@article {3152435, title = {Reactive standard deontic logic}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, year = {2013}, pages = {117{\textendash}157}, abstract = {

We introduce a reactive variant of SDL (standard deontic logic): SDLR1 (reactive standard deontic logic). Given a Kripkean view on the semantics of SDL in terms of directed graphs where arrows {\textrightarrow} represent the accessibility relation between worlds, reactive models add two elements: arrows {\textrightarrow} are labelled as ‘active’ or ‘inactive’, and double arrows \&8608; connect arrows, e.g. (x1 {\textrightarrow} x2) \&\#8608; (x3 {\textrightarrow} x4). The idea is that passing through x1 {\textrightarrow} x2 activates a switch represented by \&8608; that inverts the label of x3 {\textrightarrow} x4 and hence activates respectively deactivates this arrow. This allows to introduce two modalities: \&\#9633; is the usual KD-modality of SDL and operates on the Kripkean graph where all labels and double arrows are ignored, while \&\#8709; takes them into account. We demonstrate that RSDL1 allows for an intuitive interpretation of ‘ought’. The logic can handle contrary-to-duty cases such as several instantiations of the Chisholm set in a paradox-free way by means of using double arrows and annotations to block and give access to ideal worlds.

}, issn = {0955-792X}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exs043}, author = {Gabbay, Dov M. and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} } @article {2999523, title = {The rationality of scientific reasoning in the context of pursuit: drawing appropriate distinctions}, journal = {PHILOSOPHICA}, volume = {86}, year = {2012}, pages = {51{\textendash}82}, abstract = {

The aim of this paper is to disambiguate between different notions of pursuit worthiness regarding scientific inquiries. To this end we propose a unifying pattern of pursuit worthiness: “It is rational for Y to pursue X if and only if pursuing X is conducive of the set of goals Z.” By showing in which ways variables X, Y, and Z can be changed, we present different notions of pursuit and pursuit worthiness. With respect to variable X, we distinguish the pursuit of scientific theories, epistemic objects, and technological developments. With respect to variable Z, we distinguish between epistemic and practical pursuit worthiness. Finally, with respect to variable Y, we distinguish between individual and communal pursuit worthiness. By means of these distinctions we are able to explicate some of the major ambiguities underlying the concept of pursuit of pursuit worthiness, as well as to shed light on some confusions in philosophical literature that have resulted from their neglect.

}, issn = {0379-8402}, author = {Kosolosky, Laszlo and {\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian} }