@article {3152328,
	title = {Kuhn and the question of pursuit worthiness},
	journal = {Topoi - An International review of philosophy},
	volume = {32},
	number = {1},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {9{\textendash}19},
	abstract = {<p>The aim of this paper is, on the one hand, to critically investigate Kuhn{\textquoteright}s stance on the assessment of the pursuit worthiness of scientific theories, and, on the other hand, to show the actuality of some of Kuhn{\textquoteright}s points on this issue, in view of their critical analysis. To this end we show that Kuhn presents certain tools, which may help scientists to overcome communication breakdowns when engaging in the process of rational deliberation regarding the question whether a theory is worthy of further pursuit. These tools are persuasion, translation and interpretation. However, we argue that the perspective of epistemic semantic monism present in Kuhn{\textquoteright}s work obstructs the full applicability of these tools. We show that dropping this perspective makes the notions of persuasion and interpretation more fruitful, and moreover, allows for a pluralism of scientific theories and practices that complements the pluralism based on disagreement among scientists, emphasized by Kuhn.</p>},
	issn = {0167-7411},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9144-9},
	author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}
}
@article {1078347,
	title = {Kuhn and coherentist epistemology},
	journal = {Studies in history and philosophy of science},
	volume = {40},
	number = {3},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {322{\textendash}327},
	abstract = {<p>The paper challenges a recent attempt by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen to show that since Thomas Kuhns philosophical standpoint can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology, it does not necessarily lead to: (Thesis 1) an abandonment of rationality and rational interparadigm theory comparison, nor to (Thesis 2) an abandonment of convergent realism. Leaving aside the interpretation of Kuhn as a coherentist, we will show that Kuukkanens first thesis is not sufficiently explicated, while the second one entirely fails. With regard to Thesis 1, we argue that Kuhns view on inter-paradigm theory comparison allows only for (what we shall dub as) the weak notion of rationality, and that Kuukkanens argument is thus acceptable only in view of such a notion. With regard to Thesis 2, we show that even if we interpret Kuhn as a coherentist, his philosophical standpoint cannot be seen as compatible with convergent realism since Kuhns argument against it is not ultimately empirical, as Kuukkanen takes it to be.</p>},
	issn = {0039-3681},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.06.003},
	author = {{\v S}e{\v s}elja, Dunja and Stra{\ss}er, Christian}
}
