@incollection {5673678, title = {Data-driven induction in scientific discovery: a critical assessment based on Kepler{\textquoteright}s discoveries}, booktitle = {Logic, reasoning, and rationality}, year = {2014}, pages = {59{\textendash}76}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Motivated by the renewed interest in knowledge discovery from data (KDD) by the artificial intelligence community, this paper provides a critical assessment of the model of data-driven induction for scientific discovery. The most influential research program using this model is developed by the BACON team. Two of the main claims by this research program, the descriptive and constructive power of data-driven induction, are evaluated by means of two historical cases studies: the discovery of the sine law of refraction in optics and Kepler{\textquoteright}s third law of planetary motion. I will provide evidence that the data used by the BACON program{\textendash}-despite the claims being made{\textendash}-does not correspond with the historical data available to Kepler and his contemporaries. Secondly, it is shown that for the two cases the method by which the general law was arrived at did not involve data-driven induction. Finally, the value of the data-driven induction as a general model for scientific discovery is being questioned.

}, isbn = {9789401790109}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9011-6\_4}, author = {Heeffer, Albrecht}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Wouters, Dietlinde and Meheus, Joke} } @article {924965, title = {The debate between causal realism and causal constructivism: metaphilosophical reflections}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {81}, year = {2008}, pages = {59{\textendash}71}, abstract = {

In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First, I argue that the debate, if it is couched in the general terms as it is traditionally done, rests on a false dilemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {446322, title = {De-ontologizing the debate on social explanations: a pragmatic approach based on epistemic interests.}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, year = {2008}, pages = {423{\textendash}442}, abstract = {

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences-refining the conceptual tools of social scientists-and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology.

}, issn = {0163-8548}, author = {Van Bouwel, Jeroen and Weber, Erik} } @article {152619, title = {Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.}, journal = {Behavior and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, year = {2002}, pages = {43{\textendash}59}, abstract = {

If dispositions are conceived as properties of systems that refer to possiblecausal relations, dispositions can be used in singular causal explanations. By means of these dispositional explanations, we can explain behavior B of a system x by (i) referring toa situation of type S that triggered B, given that x has a disposition D to do B in S, or (ii) byreferring to a disposition D of x to do B in S, given that x is in a situation of type S.Dispositional explanations are adequate and indispensable explanations: they can explain behavior B without explicitly referring to the underlying causal basis in x that constitutes adisposition to do B. Radical Behaviorist explanations are a sort of dispositionalexplanations, but the dispositional model is not restricted to these explanations. Thedispositional model is compatible with, or can be applied to, several research programs

}, issn = {1053-8348}, author = {Vanderbeeken, Robrecht and Weber, Erik} } @article {257908, title = {Default Reasoning in the Correction of Falsified System Descriptions}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {37}, number = {145}, year = {1996}, pages = {13{\textendash}22}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @incollection {219925, title = {De verklarende kracht van statistische hypothesen}, booktitle = {Acta Filosofiedag 1990}, year = {1992}, pages = {53-56}, publisher = {Ebduron}, address = {Delft}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Commers, Ronald} } @article {4172217, title = {De asymmetrie van wetenschappelijke verklaringen}, journal = {Algemeen nederlands tijdschrijft voor wijsbegeerte}, volume = {81}, year = {1989}, pages = {47{\textendash}58}, issn = {0002-5275}, author = {Weber, Erik} }