@article {1997, title = {Contrastive Causation in Genetics and Physics}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {90}, year = {2015}, pages = {93-113}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Bal, Inge} } @article {3182109, title = {Causaliteit en de methodestrijd: naar een ge{\"\i}ntegreerd gebruik van kwalitatief en kwantitatief onderzoek in een praktisch geori{\"e}nteerde criminologie}, journal = {Panopticon}, volume = {34}, year = {2013}, pages = {115{\textendash}133}, abstract = {

In this article, we re-examine an old problem in criminology i.e the "battle of the methods". Even though the battle has become less explicit recently, it does have a contemporary named the incompatibility thesis in the field of mixed methods research in the social sciences. We look at this incompatibility thesis from the point of view of the philosophy of science, more precisely by discussing different forms of causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality. Subsequently, comparative causality, process theories of causality and mechanistic causality are discussed. We argue that qualitative and quantitative methods each pursue a specific kind of knowledge, but that a functional integration of both is desirable. We conclude by referring to two main advantages of such integration, viz. the manipulation of causal relationships and extrapolation of research results in time and space.

}, issn = {0771-1409}, author = {Heylen, Ben and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {2020639, title = {Can economics become a purely experimental science? {A} comparative study}, booktitle = {Worldviews, science and us : bridging knowledge and its implications for our perspectives on the world}, year = {2012}, publisher = {World Scientific Publishing Company}, abstract = {

The role of experiments in economics is increasing. This paper deals with a philosophical question that is raised by this evolution: can economics become a purely experimental science? I answer this question by comparing economics with a branch of biomedical science.

}, isbn = {9789814383073}, url = {http://www.worldscibooks.com/general/8341.html}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Aerts, Diederik and Broekaert, Jan and D{\textquoteright}Hooghe, Bart and Note, Nicole} } @article {2977907, title = {Causality and explanation in the sciences}, journal = {Theoria - revista de teoria historia y fundamentos de la ciencia}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, year = {2012}, pages = {133{\textendash}136}, abstract = {

Editors{\textquoteright} introduction to the special issue on the Causality and Explanation in the Sciences conference, held at the University of Ghent in September 2011.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, author = {Leuridan, Bert and Weber, Erik} } @article {2985552, title = {Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {84}, year = {2012}, pages = {123{\textendash}148}, abstract = {

In a paper "Causation in Context" (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies{\textquoteright} arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {1855775, title = {The covering law model applied to dynamical cognitive science: a comment on Joel Walmsley}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, year = {2011}, pages = {33{\textendash}39}, abstract = {

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim{\textquoteright}s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley{\textquoteright}s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not.

}, issn = {0924-6495}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-010-9216-9}, author = {Gervais, Raoul and Weber, Erik} } @article {weber2010causal, title = {Causal Methodology. A Comment on Nancy Cartwright{\textquoteright}s Hunting Causes and Using Them}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {70}, number = {2}, year = {2010}, pages = {318{\textendash}325}, doi = {10.1093/analys/anp045}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {924987, title = {Causation, unification and the adequacy of explanations of facts}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {301{\textendash}320}, abstract = {

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. Wesley Salmon, for instance, distinguished two types of explanation: causal explanations (which provide insight in the causes of the fact we want to explain) and unification explanations (which fit the explanandum into a unified world view). The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact relation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

}, issn = {0495-4548}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.698}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @conference {674351, title = {"Clear Moon, Frost soon". An introduction to the Study of Meteorological Practices in the Low Countries (1550-1850)}, booktitle = {Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium. Proceedings of the Young Researcher Days 2008}, year = {2009}, publisher = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, organization = {{Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgi{\"e}}, isbn = {9789065690432}, author = {Pieters, Eva}, editor = {Weber, Erik and Libert, Thierry and Marage, Pierre and Vanpaemel, Geert} } @article {924897, title = {Conceptual analysis of causation and theoretical utility in everyday contexts}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {52}, number = {206}, year = {2009}, pages = {177{\textendash}190}, abstract = {

In this paper we elaborate Ned Hall{\textquoteright}s theoretical utility perspective for causation in everyday contexts. We do this by presenting some instances of it, thereby adding some flesh to the skeleton that Hall has provided. Our elaboration of the theoretical utility perspective also provides arguments for it: the instances we present show the fruitfulness of the approach. A question raised by Hall{\textquoteright}s proposal is: should we give up descriptive analysis of causation (and descriptive analysis in general) completely? We argue that, at least for causation, traditional descriptive conceptual analysis must be given up. However, we also argue that a more modest variant of descriptive conceptual analysis can be useful.

}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {427052, title = {Confusion and bad arguments in the conceptual analysis of causation}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, year = {2008}, pages = {81{\textendash}99}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {De Vreese, Leen and Weber, Erik} } @article {386240, title = {The Concept of Causation in {N}ewton{\textquoteright}s Mechanical and Optical Work}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {16}, year = {2007}, pages = {265{\textendash}288}, abstract = {

In this essay the authors explore the nature of efficient causal explanation in Newton’s Principia and The Opticks. It is argued that: (1) In the dynamical explanations of the Principia, Newton treats the phenomena under study as cases of Hall’s second kind of atypical cau- sation. The underlying concept of causation is therefore a purely in- terventionist one. (2) In the descriptions of his optical experiments, Newton treats the phe- nomena under study as cases of Hall’s typical causation. The underly- ing concept of causation is therefore a mixed interventionist/mechani- cist one.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Ducheyne, Steffen and Weber, Erik} } @incollection {371044, title = {Conceptual tools for causal analysis in the social sciences.}, booktitle = {Causality and probability in the sciences}, year = {2007}, pages = {197{\textendash}213}, publisher = {College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {1904987354}, author = {Weber, Erik}, editor = {Russo, Federica and Williamson, Jon} } @article {ELe:scurvy, title = {The Causes and Cures of Scurvy. {H}ow Modern was {J}ames {L}ind{\textquoteright}s Methodology?}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {55{\textendash}67}, author = {Weber, Erik and De Vreese, Leen} } @article {334981, title = {Coping with inconsistencies: {E}xamples from the social sciences}, journal = {Logic and logical philosophy}, volume = {14}, year = {2005}, pages = {89{\textendash}101}, abstract = {

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.

}, issn = {1425-3305}, author = {Weber, Erik and Van Bouwel, Jeroen} } @incollection {324232, title = {Cassirer{\textquoteright}s critical idealism: a comment on {T}homas {M}ormann.}, booktitle = {Laws and Models in Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {161{\textendash}171}, publisher = {King{\textquoteright}s College Publications}, address = {London}, isbn = {0954300661}, author = {Van Dyck, Maarten and Weber, Erik}, editor = {Gillies, D.} } @article {weber1996comment, title = {Comment construit-on une explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique?}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, year = {1996}, pages = {183{\textendash}204}, abstract = {

Comment devons-nous appliquer notre savoir scientifique (lois de la nature, th{\'e}ries, etc.) pour qu{\textquoteright}il contribue {\`a} mieux comprendre les ph{\'e}nom{\`e}nes ({\'e}v{\'e}nements particuliers, regularit{\'e}, etc.) que nous observons? Le mod{\`e}le d{\'e}ductif-nomologique d{\textquoteright}explication scientifique, dans lequel Carl Hempel construit le concept d{\textquoteright}explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique, ne procure pas une r{\'e}ponse compl{\`e}te {\`a} cette question. Un des probl{\`e}mes est que Hempel nous dit ce que nous devons construire quand nous voulons comprendre un ph{\'e}om{\`e}ne (une explication d{\'e}ductive-nomologique), mais ne nous dit pas comment une explication de ce type est construite. Afin de r{\'e}oudre ce probl{\`e}me, une m{\'e}thode pour construire des explications d{\'e}ductives-nomologiques est d{\'e}velopp{\'e}e.

}, author = {Weber, Erik} } @article {4164554, title = {A causal approach to explanations}, journal = {Logique et analyse}, volume = {30}, number = {117-118}, year = {1987}, pages = {51{\textendash}68}, issn = {0024-5836}, author = {Weber, Erik} }