@article {D:TelAviv2012, title = {Spoiled for Choice?}, journal = {Journal of Logic and Computation}, volume = {26}, year = {2016}, pages = {65-95}, abstract = {

The transition from a theory that turned out trivial to a consistent replacement need not proceed in terms of inconsistencies, which are negation gluts. Logics that tolerate gluts or gaps (or both) with respect to any logical symbol may serve as the lower limit for adaptive logics that assign a minimally abnormal consequence set to a given premise set. The same obtains for logics that tolerate a combination of kinds of gluts and gaps. This result runs counter to the obsession with inconsistency that classical logicians and paraconsistent logicians share.
All such basic logics will be systematically reviewed, some variants will be outlined, and the claim will be argued for. While those logics tolerate gluts and gaps with respect to logical symbols, ambiguity logic tolerates ambiguities in non-logical symbols. Moreover, forms of tolerance may be combined, with zero logic as an extreme.\{\.I}n the baffling plethora of corrective adaptive logics (roads from trivial theories to consistent replacements), adaptive zero logic turns out theoretically interesting as well as practically useful. On the one hand all meaning becomes contingent, depending on the premise set. On the other hand, precisely adaptive zero logic provides one with an excellent analyzing instrument. For example it enables one to figure out which corrective adaptive logics lead, for a specific trivial theory, to a suitable and interesting minimally abnormal consequence set.

}, doi = { 10.1093/logcom/ext019}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:AcLFI, title = {Some Adaptive Contributions to Logics of Formal Inconsistency}, booktitle = {New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2015}, pages = {309 -333}, publisher = {Springer}, abstract = {

Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {B{\'e}ziau, Jean-Yves and Chakraborty, Mihir and Dutta, Soma} } @article {DJDaL:diag, title = {Some Adaptive Logics for Diagnosis}, journal = {Logic and Logical Philosophy}, volume = {11/12}, year = {2003}, pages = {39{\textendash}65}, abstract = {

A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of premises and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from \cite{EDa:diag} and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke and Provijn, Dagmar and Verhoeven, Liza} } @article {D:RMs, title = {A Strengthening of the {R}escher{\textendash}{M}anor Consequence Relations}, journal = {Logique et Analyse}, volume = {46}, number = {183{\textendash}184}, year = {2003}, pages = {289{\textendash}313}, abstract = {

The flat Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations{\textendash}-the Free, Strong, Weak, C-Based, and Argued consequence relation{\textendash}-are defined in terms of the classical consequences of the maximal consistent subsets of (possibly) inconsistent sets of premises. If the premises are inconsistent, the Free, Strong and C-Based consequence sets are consistent and the Argued consequence set avoids explicit inconsistencies (such as A and \ A).

The five consequence relations may be applied to discussive situations as intended by Jaskowski{\textendash}-the comparison with Jaskowski{\textquoteright}s D2 is instructive. The method followed by Joke Meheus to extend D2 to an adaptive logic, may also be applied to the Rescher{\textendash}Manor consequence relations. It leads to an extension of the Free, Strong, Weak, and C-Based consequence relations. The extended consequence sets are consistent and closed under Classical Logic. Applying the method to the Argued consequence relation leads to a different consequence relation, not an extension. Neither the Argued consequence relation nor its extension appear very interesting in the present application context.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:scaial, title = {Some Computational Aspects of Inconsistency-Adaptive logics}, journal = {CLE e-Prints}, volume = {2}, number = {7}, year = {2002}, pages = {15~pp.}, abstract = {

This paper concerns a goal directed proof procedure for the propo- sitional fragment of the adaptive logic ACLuN1. The procedure forms an algorithm for final derivability and may easily be generalized for the propositional fragment of all at adaptive logics. The aim is to articulate a procedure that, if extended to the predicative level, provides criteria for final derivability.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:camp, title = {On some Remarkable Relations between Paraconsistent Logics, Modal Logics, and Ambiguity Logics}, booktitle = {Paraconsistency. {T}he Logical Way to the Inconsistent}, year = {2002}, pages = {275{\textendash}293}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, address = {New York}, abstract = {

This paper concerns some connections between paraconsistent logics, modal logics (mainly S5), and Ambiguity Logic AL (Classical Logic applied to a language in which all letters are indexed and in which quantifiers over such indices are present). S5 may be defined from AL.

Three kinds of connections are illustrated. First, a paraconsistent logic A is presented that has the same expressive power as S5. Next, I consider the definition of paraconsistent logics from S5 and AL. Such definition is shown to work for some logics, for example Priest{\textquoteright}s LP. Other paraconsistent logics appear to withstand such definition, typically those that contain a detachable material implication. Finally, I show that some paraconsistent logics and inconsistency-adaptive logics serve exactly the same purpose as some modal logics and ampliative adaptive logics based on S5. However, they serve this purpose along very different roads and the logics cannot be defined from one another.

The paper intends to open lines of research rather than pursuing them to the end. It also contains a poor person{\textquoteright}s semantics for S5 as well as a description of the simple but useful and powerful AL.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Carnielli, Walter A. and Coniglio, Marcelo E. and Loffredo D{\textquoteright}Ottaviano, Itala M.} } @article {DJ:tabl2, title = {Shortcuts and Dynamic Marking in the Tableau Method for Adaptive logics}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {69}, year = {2001}, pages = {221{\textendash}248}, abstract = {

Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In \cite{DJ:tabl1}, we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we first describe these methods (without repeating the meta-theoretic proofs). Next, we present several ways to increase the efficiency of the methods. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision{\textendash}-the conclusion follows or does not follow{\textendash}-in a very economical way.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik and Meheus, Joke} } @incollection {D:surv-ial, title = {A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic}, year = {2000}, pages = {49{\textendash}73}, publisher = {Research Studies Press}, address = {Baldock, UK}, abstract = {

This paper offers a systematic review of some central philosophical and technical results on adaptive logics. Quite a few of the results are still in print or forthcoming.

}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Batens, Diderik and Mortensen, Chris and Priest, Graham and Van Bendegem, Jean Paul} } @article {JD:steering, title = {Steering Problem Solving Between Cliff Incoherence and Cliff Solitude}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {58}, year = {1996}, note = {Appeared 1998}, pages = {153{\textendash}187}, abstract = {

Starting from Nickles{\textquoteright} constraint-inclusion model, we present five challenges that any rational problem solving model should meet, but that seem to lead to an inextricable riddle. We then introduce the contextual model and show, step by step, that it meets all the challenges and resolves the riddle. This results in a strong argument for the concept of rationality that underlies the model.

}, author = {Meheus, Joke and Batens, Diderik} } @incollection {D:sks, title = {The structure of our knowledge system}, booktitle = {Communication and Cognition. {A}pplied Epistemology}, year = {1987}, pages = {101}, publisher = {Communication and Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Vandamme, Fernand} } @incollection {D:rssm\&l, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, booktitle = {Reason, Emotion and Music. {T}owards a Common Structure for Arts, Sciences and Philosophies, Based on a Conceptual Framework for the Description of Music}, year = {1986}, note = {

Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}

}, pages = {127{\textendash}143}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik}, editor = {Apostel, Leo and Sabbe, Herman and Vandamme, Fernand} } @article {D:rssm\&lcc, title = {Some remarks on the structural similarity between music and logic}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {19}, year = {1986}, note = {Reprint of \cite{D:rssm\&lcc}}, pages = {135{\textendash}151}, publisher = {Communication \& Cognition}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:expert, title = {Static and dynamic paraconsistent logics and their use in expert systems}, journal = {CC-AI}, volume = {3}, year = {1986}, pages = {33{\textendash}50}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:scloa, title = {Some contributions to the logic of action}, journal = {Communication and Cognition}, volume = {9}, year = {1976}, pages = {347{\textendash}376}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:srrs\&v, title = {Some remarks on the relations between science and values}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {17}, year = {1976}, pages = {13{\textendash}46}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @book {D:studies, title = {Studies in the Logic of Induction and in the Logic of Explanation. {C}ontaining a New Theory of Meaning Relations}, series = {Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, Rijksuniversiteit Gent}, volume = {161}, year = {1975}, publisher = {De Tempel}, organization = {De Tempel}, address = {Brugge}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:KLrir, title = {Some objections to {K}eith {L}ehrer{\textquoteright}s rule {IR}}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {22}, year = {1971}, pages = {357{\textendash}362}, author = {Batens, Diderik} } @article {D:cpd, title = {Some proposals for the solution of the {C}arnap-{P}opper discussion on {\textquoteleft}inductive logic{\textquoteright}}, journal = {Studia Philosophica Gandensia}, volume = {6}, year = {1968}, pages = {5{\textendash}25}, author = {Batens, Diderik} }