@article {4443818, title = {Function ascription and explanation: elaborating an explanatory utility desideratum for ascriptions of technical functions}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {79}, number = {6}, year = {2014}, month = {February}, pages = {1367{\textendash}1389}, abstract = {

Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to $\phi$;?, (iii) how does artifact x realize its capacity to $\phi$;? We argue that while function ascriptions serve a mere heuristic role in the first context, they have substantial explanatory leverage in the second and third context. In addition, we assess the relevance of function ascriptions in the context of engineering redesign. Here, function ascriptions also play a relevant role: (iv) they enable normative statements of the sort that component b functions better than component a. We unpack these claims by considering philosophical theories of technical functions, in particular the ICE theory, and engineering work on function ascription and explanation. We close the paper by relating our analysis to current debates on the explanatory power of mechanistic vis-{\`a}-vis functional explanations.

}, doi = {10.1007/s10670-014-9605-1}, author = {van Eck, Dingmar and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {J:flash, title = {A Formal Logic for the Abduction of Singular Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation}, year = {2011}, pages = {93{\textendash}108}, publisher = {Springer}, address = {Dordrecht}, author = {Meheus, Joke}, editor = {Dieks, Dennis and Gonzalez, Wenceslao J. and Hartmann, Stephan and Uebel, Thomas and Weber, Erik} } @article {334983, title = {Forms of causal explanation}, journal = {Foundations of science}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, year = {2005}, pages = {437{\textendash}454}, issn = {1233-1821}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {386239, title = {The Functions of Intentional Explanations of Actions}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {33}, year = {2005}, pages = {1{\textendash}16}, abstract = {

This paper deals with the "functions of intentional explanations" of actions (IEAs), i.e., explanations that refer to intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) of the agent. IEAs can have different formats. We consider these different formats to be instruments that enable the explainer to capture different kinds of information. We pick out two specific formats, i.e. "contrastive" and "descriptive", which will enable us to discuss the functions of IEAs. In many cases the explanation is contrastive, i.e. it makes use of one or more contrasts between real intentional states and ideal intentional states (ideal from the point of view of the explainer). In many other cases IEAs have a descriptive (covering-law) format. The aim of this paper is to analyze the functions the two kinds of explanations can have. We will show that certain functions are better served by one rather than the other format. This leads to pluralism with respect to formats. We argue that both formats are necessary and that their functions are complementary.

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Weber, Erik and Vanderbeeken, Robrecht} } @article {EDa:diag, title = {A Formal Analysis of Diagnosis and Diagnostic Reasoning}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {42}, number = {165-166}, year = {1999}, pages = {161{\textendash}180}, abstract = {

Diagnostic reasoning may relate to an established fault in a system or in an individual.
With respect to systems, three types of diagnosis are distinguishable: non-explanatory, weak explanatory and strong explanatory. The latter are defined, illustrated and their respective functions are described. The reasoning process for the construction of non-explanatory diagnoses is analysed and we propose two adaptive logics that are adequate tools for modelling this kind of diagnostic reasoning. We also discuss (weak and strong) explanatory diagnostic reasoning and show that it can be divided in three stages. The modelling of each stage requires a different adaptive logic.
With respect to individuals, we show that non-explanatory diagnoses do not occur. The earlier findings for explanatory diagnostic reasoning may be adopted.

}, author = {Weber, Erik and Provijn, Dagmar} }