the theory of Helen Longino, we highlight how the debate between the parties has been conducted, and explain why it failed to become a fruitful debate, based on a critical discourse and by which both parties strive for objective knowledge. We also draw a few lessons for the future.

}, issn = {1373-0975}, author = {Martens, Liesbeth and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {2094355, title = {Het doel van wetenschap: is er een derde weg tussen onbeperkt intentioneel realisme en strikt pragmatisme?}, booktitle = {Door Denken en Doen. Essays bij het Werk van {R}onald {C}ommers}, year = {2012}, pages = {243{\textendash}253}, publisher = {Academia Press}, abstract = {

Ik onderscheid drie posities met betrekking tot het doel van wetenschap: onbeperkt intentioneel realisme, strikt pragmatisme en gesofistikeerd pragmatisme. Ik argumenteer dat er geen echt verschil is tussen gesofisticeerd pragmatisme en onbeperkt intentioneel realisme: ze komen beide neer op "anything goes." Dit betekent dat gesofistikeerd pragmatisme niet de gulden middenweg is die het op het eerste zicht lijkt te zijn.

}, isbn = {9789038219431}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Claes, Tom} } @incollection {944198, title = {How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?}, booktitle = {On Kuhn{\textquoteright}s Philosophy and its Legacy}, volume = {8}, year = {2010}, pages = {251{\textendash}282}, publisher = {CFCUL}, address = {Lisbon}, abstract = {

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such {\textquotedblleft}explanatory concepts{\textquotedblright} of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions {\textendash} Kuhn{\textquoteright}s, Thagard{\textquoteright}s, Chen{\textquoteright}s and Barker{\textquoteright}s, and Laudan{\textquoteright}s {\textendash} and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept.

}, isbn = {978-989-8247-12-4}, author = {Weber, Erik and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja}, editor = {Torres, Juan Manuel} } @article {924908, title = {How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {23}, year = {2009}, pages = {277{\textendash}-295}, abstract = {

In a recent paper in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere=s theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences B on which Russo and Williamson focus B and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells and Humphreys) and show that they cannot account for the use of mechanistic evidence. I argue that these theories are also inferior to Giere{\textquoteright}s theory in other respects.

}, issn = {0269-8595}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {241634, title = {Het construeren van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, booktitle = {Gehelen en fragmenten. De vele gezichten van de filosofie}, year = {1993}, pages = {261-265}, publisher = {Universitaire Pers}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Raymaekers, Bart} }